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Social constructivism
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==Philosophy== Strong social constructivism as a philosophical approach tends to suggest that "the natural world has a small or non-existent role in the construction of scientific knowledge".<ref>{{cite journal|author=Collins, H. M.|year=1981|title=Stages in the Empirical Program of Relativism - Introduction|journal=Social Studies of Science|volume=11|issue=1|page=3|doi=10.1177/030631278101100101|s2cid=145123888}}</ref> According to [[Maarten Boudry]] and Filip Buekens, [[Psychoanalysis#Freudian theory|Freudian psychoanalysis]] is a good example of this approach in action.<ref name="Boudry, et al. (2011)">Boudry, M & Buekens, F (2011) The Epistemic Predicament of a Pseudoscience: Social Constructivism Confronts Freudian Psychoanalysis. Theoria, 77, 159β179</ref> However, Boudry and Buekens do not claim that '[[bona fide]]' science is completely immune from all socialisation and [[Paradigm shift#Kuhnian paradigm shifts|paradigm shifts]],<ref>Kuhn, T (1962) [[Structure of Scientific Revolutions]]. Chicago University Press.</ref> merely that the strong social constructivist claim that ''all'' scientific knowledge is constructed ignores the reality of scientific success.<ref name="Boudry, et al. (2011)" /> One characteristic of social constructivism is that it rejects the role of [[Heroic theory of invention and scientific development|superhuman necessity in either the invention/discovery of knowledge or its justification]]. In the field of invention it looks to contingency as playing an important part in the origin of knowledge, with historical interests and resourcing swaying the direction of mathematical and scientific knowledge growth. In the area of justification while acknowledging the role of logic and reason in testing, it also accepts that the criteria for acceptance vary and change over time. Thus [[mathematical proofs]] follow different standards in the present and throughout different periods in the past, as Paul Ernest argues.<ref>Ernest, Paul (1998), Social Constructivism as a Philosophy of Mathematics, Albany NY: SUNY Press.</ref>
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