Editing RAF Bomber Command (section)

==Background==
At the time of the formation of Bomber Command in 1936, [[Giulio Douhet]]'s slogan "[[the bomber will always get through]]" was popular, and figures like [[Stanley Baldwin]] cited it. Until advances in [[radar]] technology in the late 1930s, this statement was effectively true. Attacking bombers could not be detected early enough to assemble fighters fast enough to prevent them reaching their targets. Some damage might be done to the bombers by [[Anti-aircraft artillery|anti-aircraft]] (AA) guns, and by fighters as the bombers returned to base, but that was not as effective as a proper defence. Consequently, the early conception of Bomber Command was as an entity that threatened the enemy with utter destruction. The Italian general [[Giulio Douhet]], author of ''The Command of the Air'', was of that view.<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/AVbombertheory.htm |title=History of Aviation - Bomber Theory: Air Power Between Two World Wars |last=Wilkinson |first=Alf |publisher=[[Spartacus Educational|Spartacus School net]] |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070930043934/http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/AVbombertheory.htm |archive-date=30 September 2007 }}</ref>

In 1936, Germany's increasing air power was feared by British government planners who commonly overestimated its size, reach and hitting power. Planners used estimates of up to 72 British deaths per tonne ({{cvt|1|t|lb|disp=output only}}) of bombs dropped, though this figure was grossly exaggerated. As well, the planners did not know that German bombing aircraft of the day (not quite 300 [[Junkers Ju 52]] medium bombers) did not have the range to reach the UK with a load of bombs and return to the mainland. British air officers did nothing to correct these perceptions because they could see the usefulness of having a strong bombing arm.{{sfn|Boyne|2012|p=19–20}}