Editing Reasonable doubt (section)

==In practice==
Because the defendant is [[Presumption of innocence|presumed innocent]], prosecutors must prove each [[Element (criminal law)|element]] of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt in order to obtain a conviction.<ref>{{cite web |title=Amdt14.S1.5.5.5 Guilt Beyond a Reasonable Doubt |url=https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/essay/amdt14-S1-5-5-5/ALDE_00013763/#ALDF_00028992 |website=Constitution Annotated |publisher=United States Congress |access-date=29 December 2024}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |title=Presumption of Innocence Burden of Proof (in cases with an affirmative defense) Proof Beyond A Reasonable Doubt |url=https://www.nycourts.gov/judges/cji/1-General/CJI2d.Burden_with_Aff._Defense.pdf |website=New York State Unified Court System |access-date=29 December 2024}}</ref> This means the evidence must leave little actual doubt in the mind of the judge or jury that the defendant committed the alleged offense.<ref>{{cite web |title=beyond a reasonable doubt |url=https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/beyond_a_reasonable_doubt |website=Legal Information Institute |publisher=Cornell University |access-date=29 December 2024}}</ref> Unreasonable or purely speculative doubts are excluded, whereas doubts grounded in tangible conflicts within the evidence or its sufficiency warrant an acquittal. In many jurisdictions, the phrase “reasonable doubt” remains purposefully undefined in jury instructions to reduce confusion, although critics argue that the lack of a clear definition may itself cause confusion.<ref name="Pi2020"/> 

Academic literature has identified several possible interpretations of what “reasonable doubt” entails.<ref name="Pi2020"/> One approach focuses on whether a doubt can be ''articulable'', meaning grounded in a coherent reason or an alternative narrative, rather than in vague distrust or pure speculation. Critics note, however, that this risks shifting the burden of proof to the defendant if they must articulate reasons to doubt guilt. Another approach frames the inquiry around whether a “reasonable person” would entertain the doubt. But critics observe that this easily becomes circular: a doubt is “reasonable” if a “reasonable” person would hold it, offering little additional guidance. A third, so-called “probabilistic” approach suggests adopting a numerical threshold (e.g., 90% or 95% certainty). Some scholars contend that such explicit quantification reflects the actual logic behind proof standards and is consistent with longstanding principles about balancing the costs of wrongful convictions and wrongful acquittals.<ref name="Pi2020"/>

Most legal systems avoid placing an explicit numerical figure on “reasonable doubt” and rely instead on jurors’ or judges’ subjective judgment; however, empirical studies show that laypeople vary widely in the probability threshold they associate with “beyond a reasonable doubt.”<ref>Kagehiro, Dorothy K. and W. Clark Staunton, [https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Legal-vs.-quantified-definitions-of-standards-of-Kagehiro-Stanton/d89fec62b534ac38d985307846710fe98c868f5f Legal v. Quantified Definitions of the Standard of Proof], 9 L. Hum. Behav. 159 (1985)</ref><ref>Simon & Mahan, Quantifying Burdens of Proof: A View from the Bench, the Jury, and the Classroom, 5 L. & Soc’y Rev. 319 (1971)</ref> Some scholars have proposed that a probabilistic or numerical approach—e.g., equating “reasonable doubt” to a particular probability threshold—can mitigate these inconsistencies.<ref name="Pi2020">Pi, Daniel, Francesco Parisi, and Barbara Luppi, ''Quantifying Reasonable Doubt,'' 72 Rutgers U. L. Rev. 455 (2020)</ref>