Editing Reserve power (section)

==Constitutional monarchies==
In [[constitutional monarchy|monarchies]] with either an [[Uncodified constitution|uncodified]] or partly unwritten constitution (such as the [[United Kingdom]] or [[Canada]]) or a wholly written constitution that consists of a text augmented by additional conventions, traditions, [[letters patent]], etc., the monarch generally possesses reserve powers.

Typically these powers are: to grant [[pardon]]; to dismiss a prime minister; to refuse to [[Dissolution of parliament|dissolve]] [[parliament]]; and to refuse or delay [[royal assent]] to legislation (to ''withhold'' royal assent amounts to a [[veto]] of a bill, while to ''reserve'' royal assent, in effect, amounts to a decision to neither grant nor refuse assent, but to delay taking a decision for an undetermined period). There are usually strict constitutional conventions concerning when these powers may be used, and these conventions are enforced by public pressure. Using these powers in contravention of tradition would generally provoke a [[constitutional crisis]].

Most constitutional monarchies employ a system that includes the principle of [[responsible government]]. In such an order, the reserve powers are thought to be the means by which the monarch and his or her viceregal representatives can legitimately exist as "constitutional guardians" or "umpires", tasked with guaranteeing that Cabinet and parliament adhere to the fundamental constitutional principles of the [[rule of law]] and responsible government itself.<ref>{{cite journal |last=Winterton |first=George |year=1993 |title=Reserve Powers in an Australian Republic |url=https://classic.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/UTasLawRw/1993/15.html |url-status=live |journal=University of Tasmania Law Review |volume=12 |issue=2 |page=252 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20250530101529/https://classic.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/UTasLawRw/1993/15.html |archive-date=2025-05-30 |access-date=}}</ref> Some constitutional scholars, such as [[George Winterton]], have stated that reserve powers are a good thing in that they allow for a head of state to handle an unforeseen crisis<ref name=Winterton252>{{Harvnb| Winterton| 1993| p=252}}</ref> and that the use of convention to limit the use of reserve powers allows for more gradual and subtle constitutional evolution than is possible through formal amendment of a written constitution. Others, such as [[H. V. Evatt|Herbert Evatt]], believe or believed that reserve powers are vestigial and potentially open to abuse.<ref name=Winterton252 /><ref name=Evatt306>{{citation| last=Evatt| first=Herbert| author-link=H. V. Evatt| title=The King and His Dominion Governors| edition=2| location=London| publisher=Frank Cass| year=1967| page=306| isbn=978-0714614717}}</ref> Evatt felt that the reserve powers could be codified and still serve their intended function in a responsible government system,<ref name=Evatt306 /> as they do in Ireland, Japan, and Sweden.<ref name=Winterton252 />

===Belgium===
In Belgium a constitutional provision explicitly states that no act of the monarch is valid without the signature of a member or members of the government, which thereby becomes solely responsible, hence excluding any reserve power for the crown. In legal terminology, a competence vested in 'the King' thus very often means the government, as opposed to formal laws which require a (sometimes qualified) parliamentary majority.

Constitutional precedence has even established the unwritten but binding rule that the Monarch must give assent to any parliamentary decision, regardless of any other considerations (which can only be advanced in private audience with government members, not imposed), as soon as the government presents it for royal signature and thus assumes full political responsibility.

In 1990, when a law liberalising [[Belgium]]'s abortion laws was approved by parliament, King [[Baudouin of Belgium|Baudouin]] [[Baudouin_of_Belgium#Religious_influences|refused]] to give his royal assent, only the second time in Belgium's history the monarch elected to do so. Instead, he requested that the cabinet declare him unable to reign for a day, which it did, thereby assuming the king's constitutional powers. All members of the government then signed the bill, passing it into law. The bicameral legislature approved a proposition that Baudouin was capable of reigning again the next day.

===Commonwealth realms===
Within the [[Dominion]]s, until the 1920s, most reserve powers were exercised by a [[governor-general]] on the advice of either the local or the [[British government]], though the latter took precedence. After the [[Balfour Declaration of 1926|Balfour Declaration]] was produced by the [[1926 Imperial Conference]], formally establishing the autonomy and equal status of Commonwealth governments, governors-general ceased to be advised in any way by the British government. For example, the first [[Governor-General of the Irish Free State]], [[Timothy Michael Healy|Tim Healy]], was instructed by the British Dominions Office in 1922 to withhold the royal assent on any bill passed by the two houses of the [[Oireachtas]] (the Irish parliament) that attempted to change or abolish the [[Oath of Allegiance (Ireland)|Oath of Allegiance]]. However, no such bill was introduced during Healy's period in office. By the time [[Oath of Allegiance (Ireland)#De Valera and abolition|the oath was abolished by the Irish Parliament]] in 1933, the Irish governor-general was formally advised exclusively by the Irish government.

====Australia====
While the reserve power to dismiss a government has not been used in the United Kingdom since 1834, this power has been exercised more recently in Australia, on two occasions:
# On 13 May 1932, when the [[Governor of New South Wales]] [[Philip Game|Sir Philip Game]] [[Lang Dismissal Crisis|dismissed the Government of New South Wales]].
# On 11 November 1975, when the [[Governor-General of Australia]] [[John Kerr (governor-general)|Sir John Kerr]] [[1975 Australian constitutional crisis|dismissed the Commonwealth Government]].

In both cases an election was held very soon afterwards and, again in both cases, the dismissed government was massively defeated by [[Direct election|popular vote]].

In Queensland in 1987, during a tense period of leadership succession, the [[Governor of Queensland]], [[Walter Campbell (judge)|Sir Walter Campbell]], exercised reserve power in declining to follow the advice of the [[Premier of Queensland|Premier]], Sir [[Joh Bjelke-Petersen]].  Campbell initially refused to redistribute ministerial portfolios on the sole advice of the premier, who lacked the confidence of his cabinet.  Subsequently, during a period when Queensland had a "Premier who is not leader" and the governing party had a "Leader who is not Premier",<ref>[[Peter Bowers (Australian journalist)|Peter Bowers]] and Greg Roberts, ‘Ahern leads, but Joh rules’, Sydney Morning Herald, 27 November 1987. Cited in Geoff Barlow & JF Corkery, "Sir Walter Campbell Queensland Governor and his role in Premier Joh Bjelke-Petersen's resignation, 1987", 23. Owen Dixon Society eJournal (Gold Coast, Queensland: Bond University, 2007)</ref> there was speculation on the potential exercise of vice-regal reserve power by Campbell, in dismissing the premier in the absence of a parliamentary [[motion of no confidence]].  Ultimately, Campbell was praised for his handling of the undesirable situation.<ref>Barlow & Corkery "Sir Walter Campbell", 28-29</ref>

These are among several exercises of the reserve powers in Australia in the 20th century at state and federal levels.<ref>[[H. V. Evatt]], ''The King and His Dominion Governors'', 1936; 2nd ed., introduction by [[Zelman Cowen]], 1967; 3rd ed., introduction by [[Eugene Forsey]], in ''Evatt and Forsey on the reserve powers'', ed. by [[George Winterton]], 1990. [[Donald Markwell]], ''The Crown and Australia'', University of London, 1987 - {{cite web |url=http://www.kcl.ac.uk/content/1/c6/01/65/70/DMarkwell.pdf |title=Archived copy |access-date=2009-02-25 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090225161729/http://www.kcl.ac.uk/content/1/c6/01/65/70/DMarkwell.pdf |archive-date=2009-02-25 }}. [[Donald Markwell]], "Griffith, Barton and the early governor-generals: aspects of Australia's constitutional development", ''Public Law Review'', 1999.</ref>

====Canada====
The reserve powers in Canada fall within the [[royal prerogative]] and belong specifically to [[Monarchy of Canada|the monarch]], as the [[Constitution Act, 1867]], vests all executive power in the country's sovereign.<ref>{{cite web |title=Constitution Act, 1867: III. Executive Power |url=https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/const/page-1.html#h-3 |website=Department of Justice Canada: Justice Laws Website |publisher=Government of Canada |access-date=14 May 2023 |language=English |date=29 March 1867}}</ref> King [[George VI]] in 1947 issued [[Letters Patent, 1947|Letters Patent]] permitting the [[Governor General of Canada|governor general]] "to exercise all powers and authorities lawfully belonging to Us [the monarch] in respect of Canada."<ref>{{Cite journal| last=George VI| author-link=George VI| date=1 October 1947| title=Letters Patent Constituting the Office of Governor General of Canada| location=Ottawa| publisher=King's Printer for Canada| url=http://www.solon.org/Constitutions/Canada/English/LettersPatent.html| access-date=29 May 2009}}</ref>

The reserve power of dismissal has never been used in Canada, although other reserve powers have been employed to force the [[Prime Minister of Canada|prime minister]] to resign on two occasions: The first took place in 1896, when the Prime Minister, Sir [[Charles Tupper]], refused to step down after his party did not win a majority in the House of Commons during [[1896 Canadian federal election|that year's election]], leading Governor General [[John Hamilton-Gordon, 1st Marquess of Aberdeen and Temair|the Earl of Aberdeen]] to no longer recognize Tupper as prime minister and disapprove of several appointments Tupper had recommended. On the second occasion, which took place in 1925 and came to be known as the [[King–Byng affair]], Prime Minister [[William Lyon Mackenzie King]], facing a [[Motion of no confidence|non-confidence motion]] in the House of Commons, [[Advice (constitutional)|advised]] the Governor General, [[Julian Byng, 1st Viscount Byng of Vimy|the Viscount Byng of Vimy]], to [[dissolution of parliament|dissolve]] the new parliament, but Byng refused.

At the provincial level, on 29 June 2017 [[Lieutenant Governor]] of [[British Columbia]] [[Judith Guichon]] used her reserve powers to deny the request of Premier [[Christy Clark]] to dissolve the legislature and call a new election only 51 days after the recent provincial election. Clark had advised Guichon to dissolve the legislature as, in her view, the appointment of a Speaker would have resulted in frequent tie votes and an untenable position. Guichon refused this advice and instead asked [[John Horgan]] to form a government, becoming the new premier.<ref name="guichon">{{cite book | last=Twomey | first=Anne |author-link=Anne Twomey (academic) | date=27 April 2018 | title=The Veiled Sceptre: Reserve Powers of Heads of State in Westminster Systems | publisher=[[Cambridge University Press]] | pages=432–433 | isbn=978-1107056787 }}</ref>

No modern governor general has [[Disallowance and reservation in Canada|disallowed]] a bill, though [[Lieutenant Governor (Canada)|provincial lieutenant governors]] have.<ref>"[https://www.assembly.ab.ca/lao/library/lt-gov/bowen.htm The Honourable John C. Bowen, 1937–50] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20081220124432/http://www.assembly.ab.ca/lao/library/lt-gov/bowen.htm |date=2008-12-20 }}". Legislative Assembly of Alberta. Retrieved on 22 April 2007.</ref>

[[Peter Hogg]], a constitutional scholar, has opined that "a system of [[responsible government]] cannot work without a formal head of state who is possessed of certain reserve powers."<ref>{{citation| last=Hogg| first=Peter| author-link=Peter Hogg| title=Constitutional Law of Canada| page=253| publisher=Carswell| location=Toronto| year=1999| isbn=978-0459239251}}</ref> Further, [[Eugene Forsey]] stated "the reserve power is indeed, under our Constitution, an absolutely
essential safeguard of democracy. It takes the place of the legal and judicial safeguards provided in the United States by written Constitutions, enforceable in the courts."<ref>{{citation| last=Forsey| first=Eugene| author-link=Eugene Forsey| title=Freedom and Order| page=48| location=Toronto| publisher=McClelland and Stewart| year=1974| asin=B005JL56TA}}</ref>

====New Zealand====
{{Main|Governor-General of New Zealand}}

New Zealand's early governors, the predecessors of today's [[Governor-General of New Zealand|governors-general]], exercised considerable power, with exclusive authority over some matters such as foreign and [[Māori people|Māori]] affairs. They also had a real choice in selecting premiers – parliaments of the period being composed of independent members who formed loose and shifting factions – and were not always obliged to act on the advice of their ministers. As New Zealand's political system matured, the [[Colonial Office]] increasingly instructed the governors to follow the advice of local ministers, and the powers of the office have continually shrunk. Important remnants of these early powers remain. The governor-general has a number of reserve powers, which may be used on behalf of King [[Charles III]].<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.gg.govt.nz/role/powers.htm|title=The Reserve Powers|publisher=The Governor-General of New Zealand|access-date=9 July 2009}}</ref> Sir [[Kenneth Keith]] describes the use of these powers as based on the principle that "The [[Elizabeth II|Queen]] reigns, but the government rules, so long as it has the support of the House of Representatives".<ref name="cabinet_manual">{{cite web|url=http://www.dpmc.govt.nz/cabinet/manual/intro.html|title=On the Constitution of New Zealand: An Introduction to the Foundations of the Current Form of Government|author=Sir [[Kenneth Keith]]|year=2008|access-date=12 September 2011|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/19991009163331/http://www.dpmc.govt.nz/cabinet/manual/intro.html|archive-date=9 October 1999}}</ref>

The most visible reserve powers are the power to appoint a [[Prime Minister of New Zealand|prime minister]] and the related power to accept a prime minister's resignation. This power is exercised every time a general election results in a change of government, most recently [[2023 New Zealand general election|in 2023]]. It may also be exercised if a prime minister [[motion of no confidence|loses the confidence of Parliament]] and resigns instead of advising a dissolution of Parliament; the last such occasion was [[1911 New Zealand general election|in 1911]]. Finally, it may happen if a Prime Minister is maneuvered out of their position by their own party, retires or resigns for personal reasons, or dies in office. Though the power of appointment is listed among the reserve powers, in fact the governor-general abides by strict conventions, and has always appointed the leader of the dominant faction in the [[New Zealand House of Representatives|House of Representatives]]. The governor-general retains the theoretical power to appoint as prime minister a member of the House of Representatives who clearly does not have the support of a majority of MPs, but no governor-general has sought to use this power since New Zealand gained [[responsible government]], though some cabinets in the 19th century proved extremely short-lived. In earlier times, if a prime minister died, became incapacitated, or resigned unexpectedly, a governor-general might be able to choose a temporary prime minister from among several senior ministers, while the governing party decided on a new leader who would then be duly appointed prime minister. Today, however, the practice of appointing – on prime-ministerial advice – a permanent deputy prime minister, who becomes acting prime minister when needed, has largely removed even this discretion from the governor-general.{{citation needed|date=January 2023}}

The governor-general has a number of other legal powers.<ref name="gg_nz">{{cite web|url=http://gg.govt.nz/role/constofnz/intro|title=On the Constitution of New Zealand: An Introduction to the Foundations of the Current Form of Government|author=Sir [[Kenneth Keith]]|year=2008|access-date=5 April 2014}}</ref> They may dismiss an incumbent prime minister and [[Cabinet of New Zealand|Cabinet]], an individual [[Ministers in the New Zealand Government|minister]], or any other official who holds office "during the [[At His Majesty's pleasure|King's pleasure]]" or "during the Governor-General's pleasure".<ref name="cabinet_manual" /> Conventionally, the governor-general follows the advice of the prime minister or another appropriate minister in matters of appointment and dismissal. Likewise, by convention, the Government as a whole remains in office as long as it keeps the confidence of the House.

The governor-general can also dissolve Parliament and call elections without prime-ministerial advice. Dissolving Parliament and calling for elections is part of the governor-general's normal duties; every parliamentary dissolution and subsequent general election in New Zealand's history has been called by the governor or governor-general. However, all elections since responsible government was introduced, including snap elections, have been requested by the incumbent premier or prime minister, and are accordingly not examples of use of the reserve powers. A prime minister who has lost the confidence of the House will conventionally either advise a [[dissolution of Parliament]] and new elections, or tender their resignation. If a defeated prime minister refuses to do either of these two things, the governor-general could use the reserve powers to either dismiss the prime minister (see above), or dissolve Parliament without the prime minister's advice. Likewise, if the prime minister tenders their resignation, the governor-general could theoretically refuse to accept it, and dissolve Parliament against the Prime Minister's advice.

A governor-general can also refuse a prime minister's request to dissolve Parliament and hold elections. If a prime minister has been defeated by a vote of no confidence, a refusal by the governor-general to dissolve Parliament would, in effect, force the prime minister to resign and make way for a successor. See the [[Lascelles Principles]] for factors which might guide the governor-general in making a decision on whether or not to grant a dissolution in those circumstances. A governor-general could also legally refuse a request for a [[snap election]] from a prime minister in whom the House has confidence, but such a refusal would be extremely unlikely.

The power to withhold royal assent to Bills is controversial. Many constitutional commentators believe that the governor-general (or the [[Monarchy of New Zealand|sovereign]]) no longer has the power to refuse royal assent to any bill properly passed by the House of Representatives – former law professor and Prime Minister Sir [[Geoffrey Palmer (New Zealand politician)|Geoffrey Palmer]] and Professor [[Matthew Palmer]] argue any refusal of royal assent would lead to a constitutional crisis.<ref name="bridled_power">{{cite book|title=Bridled Power: New Zealand's Constitution and Government|isbn=0-19-558463-5|author=Sir [[Geoffrey Palmer (New Zealand politician)|Geoffrey Palmer]] and [[Matthew Palmer]]|publisher=Oxford University Press|year=2004|edition=Fourth}}</ref> Others, such as Professor Philip Joseph, believe the Governor-General does retain the power to refuse royal assent to Bills in exceptional circumstances - such as the abolition of democracy.<ref>{{cite book|title=Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand|isbn=978-0-86472-399-4|author=Philip Joseph|publisher=Brookers|year=2002|edition=Second}}</ref> A similar controversial power is the ability to refuse to make Orders and regulations advised by the Government or by individual Ministers.

There have been a handful of occasions when reserve powers were used, or at least considered.

In the 1890s, Premier [[John Ballance]] advised the Governor to make several new appointments to the (since abolished) [[New Zealand Legislative Council|Legislative Council]]. Two successive Governors, [[William Onslow, 4th Earl of Onslow|the Earl of Onslow]] and [[David Boyle, 7th Earl of Glasgow|the Earl of Glasgow]], refused to make the appointments, until the Colonial Office intervened in Ballance's favour. This incident markedly reduced the discretionary powers of the Governor. Though these remained the same in law for the time being, later Governors and governments considered that there would be far fewer scenarios in which their use would be appropriate.

Almost a century later, in 1984, there was a brief [[1984 New Zealand constitutional crisis|constitutional crisis]]. The outgoing Prime Minister, Sir [[Rob Muldoon]], had just lost an election, but refused to advise the Governor-General, [[David Beattie|Sir David Beattie]], to make urgent regulations desired not only by the incoming Prime Minister, [[David Lange]], but also by many in Muldoon's own party and cabinet. At the time, the option of Beattie dismissing Muldoon and replacing him, without waiting for Muldoon's resignation, was reportedly discussed. Muldoon eventually relented under pressure from his own cabinet, making the use of Beattie's reserve powers unnecessary.

====Saint Kitts and Nevis====
A constitutional crisis occurred in [[Saint Kitts and Nevis]] in 1981, when the [[Governor-General of Saint Kitts and Nevis|governor]], Sir [[Probyn Inniss]], used his reserve powers to refuse assent to a bill passed by the government of Sir [[Kennedy Simmonds]], the country's [[Prime Minister of Saint Kitts and Nevis|premier]]. Inniss believed that the bill was unconstitutional, and would soon be struck down by the [[Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court|West Indies Associated States Supreme Court]]. The situation was resolved when Queen Elizabeth II, at the request of Simmonds, terminated Inniss's commission as governor.<ref>{{cite book |last=Phillips |first=Fred |date=2013 |title= Commonwealth Caribbean Constitutional Law |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=dx-PAgAAQBAJ| page=331|publisher=Routledge |isbn=9781135338053 }}</ref>

====Tuvalu====
{{See also|Tuvaluan constitutional crisis}}
The [[Constitution of Tuvalu]] provides, in article 52, that the [[Governor-General of Tuvalu|Governor-General]] exercises his powers "only in accordance with the advice of (a) the Cabinet; or (b) the Prime Minister [...] except where he is required to act (c) in accordance with the advice of any other person or authority [...] or
(e) in his own deliberate judgment (in which case he shall exercise an independent discretion)".

In 2013, Governor-General Sir [[Iakoba Italeli]] was requested by the Opposition to act without (and indeed against) the Prime Minister's advice. On 28 June, Prime Minister [[Willy Telavi]]'s government had lost [[2013 Nukufetau by-election|a crucial by-election]], which gave the Opposition a majority of one in Parliament. The Opposition immediately called for the government to reconvene Parliament, so that a [[motion of no confidence]] could be introduced, and a new government formed.<ref>[http://www.islandsbusiness.com/news/tuvalu/1636/tuvalus-opposition-waiting-to-hear-from-gg/ "Tuvalu’s Opposition waiting to hear from GG"] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140108011424/http://www.islandsbusiness.com/news/tuvalu/1636/tuvalus-opposition-waiting-to-hear-from-gg/ |date=2014-01-08 }}, ''[[Islands Business]]'', 1 July 2013</ref> Prime Minister Telavi responded that, under the Constitution, he was only required to convene Parliament once a year (for a vote on the budget), and was thus under no obligation to summon it until December.<ref>[http://www.rnzi.com/pages/news.php?op=read&id=77230 "Parliament needs one yearly meeting only says defiant Tuvalu PM"], Radio New Zealand International, 2 July 2013</ref> The Opposition turned to the Governor-General. On 3 July, Italeli exercised his reserve powers in ordering Parliament to convene, against the Prime Minister's wishes, on 30 July.<ref>[http://www.islandsbusiness.com/news/tuvalu/1725/tuvalus-parliament-convenes-july-30/ "Tuvalu’s parliament convenes July 30"] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130921053503/http://www.islandsbusiness.com/news/tuvalu/1725/tuvalus-parliament-convenes-july-30/ |date=2013-09-21 }}, ''Islands Business'', 3 July 2013</ref>

In the end, the Governor-General dismissed the Prime Minister from office.

====United Kingdom====
{{Main|Royal prerogative in the United Kingdom}}

In the UK, the monarch has numerous theoretical ''personal prerogatives'', but beyond the appointment of a prime minister, there are in practice few circumstances in modern British government where these prerogatives could be justifiably exercised;{{citation needed|date=March 2017}} they have rarely been exercised in the last century. In October 2003 the Government made public the following prerogatives but it said at the time that a comprehensive catalogue of prerogative powers could not be supplied:<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2003/oct/21/uk.freedomofinformation|title=Mystery lifted on Queen's powers|first=Clare|last=Dyer|date=21 October 2003|website=the Guardian}}</ref>
* To refuse to dissolve Parliament when requested by the prime minister. This was last reputedly considered in 1910, but [[George V of the United Kingdom|George V]] later changed his mind. Harold Wilson, leading a minority government in 1974, was told that [[Elizabeth II]] might refuse to dissolve Parliament if she could identify an alternative prime minister able to command a cross-party majority.<ref>{{Cite web | url=https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1501749/Papers-reveal-Premiers-dilemma-in-March-1974.html |title = Papers reveal Premier's dilemma in March 1974|date = 2005-10-28}}</ref>  See [[Lascelles Principles]].
* To appoint a prime minister of their own choosing. This was last done in Britain in 1963 when [[Elizabeth II]] appointed [[Sir Alec Douglas-Home]] as prime minister, on the advice of outgoing [[Harold Macmillan]].
* To dismiss a prime minister and their government on the monarch's own authority. This was last done in Britain in 1834 by [[King William IV]].
* To summon and prorogue Parliament
* To command the armed forces
* To dismiss and appoint ministers
* To commission officers in the armed forces
* To appoint [[King's Counsel]]
* To issue and withdraw passports
* To create corporations via royal charter
* To appoint bishops and archbishops of the Church of England
* To grant honours
* To grant the [[Royal prerogative of mercy|prerogative of mercy]]
* To delay a bill's assent through the use of his or her reserve powers in near-revolutionary situations, thereby vetoing the bill<ref>{{cite journal|title=Modern Royal Assent Procedure at Westminster |first1=Francis |last1=Bennion |author-link1=Francis Bennion |journal=Statute Law Review |volume=2 |issue=3 |page=138 |doi=10.1093/slr/2.3.133 |date=1 October 1981}}
</ref>
* To refuse the royal assent of a parliamentary bill on the advice of ministers,<ref>[[Thomas Erskine May]]'s [[Parliamentary Practice]], page 373, 2nd edition, 1851</ref> last exercised by [[Anne, Queen of Great Britain|Queen Anne]] when she withheld royal assent from the [[Scottish Militia Bill 1708]]
* To declare war and peace
* To deploy the armed forces overseas
* To ratify and make treaties
* To refuse the "[[King's Consent]]", where direct monarchical assent is required for a bill affecting, directly or by implication, the prerogative, hereditary revenues—including ''[[ultimus haeres]]'', [[treasure trove]], and ''[[bona vacantia]]''—or the personal property or interests of the Crown to be heard in Parliament. In 1999, [[Queen Elizabeth II]], acting on the advice of the government, refused to signify her consent to the [[Military Action Against Iraq (Parliamentary Approval) Bill]], which sought to transfer from the monarch to Parliament the power to authorise military strikes against Iraq.

These powers could be exercised in an emergency such as a constitutional crisis (such as surrounded the [[People's Budget]] of 1909) or in wartime. They would also be very relevant in the event of a [[hung parliament]].

For example, in the hung parliament in 1974, the serving Prime Minister, [[Edward Heath]], attempted to remain in power but was unable to form a [[working majority]]. The Queen then asked [[Harold Wilson]], leader of the Labour Party, which had the largest number of seats in the Commons but not an overall majority, to attempt to form a government. Subsequently, Wilson asked that if the government were defeated on the floor of the House of Commons, the Queen would grant a dissolution, which she agreed to.<ref name="clark580">Letter 10 February 1999 from [[Joe Haines (journalist)|Joe Haines]] ([[Harold Wilson]]'s press secretary) to [[Alan Clark]]; reproduced in Alan Clark, ''The Tories: Conservatives and the Nation State 1922-1997'' (Phoenix Paperback 1999 Edition) page 580 {{ISBN|978-0-7538-0765-1}}</ref>

===Japan===
Unlike most other constitutional monarchs, the [[Emperor of Japan]] has no reserve powers. Following [[Japan]]'s defeat in [[World War II]], the Emperor's role is defined in Chapter I of the 1947 [[Constitution of Japan]], as decided by the [[Occupation of Japan|foreign powers]] that had defeated the country. It states that sovereignty rests with the Japanese citizenry, not the Emperor who is merely the symbol of the State and the unity of the people.

===Malaysia===
The [[Yang di-Pertuan Agong]] (the elected supreme federal ruler, commonly glossed as “King”) has no reserve powers. Article 40 of the [[Constitution of Malaysia|Malaysian constitution]] specifies only three powers of the Agong: to reject a request to dissolve [[Parliament of Malaysia|Parliament]], to convene a meeting of the [[Conference of Rulers]]; and to appoint the [[Prime Minister of Malaysia|Prime Minister]], whom he has no power to dismiss.<ref>{{cite news|date=12 August 2021|title=When and how Parliament meets is outside Agong's powers, says former top judge|work=malaysianow.com|url=https://www.malaysianow.com/news/2021/08/12/when-and-how-parliament-meets-is-outside-agongs-powers-says-former-top-judge/|access-date=21 August 2021}}</ref>

===Spain===
The [[Constitution of Spain|Spanish Constitution of 1978]] does not specifically grant [[state of emergency|emergency powers]] to the government, though does state in Article 56 that the [[Monarchy of Spain|monarch]] "arbitrates and moderates the regular functioning of the institutions", and invests the monarch with the responsibility of overseeing that the forms of the constitution are observed.<ref name="Wiki Source Spa Constitution 78">{{cite web|url=http://es.wikisource.org/wiki/Constituci%C3%B3n_espa%C3%B1ola_de_1978:_04|title=Constitución española de 1978: 04 - Wikisource|website=es.wikisource.org}}</ref><ref name="Official website of the Royal Household">{{cite web|url=http://www.casareal.es/laCorona/laCorona-iden-idweb.html|title=Casa de Su Majestad el Rey de España - Castellano - Error 404|website=www.casareal.es}}</ref> It is through this constitutional language that wider "reserve powers" are granted to the monarch. It is through this clause and his position as commander-in-chief of the [[Spanish Armed Forces]] that [[Juan Carlos I|King Juan Carlos I]] undermined the attempted [[23-F]] military [[Coup d'état|coup]] in 1981.

<blockquote>
Title II, Articles 56<br />
''The King is Head of State, the symbol of its unity and permanence. He arbitrates and moderates the regular functioning of the institutions, assumes the highest representation of the Spanish State in international relations, especially with the nations of its historical community, and exercises the functions expressly conferred on him by the Constitution and the laws''.<ref name="Wiki Source Spa Constitution 78"/><ref name="Official website of the Royal Household"/>
</blockquote>

The Spanish Constitution of 1978, Title II ''The Crown'', Article 62, delineates the powers of the monarch, while Title IV ''Government and Administration'', Article 99, defines the monarch's role in government.<ref name="Wiki Source Spa Constitution 78"/><ref name="Official website of the Royal Household"/><ref name="King and Prime Minister">{{cite web|url=http://es.wikisource.org/wiki/Constituci%C3%B3n_espa%C3%B1ola_de_1978:_06|title=Constitución española de 1978: 06 - Wikisource|website=es.wikisource.org}}</ref> Title VI ''Judicial Power'', Article 117, Articles 122 through 124, outlines the monarch's role in the country's independent [[Judiciary of Spain|judiciary]].<ref name="King and Judicary">{{cite web|url=http://es.wikisource.org/wiki/Constituci%C3%B3n_espa%C3%B1ola_de_1978:_08|title=Constitución española de 1978: 08 - Wikisource|website=es.wikisource.org}}</ref> However, by [[Constitutional convention (political custom)|constitutional convention]] established by Juan Carlos I, the monarch exercises prerogatives after having solicited government advice, while remaining politically [[nonpartisanism|non-partisan]] and independent. Receiving government advice does not necessarily bind the monarch into executing said advice, except where prescribed by the Constitution.

<blockquote>
''It is incumbent upon the King'':
*''a. To Sanction and promulgate the laws''
*''b. To summon and dissolve the ''[[Cortes Generales]]'' and to call for elections under the terms provided for in the Constitution.''
*''c. To Call for a referendum in the cases provided for in the Constitution''.
*''e. To appoint and dismiss members of the [[Government of Spain|Government]] on the [[Prime Minister of Spain|President of the Government]]'s proposal.''
*''f. To issue the decrees approved in the [[Council of Ministers of Spain|Council of Ministers]], to confer civil and military honours and distinctions in conformity with the law.''
*''g. To be informed of the affairs of State and, for this purpose, to preside over the meetings of the Council of Ministers whenever, he sees fit, at the President of the Government's request.''
*''h. To exercise supreme command of the [[Spanish Armed Forces|Armed Forces]]''
*''i. To exercise the right of clemency in accordance with the law, which may not authorize general pardons.''
*''j. To exercise the High Patronage of the Royal Academies.''<ref name="Wiki Source Spa Constitution 78"/><ref name="Official website of the Royal Household"/>
</blockquote>

Once a [[Elections in Spain|General Election]] has been announced by the monarch, political parties nominate their candidates to stand for the presidency of the government.

Following the General Election of the [[Cortes Generales]] (''Cortes''), and other circumstances provided for in the Constitution, the monarch meets with and interviews the [[List of political parties in Spain|political party leaders]] represented in the Congress of Deputies, and then consults with the [[Congress of Deputies (Spain)|Speaker of the Congress of Deputies]] (officially, '' Presidente de Congreso de los Diputados de España'', who, in this instance, represents the whole Cortes Generales) before nominating his candidate for the presidency, according to Section 99 of Title IV.<ref name="King and Prime Minister"/> Often minor parties form part of a larger major party, and through that membership it can be said that the monarch fulfills the constitutional mandate of consulting with party representatives with Congressional representation.

<blockquote>
Title IV Government and Administration
Section 99(1) & (2)
*(1) ''After each renewal of the Congress and the other cases provided for under the Constitution, the King shall, after consultation with the representatives appointed by the political groups with parliamentary representation, and through the Speaker of the Congress, nominate for the Presidency of the Government.''
*(2) ''The candidate nominated in accordance with the provisions of the foregoing subsection shall submit to the Congress the political program of the Government he or she intends to form and shall seek the confidence of the House.''<ref name="King and Prime Minister"/>
</blockquote>

The [[Constitution of Spain|Spanish Constitution of 1978]] explicitly says<ref>article 53.3</ref> that the monarch is not subject to any responsibility but for his acts to be valid must be endorsed by the Government and will not be valid without such an endorsement. The only exception<ref>article 65.2</ref> is that the monarch is free to appoint and remove the members of private and military advisors (''Casa Real'').

Title IV of the Constitution invests the monarch with sanction ([[royal assent|Royal Assent]]) and promulgation (publication) of laws, while Title III ''The Cortes Generals'', Chapter 2 ''Drafting of Bills'' outlines the method by which bills are passed. According to Article 91, within fifteen days that a bill has been passed by the Cortes Generales, the monarch shall give assent and publish the new law. Article 92 invests the monarch with the right to call for a referendum on the advice of the president and the previous authorization of Congress.

No provision within the Constitution invests the monarch with the ability to veto legislation directly, however no provision forbids the denial of royal assent – effectively a veto. When the media asked King [[Juan Carlos I of Spain|Juan Carlos]] if he would endorse the bill legalizing [[Same-sex marriage in Spain|gay marriages]], he answered "''Soy el Rey de España y no el de Bélgica''" ("I am the King of Spain, and not that of Belgium"){{spaced ndash}}a reference to King [[Baudouin I of Belgium]] who had refused to sign the Belgian law legalising [[abortion]].<ref>{{cite news |title=Don Juan Carlos, sobre el matrimonio gay: 'Soy el Rey de España y no el de Bélgica' |newspaper=El Mundo|date=13 May 2006|url=http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2005/05/12/espana/1115917538.html |access-date=8 January 2007|language=es}}</ref> The King gave his royal assent to Law 13/2005 on 1 July 2005; the law was [[gazette]]d in the ''[[Boletín Oficial del Estado]]'' on 2 July, and came into effect on 3 July 2005.<ref>{{cite web|title=Disposiciones Generales |publisher=Boletin Oficial del Estado|date=2 June 2005 |url=http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2005/07/02/pdfs/A23632-23634.pdf|access-date=8 January 2007|language=es}}</ref>

=== Sweden ===
Much like the Emperor of Japan, the [[Monarchy of Sweden|King of Sweden]] does not have any constitutional responsibility for the governance of the Realm, with strictly ceremonial and representative functions remaining. Under the [[Constitution of Sweden|1974 Instrument of Government]], the supreme executive authority is the [[Government of Sweden|Government]] (composed of the [[Prime Minister of Sweden|Prime Minister]] and other cabinet ministers), which is responsible to the [[Riksdag]]. The King, however, is not subordinate to the Government and thus could play an independent role as moral authority, but the prevailing convention, expressed in the preparatory works of the 1974 Instrument of Government, is that the King should stay away from anything which could reasonably be interpreted as [[Courtyard Speech|partisan politics or criticism of the Government in office]].