Editing Res extensa (section)

== ''Res extensa'' vs. ''res cogitans'' ==
''Res extensa'' and ''res cogitans'' are mutually exclusive and this makes it possible to conceptualize the complete intellectual independence from the body.<ref name=":0" /> ''Res cogitans'' is also referred to as the soul and is related by thinkers such as [[Aristotle]] in his ''De Anima'' to the indefinite realm of potentiality.<ref name=":2">{{Cite book|title=Probing the Meaning of Quantum Mechanics: Information, Contextuality, Relationalism and EntanglementProceedings of the II International Workshop on Quantum Mechanics and Quantum Information. Physical, Philosophical and Logical Approaches|last1=Aerts|first1=Diederik|last2=Chiara|first2=Maria Luisa Dalla|last3=Ronde|first3=Christian de|last4=Krause|first4=Décio|publisher=World Scientific Publishing|year=2018|isbn=9789813276888|location=New Jersey|pages=134}}</ref> On the other hand, ''res extensa'', are entities described by the principles of logic and are considered in terms of definiteness. Due to the polarity of these two concepts, the natural science focused on ''res extensa''.<ref name=":2" />

In the Cartesian view, the distinction between these two concepts is a methodological necessity driven by a distrust of the senses and the ''res extensa'' as it represents the entire material world.<ref>{{Cite book|title=McLuhan in Space: A Cultural Geography|last=Cavell|first=Richard|publisher=University of Toronto Press|year=2003|isbn=0802036104|location=Toronto|pages=83}}</ref>  The categorical separation of these two, however, caused a problem, which can be demonstrated in this question: How can a wish (a mental event), cause an arm movement (a physical event)?<ref name=":1">{{Cite book|title=Thinking Like a Planet: The Land Ethic and the Earth Ethic|last=Callicott|first=J. Baird|publisher=Oxford University Press|year=2013|isbn=9780199324897|location=New York|pages=189}}</ref> Descartes has not provided any answer to this but [[Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz|Gottfried Leibniz]] proposed that it can be addressed by endowing each geometrical point in the ''res extensa'' with mind.<ref name=":1" /> Each of these points is within ''res extensa'' but they are also dimensionless, making them unextended.<ref name=":1" /> 

In Descartes' substance–attribute–mode ontology, extension is the primary attribute of corporeal substance. He describes a piece of wax in the Second [[Meditations on First Philosophy|Meditation]] (see [[Wax argument]]).  A solid piece of wax has certain sensory qualities. However, when the wax is melted, it loses every single apparent quality it had in its solid form. Still, Descartes recognizes in the melted substance the idea of wax.