Editing Resource curse (section)

== Thesis ==
The idea that resources might be more of an economic curse than a blessing first emerged as early as 1711, with English publication ''[[The Spectator (1711)|The Spectator]]'' noting, "It is generally observed, that in countries of the greatest plenty there is the poorest living."<ref>{{Cite book|url=http://www2.scc.rutgers.edu/spectator/outputdjvu.php?filepath=./specv01/INDEX.djvu&pageno=p0680.djvu|title=The Spectator|last=Steele|volume=200 |date = 19 October 1711}}</ref> The idea gained further traction during debates in the 1950s and the 1960s about the economic problems of low and middle-income countries.<ref name="Ross 1999">{{cite journal|last1=Ross|first1=Michael L.|title=The Political Economy of the Resource Curse|journal=World Politics|date=January 1999|volume=51|issue=2|pages=297–322|doi=10.1017/S0043887100008200|s2cid=154826053}}</ref> In 1993 Richard Auty first used the term ''resource curse'' to describe how countries rich in mineral resources were unable to use that wealth to boost their economies and how, counter-intuitively, these countries had lower [[economic growth]] than countries without an abundance of natural resources. An influential 1995 study by [[Jeffrey Sachs]] and Andrew Warner found a strong correlation between natural resource abundance and poor economic growth.<ref>{{cite journal|last1=Sachs|first1=Jeffrey|last2=Warner|first2=Andrew|title=Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth|journal=NBER Working Paper|date=1995|issue=5398|doi=10.3386/w5398|doi-access=free}}</ref> As of 2016, hundreds of studies have evaluated the effects of resource wealth on a wide range of economic outcomes, and offered many explanations for how, why, and when a resource curse is likely to occur.<ref name="Venables 2016">{{cite journal|last1=Venables|first1=Anthony J.|title=Using Natural Resources for Development: Why Has It Proven So Difficult?|journal=Journal of Economic Perspectives|date=February 2016|volume=30|issue=1|pages=161–184|doi=10.1257/jep.30.1.161|s2cid=155899373|doi-access=free}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal|last1=Frankel|first1=Jeffrey|title=The Natural Resource Curse: A Survey of Diagnoses and Some Prescriptions|journal=HKS Faculty Research Working Paper Series|date=2012|issue=RWP12{{hyphen}}014|url=http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:8694932}}</ref> While "the lottery analogy has value but also has shortcomings",<ref>{{cite book |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=MWJdAQAAQBAJ&pg=PT81 |title=Alaska's Permanent Fund Dividend: Examining its Suitability as a Model |editor1-first=Karl |editor1-last=Widerquist |editor2-first=Michael W. |editor2-last=Howard |chapter=Politics, the Preservation of Natural Resource Wealth, and the Funding of a Basic Income Guarantee |first1=James B. |last1=Bryan |first2=Sarah Lamarche |last2=Castillo |publisher=Springer |date=2012 |isbn=978-1137015020 |page=81}}</ref> many observers have likened the resource curse to the difficulties that befall [[lottery]] winners who struggle to manage the complex side-effects of newfound wealth.<ref>{{cite press release |url=http://www.cgdev.org/article/turning-oil-cash-how-developing-countries-can-win-resource-lottery-and-avoid-curse |title=Turning Oil into Cash: How Developing Countries Can Win the Resource Lottery and Avoid the Curse |publisher=[[Center for Global Development]] |date=3 June 2015}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |url=https://archive.org/details/isbn_9781594203350 |url-access=registration |title=Private Empire: ExxonMobil and American Power |first=Steve |last=Coll |author-link=Steve Coll |publisher=Penguin |date=2012 |isbn=978-1101572146 |page=[https://archive.org/details/isbn_9781594203350/page/107 107]}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |url=http://library.cqpress.com/cqresearcher/document.php?id=cqrglobal2011122000 |title=The Resource Curse |first=Jennifer |last=Weeks |journal=[[CQ Press|CQ Researcher]] |volume=5 |issue=24 |date=20 December 2011}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |url=http://www.csmonitor.com/Business/Donald-Marron/2010/0615/Afghanistan-and-the-natural-resource-curse |title=Afghanistan and the natural resource curse |first=Donald |last=Marron |author-link=Donald B. Marron Jr. |newspaper=Christian Science Monitor |date=15 June 2010}}</ref>

As of 2009, scholarship on the resource curse has increasingly shifted towards explaining why some resource-rich countries succeed and why others do not, as opposed to just investigating the average economic effects of resources.<ref name=":7">{{Cite journal|last=Torvik|first=Ragnar|date=2009-07-01|title=Why do some resource-abundant countries succeed while others do not?|journal=Oxford Review of Economic Policy|volume=25|issue=2|pages=241–256|doi=10.1093/oxrep/grp015|s2cid=9992028|issn=0266-903X}}</ref> Research suggests that the manner in which resource income is spent, the system of government, institutional quality, type of resources, and early vs. late [[industrialization]] all have been used to explain successes and failures.<ref name=":7" />

Since 2018, a discussion has emerged concerning the potential for a resource curse related to critical materials for [[renewable energy]].<ref name=":11">{{Cite journal|last=Overland|first=Indra|date=2019-03-01|title=The geopolitics of renewable energy: Debunking four emerging myths|journal=Energy Research & Social Science|volume=49|pages=36–40|doi=10.1016/j.erss.2018.10.018|issn=2214-6296|doi-access=free|bibcode=2019ERSS...49...36O }}</ref> This could concern either countries with abundant renewable energy resources, such as sunshine, or critical materials for renewable energy technologies, such as [[neodymium]], [[cobalt]], or [[lithium]].

Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, who developed [[selectorate theory]], explains that when an autocratic country has lots of natural resources, the ruler's optimal strategy for political survival is to use that revenue to buy the loyalty of critical support groups and oppress the rest of the population by denying them civil liberties and underfunding education and infrastructure.  Education, liberty, and infrastructure can make the people more productive, but they also make it easier for them to organize opposition movements.  Since the ruler can obtain sufficient revenue from his country's natural resources, he has no need for a productive populace and therefore does not have to risk liberalization.  By contrast, in a dictatorship with few natural resources, there may be a necessity for the ruler to liberalize his society somewhat so that the economy can be organized more efficiently, and to invest in education and healthcare to create a skilled and healthy workforce.  Bueno de Mesquita cites Ghana and Taiwan as examples of countries where the rulers permitted democratization out of necessity.<ref>Bruce Bueno de Mesquita (2011). ''The Dictator's Handbook''</ref>