Editing Operation Uranus (section)

==Background==
On 28 June 1942, the [[Wehrmacht]] began its offensive against Soviet forces opposite of [[Army Group South]], codenamed [[Case Blue]].<ref>{{harvnb|McCarthy|Syron|2002|p=131}}</ref> After breaking through Red Army forces by 13 July, German forces encircled and captured the city of [[Rostov-on-Don|Rostov]].<ref>{{harvnb|Glantz|House|1995|p=119}}</ref> Following the fall of Rostov, Hitler split German forces operating in the southern extremity of the southern Russian SFSR in an effort to simultaneously capture the city of [[Volgograd|Stalingrad]] and the [[Battle of the Caucasus|Caucasus oil fields]].<ref>{{harvnb|Glantz|House|1995|p=120}}</ref> The responsibility to take Stalingrad was given to the [[6th Army (Wehrmacht)|Sixth Army]], which immediately turned towards the [[Volga River]] and began its advance with heavy air support from the ''[[Luftwaffe]]''{{'}}s ''[[Luftflotte 4]]''.<ref>{{harvnb|McCarthy|Syron|2002|pp=135–136}}</ref> On 7 August, two German panzer [[corps]] were able to flank and encircle a Soviet force of 50,000 personnel and approximately 1,000 tanks, and on 22 August German forces began to cross the Don River to complete the advance towards the Volga.<ref>{{harvnb|McCarthy|Syron|2002|p=136}}</ref> The following day, the [[Battle of Stalingrad]] began when vanguards of the Sixth Army penetrated the suburbs of the city.<ref>{{harvnb|Cooper|1978|p=422}}</ref>

By November the Sixth Army had occupied most of Stalingrad, pushing the defending Red Army to the banks of the Volga River.<ref>{{harvnb|Clark|1965|p=239}}</ref> By this stage, there were indications of an impending Soviet offensive which would target Wehrmacht forces around the city, including increased Soviet activity opposite the Sixth Army's flanks, and information gained through the interrogation of Soviet prisoners.<ref>{{harvnb|Clark|1965|p=241}}</ref> The German command remained focused upon finalizing its capture of Stalingrad<ref>{{harvnb|Clark|1965|p=242}}</ref> and were unsure of where or when the counterattack would take place. Actions were taken to provide a reserve behind the Italian and Romanian armies, with [[6th Panzer Division]] and two additional infantry divisions ordered to Russia from France. However, this move would only be completed by December.<ref>{{harvnb|Glantz|2009|p=643}}</ref> Head of [[Oberkommando des Heeres|Army General Staff]] General [[Franz Halder]] had been dismissed in September after his efforts to warn about the danger which was developing along the over-extended flanks of the Sixth Army and the [[4th Panzer Army|Fourth Panzer Army]].<ref>{{harvnb|McCarthy|Syron|2002|pp=137–138}}</ref> As early as September the Soviet ''[[Stavka]]'' (high command) began planning a series of counteroffensives to encompass the destruction of German forces in the south, fighting in Stalingrad and in the Caucasus, and against Army Group Center.<ref>{{harvnb|Glantz|1999|p=17}}</ref> Ultimately, command of Soviet efforts to relieve Stalingrad was put under the leadership of General [[Aleksandr Vasilevsky]].<ref>{{harvnb|Glantz|1999|p=18}}</ref>

The ''Stavka'' developed two major operations to be conducted against Axis forces near Stalingrad, ''Uranus'' and [[Operation Little Saturn|''Saturn'']], and also planned for [[Operation Mars]], designed to engage German Army Group Center in an effort to distract reinforcements and to inflict as much damage as possible.<ref>{{harvnb|Glantz|House|1995|pp=129–130}}</ref> Operation Uranus involved the use of large Soviet mechanized and infantry forces to encircle German and other Axis forces directly around Stalingrad.<ref>{{harvnb|Glantz|House|1995|p=130}}</ref> As preparations for the offensive commenced, the attack's starting points were positioned on stretches of front to the rear of the German Sixth Army, largely preventing the Germans from reinforcing those sectors quickly where [[Axis powers|Axis]] units were too overstretched to occupy effectively.<ref>{{harvnb|Beevor|1998|pp=225–226}}</ref> The offensive was a [[Pincer movement|double envelopment]]; Soviet mechanized forces would penetrate deep into the German rear, while another attack would be made closer to the German Sixth Army in an effort to attack German units there directly in the rear.<ref>{{harvnb|Beevor|1998|p=226}}</ref> While the Red Army prepared, the German high commanders—influenced by their belief that the Red Army, building up opposite German Army Group Center to the north, was incapable of mounting a simultaneous offensive in the south—continued to deny the possibility of an impending Soviet offensive.<ref name="McTaggart20064950">{{harvnb|McTaggart|2006|pp=49–50}}</ref>