Editing Selous Scouts (section)

==Background==
{{See also|Rhodesian Bush War}}
In November 1965 the government of the British colony of [[Southern Rhodesia]] issued an illegal [[Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence|Unilateral Declaration of Independence]]. This government represented the country's small [[White Zimbabweans|white minority]] and was led by Prime Minister [[Ian Smith]]. The black majority of the population had little influence on the government, which sought to continue white racial privileges.{{sfn|Evans|2007|pp=180–181}} At the time of independence the [[Rhodesian Security Forces]] were relatively large and well trained and equipped.{{sfn|Evans|2007|pp=179–180}}

Two groups with armed elements emerged as the opposition to the white Rhodesian regime. These were the [[Zimbabwe African National Union]] (ZANU), whose military wing was the [[Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army]] (ZANLA), and the [[Zimbabwe African People's Union]] (ZAPU) and its armed wing the [[Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army]] (ZIPRA). Both groups were initially based in [[Zambia]], and from the late 1960s began dispatching insurgents into Rhodesia who used [[guerrilla warfare|guerrilla]] tactics.{{sfn|Evans|2007|p=182}} These attacks initially proved ineffective and the Rhodesian military, which had been bolstered by forces from [[South Africa]], was able to effectively counter them.{{sfn|Evans|2007|p=183}} Rhodesia's security situation began to deteriorate from late 1972, when the guerrilla armies began making more effective attacks in the north-east of the country.{{sfn|Evans|2007|p=185}} The collapse of the Portuguese Empire in 1975 that led to the independence of [[Mozambique]] led to a further increase to the challenges facing the Rhodesian regime, with the guerrillas using that country as well as [[Botswana]] as bases.{{sfn|Evans|2007|p=185}}

A tactic in which security forces pose as 'pseudo' insurgents to gather intelligence was developed prior to the Rhodesian Bush War, and had also been used by police forces. [[False flag#Pseudo-operations|Pseudo operations]] involve security force personnel being trained to closely imitate insurgents. Teams of these personnel then enter regions where insurgents are active and portray themselves as insurgents. After establishing credibility, the team collects intelligence on actual insurgents and their sources of support. These tactics can be most necessary in regions where the insurgents have eliminated the government's sources of intelligence, as was the case in north-eastern Rhodesia in 1973.{{sfn|Cilliers|1985|p=118}} In general, 'pseudo' teams undertake only intelligence collection work, and do not attack insurgents themselves. 'Pseudo' tactics are generally most effective when the teams include former insurgents who have been 'turned' to side with the government.{{sfn|Cilliers|1985|p=119}} The effectiveness of these tactics is partially dependent on their use not becoming known, as this will lead to insurgents improving their security processes. Internationally, there has also been a risk of pseudo units breaking the law. If local civilians learn that the security forces are posing as insurgents and using this as cover to break the law, the tactics can be counter-productive as they will erode support for the government.{{sfn|Cilliers|1985|pp=119–120}} The British authorities used pseudo tactics during the [[Malayan Emergency]], with this coming to the attention of the Rhodesians [[Southern Rhodesian military involvement in the Malayan Emergency|who took part]] in that conflict.<ref name="Telegraph Reid-Daly obit">{{cite news |title=Lieutenant-Colonel Ron Reid-Daly|page=31 |url=https://www.newspapers.com/image/754119141/?clipping_id=125369757&fcfToken=eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJmcmVlLXZpZXctaWQiOjc1NDExOTE0MSwiaWF0IjoxNjg1MTQ1MzUxLCJleHAiOjE2ODUyMzE3NTF9.kSY2mgLDoy8bUDncU_fZQSH8AabFqHuOk7Gokb7l7zM |work=The Telegraph |date=21 September 2010|via=Newspapers.com}}</ref>