Editing RAF Coastal Command (section)

==Formation and neglect==
[[File:Joubert de la Ferte.jpg|thumb|upright|Philip Joubert de la Ferté, Coastal Command's second AOC-in-C. Joubert continually complained about the neglect of Coastal Command]]
In 1936, almost 18 years after the end of the First World War, there was a change in the command structure of the RAF. Several [[Expansion Schemes]] were heading at such pace to re-arm the British military in face of the [[Nazi]] threat that "Area" formations were now to be called "Commands". Fighter and Bomber Areas became Fighter and Bomber Commands and Coastal Area was renamed Coastal Command. Its headquarters was located at [[Lee-on-Solent]]. [[Air Marshal]] [[Sir Arthur Longmore]], Air Officer Commanding (AOC) [[RAF Coastal Area]] oversaw the renaming and handed over command to Air Marshal [[Philip Joubert de la Ferté]] on 24 August 1936.<ref>de la Ferté 1960, p. 108, and Hyde 1977, pp. 385–386.</ref>

In March 1935 the threat from Nazi Germany prompted a series of expansion schemes which pushed the number of squadrons up to 163 (as per Expansion Scheme M, the last before the outbreak of war) and the number of aircraft to 2,549. The scheme was never fully implemented, and Scheme F, 124 Squadrons and 1,736 aircraft, was the only scheme that ran its full course. It did produce modern aircraft and it made adequate provision for reserves (75 per cent) but again, the bomber forces received no less than 50 per cent which averaged 57 per cent over all schemes. Maritime air units never made up more than 12 per cent of British air strength. From a pre-expansion strength of just five squadrons, four of which were flying boats, the figure of maritime squadrons rose to 18 by September 1939, with a strength of just 176 aircraft. Some 16 of these were allocated to trade defence but given Trenchard's policy (which was still in place after his retirement) of developing bombers for the maritime arm which could bolster the air offensive, most were not specialised [[anti-submarine warfare]] (ASW) aircraft.<ref>Goulter 1995, p. 76.</ref> The Air Ministry was thoroughly uninterested in any aircraft which fell outside the bomber function.<ref>Goulter 1995, p. 77.</ref><ref>Buckley 1995, p. 101.</ref>

Joubert was highly critical of the Air Ministry's attitude to his service. In 1937 several exercises were carried out by Coastal Command in co-operation with submarines against the [[Home Fleet]] to judge the surface fleet's defence against submarine and air attack. Despite the experiences of the First World War, no attention was paid to the problem of attacking submarines from the air as part of trade protection measures. Owing to misplaced faith in the imperfect [[ASDIC]] invention which was never intended to detect surface-running submarines, it appeared the Royal Navy no longer considered U-boats a threat to Britain's sea lanes. The Air Ministry, keen to concentrate on strategic air forces, did not dispute the Admiralty's conclusions and Coastal Command did not receive any guidance from the Air Ministry. The saving grace for both services was the construction of the Combined Headquarters which enabled rapid collaboration in maritime operations. This was one of the few successes in organisation and preparation made before the outbreak of war.<ref>de la Ferté 1960, p. 109.</ref><ref>Terraine 1989, pp. 176–177.</ref>

When the review of the role Coastal Command was to play in war was assessed in 1937, the AOC [[Sir Frederick Bowhill]] was informed by his Senior Air Staff Officer, Air Commodore [[Geoffrey Bromet]], that the other two commands (Bomber and Fighter) had clear mission objectives while Coastal Command had been given no clear mandate. It was assumed that Coastal Command was to keep sea communications open for merchant shipping and prevent seaborne raids on British coastlines and ports. No mention of U-boats was made by either man. Both apparently assumed aircraft and surface raiders presented the greater threat in British waters, thus following the [[Admiralty (United Kingdom)|Admiralty]] line that U-boats were no longer a threat.<ref>Hendrie 2006, p. 64.</ref> When [[Admiral]] [[Sir Dudley Pound]] enquired about aerial assets in trade and commerce defence, [[Chief of the Air Staff (United Kingdom)|Chief of the Air Staff]] [[Cyril Newall, 1st Baron Newall|Cyril Newall]], replied that there was not enough "[[Fruit preserves|jam]]" [resources] to go around and stated it was more advisable to risk losses on trade routes than weaken the RAF's ability to protect Britain from air attack and bomb its enemies.<ref>Hendrie 2006, pp. 64–65.</ref>

In March 1937, the Director of Operations, [[Group Captain]] [[Robert Saundby]], complained that the role for Coastal Command in war, namely supporting the bomber offensive and second, the support of naval forces along the British coastline, were too limited and was in danger of diverting the Command from its main concern: ASW. In October the Deputy Chief of the [[Air Staff (United Kingdom)|Air Staff]] (DCAS) Air Vice Marshal [[Richard Peirse]] confirmed that there was no formal role for the service or location of its units. Peirse did reverse the decision to have strategic bombing support as the primary function. This was changed to trade defence, Coastal Command was only to be used for other purposes if trade routes were suffering little interference and the intensity of air attack on Britain, or air attacks on enemy targets, required all available air units for those purposes. In December 1937, the Naval and Air Staffs met again and changed the priority to [[North Sea]] reconnaissance. The Naval Staff insisted that surface commerce raiders presented the greatest danger and aircraft could prove decisive only in locating enemy warships.<ref>Goulter 1995, p. 91.</ref> ASW remained in third place, after direct co-operation with surface fleets. In December 1938, this was changed again and ASW moved up to second priority. In August 1939 it was moved to first priority. When Coastal Command went to war, its first task was to co-operate with the Navy to prevent enemy vessels from escaping into the North Sea and Atlantic Oceans. Secondly, it was to provide ASW support where and when it could. These steps are significant as the language indicates a change from passive reconnaissance of enemy warships and submarines to an active directive which involved the attack of the vessels by Coastal Command aircraft.<ref>Goulter 1995, p. 92.</ref>

Since the late 1920s the tension between the air and naval services had declined. It arose briefly again in 1937 when the question of the FAA operational control arose. On this occasion the British Government sided with the Admiralty. Despite a spirited defence of its asset, once the [[Minister for Co-ordination of Defence]], Sir [[Thomas Inskip]] had decided to transfer the arm, the Air Ministry was content to let the matter rest. Any threat to the Air Ministry's existence had long since passed; budgetary constraint and the reluctance to engage in another battle which would waste resources were also factors in the Air Ministry's decision not to contest the issue further. Inter-service squabbling assured maritime aviation's stagnation, especially in shore-based elements. Virtually no co-operation existed in the area of research and development.<ref>Goulter 1995, p. 53.</ref> In the case of Coastal Command, it continued to come third in the Air Ministry's list of priorities, after Fighter and Bomber Commands, well into the late 1930s.<ref>Goulter 1995, p. 57.</ref><ref>Goutler 1995, p. 90.</ref>