Editing Principle of double effect (section)

==Intentional harm vis-à-vis side effects==
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The principle of double effect is based on the idea that there is a morally relevant difference between an "intended" consequence of an act and one that is foreseen by the actor but not calculated to achieve their motive. This distinction becomes clear when comparing different types of military actions, such as those of a tactical bomber versus a terror bomber. A tactical bomber engages in strikes on enemy military targets, knowing that some civilian casualties are a foreseen but unintended consequence. However, their intention is the military objective. In contrast, a terror bomber deliberately targets civilians to induce fear and achieve political objectives, making the harm to civilians the means to an end. While civilian casualties occur in both cases, the tactical bomber’s intention is not to cause harm, and the action itself is aimed at a legitimate military goal. Because advocates of double effect propose that consequentially similar acts can be morally different, double effect is most often criticized by [[consequentialism|consequentialists]] who consider the consequences of actions entirely determinative of the action's morality.

In their use of the distinction between intent and foresight without intent, advocates of double effect make three arguments. First, that intent differs from foresight, even in cases in which one foresees an effect as inevitable. Second, that one can apply the distinction to specific sets of cases found in military ethics (terror bombing/strategic bombing), medical ethics (craniotomy/hysterectomy), and social ethics (euthanasia). Third, that the distinction has moral relevance, importance, or significance.

A common application of the principle is in the use of opioids to treat pain, but which also hasten someone’s death, when treating imminently terminal patients.<ref>{{cite web | url=https://www.bbc.co.uk/ethics/euthanasia/overview/doubleeffect.shtml | title=BBC - Ethics - Euthanasia: The doctrine of double effect }}</ref>

The doctrine consists of four conditions that must be satisfied before an act is morally permissible:

# The ''nature-of-the-act condition.'' The action itself must be morally good or, at the very least, morally neutral.
# The ''right-intention condition.'' The intention must be the achieving of only the good effect, with the bad effect being only an unintended side effect. All reasonable measures to avoid or mitigate the bad effect must be taken.
# The ''concurrence condition.''  The good effect must be caused by the action at least '''as''' immediately (in terms of causality, not—necessarily—temporally) as the bad effect.  It is impermissible to attempt to bring about an indirect good with a direct evil.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Catholic University of America |url=https://search.worldcat.org/title/New-Catholic-encyclopedia/oclc/367202 |title=New Catholic Encyclopedia |publisher=[[McGraw Hill Education|McGraw-Hill]] |year=1967 |isbn=978-0-07-010235-4 |editor-last= |edition=1st |volume=4 |location=New York |pages=1021 |language=en |oclc=367202 |archive-url=https://archive.org/details/newcatholicencyc04cath |archive-date=2011-03-21 |url-status=live}}</ref>
#::''Also formulated as:''
#:* The ''means-end condition.'' The bad effect must not be the means by which one achieves the good effect. Good ends do not justify evil means.<ref>Mark Timmons, ''Moral Theory: An Introduction'' (Rowman & Littlefield 2003 {{ISBN|978-0-8476-9768-7}}), p. 80</ref>{{NoteTag|It is debated whether these formulations are equivalent, or whether one or the other suffers from difficulty in distinguishing when something is the ''means'' by which a good is achieved, and when merely a foreseen-but-undesired ''side-effect;'' see '''4.2''', "The Problem of Closeness", in <ref name="McIntyre" />.}}
# The ''proportionality condition.'' There must be a proportionately grave reason for permitting the evil effect.