Open main menu
Home
Random
Recent changes
Special pages
Community portal
Preferences
About Wikipedia
Disclaimers
Incubator escapee wiki
Search
User menu
Talk
Dark mode
Contributions
Create account
Log in
Editing
Practical reason
(section)
Warning:
You are not logged in. Your IP address will be publicly visible if you make any edits. If you
log in
or
create an account
, your edits will be attributed to your username, along with other benefits.
Anti-spam check. Do
not
fill this in!
==Overview== Practical reason is understood by most philosophers as determining a plan of action. [[Thomism|Thomistic]] ethics defines the first principle of practical reason as "good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided."<ref>[http://www.newadvent.org/summa/2094.htm#article2 ''Summa Theologiæ'', I-IIª q. 94 a. 2].</ref> For [[Immanuel Kant|Kant]], practical reason has a law-abiding quality because the [[categorical imperative]] is understood to be binding one to one's duty rather than subjective preferences. [[Utilitarianism|Utilitarians]] tend to see reason as an instrument for the satisfactions of wants and needs. In classical philosophical terms, it is very important to distinguish three domains of human activity: theoretical reason, which investigates the truth of [[Contingency (philosophy)|contingent]] events as well as [[Logical truth|necessary truths]]; practical reason, which determines whether a prospective course of action is worth pursuing; and productive or technical reason, which attempts to find the best means for a given end. [[Aristotle]] viewed philosophical activity as the highest activity of the human being and gave pride of place to [[metaphysics]] or wisdom. Since [[René Descartes|Descartes]] practical judgment and reasoning have been treated with less respect because of the demand for greater certainty and an infallible method to justify beliefs.
Edit summary
(Briefly describe your changes)
By publishing changes, you agree to the
Terms of Use
, and you irrevocably agree to release your contribution under the
CC BY-SA 4.0 License
and the
GFDL
. You agree that a hyperlink or URL is sufficient attribution under the Creative Commons license.
Cancel
Editing help
(opens in new window)