Editing Queen Elizabeth-class battleship (section)

==Background and design==
[[File:Queen Elizabeth class diagrams Brasseys 1923.jpg|thumb|left|300px|Right plan and elevation drawing from [[Brassey's Naval Annual]] 1923; the shaded areas represent the ships' armour plating]]
The early design history of the ''Queen Elizabeth'' class is not well known because not many records have survived in the files of the [[Admiral (United Kingdom)|Admiralty]]. When [[Winston Churchill]] became [[First Lord of the Admiralty]] in October 1911, the ships of the 1911–1912 Naval Programme, the four {{sclass|Iron Duke|battleship|2}}s and the battlecruiser {{HMS|Tiger|1913|6}} were being ordered and preliminary design work had begun on the new class of battleships scheduled for the 1912–1913 Naval Programme. Each class received its own alphabetical designation with the ''Iron Duke''s being MIV, the fourth major iteration of Design M. Presumably the improved 1912–1913 ships were Design N, but no details of it have been found in Admiralty records. The letter O was not used during this time. Naval historian [[Norman Friedman]] believes that Design P was a slow ship armed with ten {{convert|15|in|adj=on|0}} guns based on a passing reference in the official history of naval construction during the First World War that such a ship was a precursor to the ''Queen Elizabeth''s.<ref>Friedman 2015, pp. 134–135 and footnote 5</ref>

Churchill and the retired [[First Sea Lord]], [[John Fisher, 1st Baron Fisher|Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fisher]] corresponded at length during this time with Fisher advocating for a fast (probably {{convert|28|kn|adj=on|lk=in}}) ship armed with eight guns and nearly as well armoured as a battleship, something that he sometimes called a "super-Lion", referring to the battlecruiser {{HMS|Lion|1910|6}}. Friedman believes that the [[Director of Naval Construction]] (DNC), Sir [[Philip Watts (naval architect)|Philip Watts]], designated Fisher's concept as Design Q with a slower version being the ''Queen Elizabeth'' class as Design R. "The destruction of papers may thus have concealed the reality that instead of being a spectacular advance on previous battleships, the ''Queen Elizabeth''s were a slow version of a ship which Fisher and probably Churchill badly wanted. Much of the fragmentary evidence for the fast ship is to be found in Fisher's letters to Churchill."<ref>Friedman 2015, pp. 134–135 and footnote 7</ref>

The tactical mission of these ships is portrayed as being fast enough to manoeuvre to catch the head of the enemy's [[battleline]] and concentrate fire against it,<ref>Burt 2012b, p. 277</ref> but they were actually intended to prevent the German battlecruisers, which were more heavily armoured than their British equivalents, from doing the same to the British fleet. A memo from Churchill to [[Rear-Admiral (Royal Navy)|Rear-Admiral]] [[Gordon Moore (Royal Navy officer)|Gordon Moore]], [[Controller of the Navy (Royal Navy)|Third Sea Lord]], on 27 October 1912, stated "the speed and power of the ''Queen Elizabeth''s...is sufficient to protect the battle fleet against any turning movement by German battlecruisers.<ref>Friedman 2014, p. 190 and footnote 5</ref>

Influenced by Fisher, Churchill ordered development of the 42-[[caliber (artillery)|calibre]] [[BL 15-inch Mk I naval gun|BL 15-inch Mk I gun]] using the codename "14inch Experimental" in January 1912. This was a risky decision as development of new heavy guns and their [[gun turret|turrets]] was normally a multi-year project, and a failure would seriously delay the completion of the ships. The first gun turret was successfully tested on 6 May 1914, likely much to the relief of the Admiralty.<ref name="Friedman 2015, p. 135">Friedman 2015, p. 135</ref>

The Admiralty decided on the design of the ''Queen Elizabeth''s on 15 June 1912, with the decision on whether they would solely use [[fuel oil]] deferred to a subsequent meeting. That meeting must have happened very shortly afterwards because the design that received the Board's stamp the following day was oil-fueled. The design had not been optimised to burn oil instead of coal and the fuel tanks had different requirements than the coal bunkers previously planned. [[Eustace Tennyson d'Eyncourt]], the DNC who followed Watts, estimated that the change so late in the design process cost some {{convert|300|LT|lk=on}} that could have been put to better use. To guarantee a supply of oil in wartime, Churchill negotiated the [[Anglo-Persian Oil Company#Creation of APOC|Anglo-Persian Oil Convention]].<ref>Friedman 2015, pp. 136–137</ref>

Fisher also believed that the 1912–1913 ships should all be battlecruisers instead of the usual mix of three battleships and a battlecruiser. Churchill initially agreed with him, but was persuaded to go back to the original plan, much to Fisher's fury.<ref name="Friedman 2015, p. 135"/> Given the speed of the new ships, envisaged as {{convert|25|kn}}, it was decided that the battlecruiser would not be needed and a fourth battleship would be built instead. When the [[Federation of Malay States]] offered to fund a further capital ship, the Admiralty decided to add a fifth unit to the class, {{HMS|Malaya}}.<ref name=raven17/>

In some respects, the ships did not quite fulfil their extremely demanding requirement. They were seriously overweight, as a result of which the draught was excessive and they were unable to reach the planned top speed of 25&nbsp;knots. In the event, the combination of oil fuel and more boilers provided for a service speed of about {{convert|24|kn}}, still a useful improvement on the traditional battle line speed of {{convert|21|kn}} and just fast enough to be thought of as the first [[fast battleship]]s.<ref name=greger101>Greger, p. 101</ref> After Jutland Admiral [[John Jellicoe, 1st Earl Jellicoe|John Jellicoe]] was persuaded that the slowest ship of this class was good only for about {{convert|23|kn}}, he concluded that, since this should be considered as the speed of the squadron, it would not be safe to risk them in operations away from the main battlefleet.