Editing Social stratification (section)

==Overview==

===Definition and usage===

"Social stratification" is a concept used in the social sciences to describe the relative social position of persons in a given [[social group]], [[categorization|category]], geographical region or other [[Social group|social unit]]. It derives from the [[Latin]] ''strātum'' (plural 'strata'; parallel, horizontal layers) referring to a given society's categorization of its people into rankings of [[Socioeconomic status|socioeconomic]] tiers based on factors like [[wealth]], [[income]], [[social status]], [[job|occupation]] and [[Power (social and political)|power]]. In modern [[Western culture|Western societies]], stratification is often broadly classified into three major divisions of [[social class]]: [[upper class]], [[middle class]], and [[Working class|lower class]]. Each of these classes can be further subdivided into smaller classes (e.g. "upper middle").<ref name="Saunders1990" /> Social strata may also be delineated on the basis of [[kinship|kinship ties]] or [[caste]] relations.

The concept of social stratification is often used and interpreted differently within specific theories. In [[sociology]], for example, proponents of [[Action theory (sociology)|action theory]] have suggested that social stratification is commonly found in [[Development theory|developed]] societies, wherein a [[dominance hierarchy]] may be necessary in order to maintain [[social order]] and provide a stable [[social structure]]. [[Conflict theory|Conflict theories]], such as [[Marxism]], point to the inaccessibility of resources and lack of [[social mobility]] found in stratified societies. Many sociological theorists have criticized the fact that the [[working classes]] are often unlikely to advance socioeconomically while the [[Wealth#The upper class|wealthy]] tend to hold political power which they use to [[Exploitation of labour|exploit]] the [[proletariat]] (laboring class). [[Talcott Parsons]], an American sociologist, asserted that stability and social order are regulated, in part, by [[universal value]]s. Such values are not identical with "consensus" but can indeed be an impetus for social conflict, as has been the case multiple times through history. Parsons never claimed that universal values, in and by themselves, "satisfied" the [[functional prerequisites]] of a society. Indeed, the constitution of society represents a much more complicated codification of emerging historical factors. Theorists such as [[Ralf Dahrendorf]] alternately note the tendency toward an enlarged middle-class in modern Western societies due to the necessity of an educated workforce in technological economies. Various social and political perspectives concerning [[globalization]], such as [[dependency theory]], suggest that these effects are due to changes in the status of workers to the [[third world]].

===Four underlying principles===
Four principles are posited to underlie social stratification. First, social stratification is socially defined as a property of a society rather than individuals in that society. Second, social stratification is reproduced from generation to generation. Third, social stratification is universal (found in every society) but variable (differs across time and place). Fourth, social stratification involves not just quantitative [[economic inequality|inequality]] but qualitative beliefs and attitudes about social status.<ref name="Grusky2011a" />

===Complexity===
Although stratification is not limited to complex societies, all complex societies exhibit features of stratification. In any complex society, the total stock of valued goods is distributed unequally, wherein the most [[Privilege (social inequality)|privileged]] individuals and families enjoy a disproportionate share of [[income]], [[Power (social and political)|power]], and other [[Value theory|valued]] social resources. The term "stratification system" is sometimes used to refer to the complex [[social relationship]]s and [[social structure]]s that generate these observed inequalities. The key components of such systems are: (a) [[Social institution|social-institutional]] processes that define certain types of goods as valuable and desirable, (b) the [[Social contract|rules]] of allocation that distribute goods and resources across various positions in the [[division of labor]] (e.g., physician, farmer, 'housewife'), and (c) the [[social mobility]] processes that link individuals to positions and thereby generate unequal control over valued resources.<ref name="Grusky1992">{{cite encyclopedia | title=Social Stratification | encyclopedia=The Encyclopedia of Sociology | publisher=Macmillan Publishing Co. |author1=Grusky, David B.  |author2=Ann Azumi Takata  |name-list-style=amp | year=1992 | pages=1955–1970}}</ref>

===Social mobility===
[[File:20220801 Economic stratification - cross-class friendships - bar chart.svg|thumb| upright=1.5| Social connectedness to people of higher income levels is a strong predictor of upward income mobility.<ref name=EconomicStratification/> However, data shows substantial social segregation correlating with economic income groups.<ref name=EconomicStratification>Data from {{cite journal |last1=Chetty |first1=Raj |last2=Jackson |first2=Matthew O. |last3=Kuchler |first3=Theresa |last4=Stroebel |first4=Johannes |last5=Hendren |first5=Nathaniel |last6=Fluegge |first6=Robert B. |last7=Gong |first7=Sara |last8=Gonzalez |first8=Frederico |last9=Grondin |first9=Armelle |last10=Jacob |first10=Matthew |display-authors=4 |title=Social capital I: measurement and associations with economic mobility |journal=Nature |date=August 1, 2022 |volume=608 |issue=7921 |pages=108–121 |doi=10.1038/s41586-022-04996-4 |pmid=35915342 |pmc=9352590 |bibcode=2022Natur.608..108C }} Charted in {{cite news |last1=Leonhardt |first1=David |title='Friending Bias' / A large new study offers clues about how lower-income children can rise up the economic ladder. |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/01/briefing/economic-ladder-rich-poor-americans.html |newspaper=The New York Times |date=August 1, 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220801104004/https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/01/briefing/economic-ladder-rich-poor-americans.html |archive-date=August 1, 2022 |url-status=live }}</ref>]]
[[Social mobility]] is the movement of individuals, social groups or categories of people between the layers or within a stratification system. This movement can be intragenerational or intergenerational. Such mobility is sometimes used to classify different systems of social stratification. [[Open system (systems theory)|Open]] stratification systems are those that allow for mobility between, typically by placing value on the [[achieved status]] characteristics of individuals. Those societies having the highest levels of intragenerational mobility are considered to be the most open and malleable systems of stratification.<ref name="Grusky2011a" /> Those systems in which there is [[Social mobility|little to no mobility]], even on an intergenerational basis, are considered closed stratification systems. For example, in caste systems, all aspects of social status are [[Ascribed status|ascribed]], such that one's social position at birth persists throughout one's lifetime.<ref name="Grusky1992" />

====Karl Marx====
{{Main|Marxism|Historical materialism|Base and superstructure}}

[[File:Pyramid of Capitalist System.jpg|thumbnail|The 1911 "[[Pyramid of Capitalist System]]" cartoon is an example of socialist [[critique of capitalism]] and of social stratification.]]
In Marxist theory, the modern [[mode of production]] consists of two main economic parts: the base and the superstructure. The base encompasses the [[relations of production]]: employer–employee work conditions, the technical [[division of labour]], and property relations. Social class, according to [[Marx]], is determined by one's relationship to the means of production. There exist at least two classes in any class-based society: the owners of the means of production and those who ''have to'' [[Labour economics|sell their labor]] to the owners of the [[means of production]]. At times, Marx almost hints that the ruling classes seem to own the working class itself as they only have their own [[labor power]] ('[[wage labor]]') to offer the more powerful in order to survive. These relations fundamentally determine the ideas and philosophies of a society and additional classes may form as part of the superstructure. Through the ideology of the ruling class—throughout much of history, the land-owning [[aristocracy]]—[[false consciousness]] is promoted both through political and non-political institutions but also through the [[arts]] and other elements of [[culture]]. When the aristocracy falls, the [[bourgeoisie]] become the owners of the means of production in the capitalist system. Marx predicted the [[capitalist]] mode would eventually give way, through its own internal conflict, to [[Class consciousness|revolutionary consciousness]] and the development of more [[Egalitarianism|egalitarian]], more [[communist]] societies.

Marx also described two other classes, the petite [[bourgeoisie]] and the [[lumpenproletariat]]. The petite bourgeoisie is like a small business class that never really accumulates enough profit to become part of the bourgeoisie, or even challenge their status. The lumpenproletariat is the [[underclass]], those with little to no social status. This includes prostitutes, street gangs, beggars, the [[Homelessness|homeless]] or other [[Untouchability|untouchables]] in a given society. Neither of these subclasses has much influence in Marx's two major classes, but it is helpful to know that Marx did recognize differences within the classes.<ref>Doob, Christopher. ''Social Inequality and Social Stratification in US Society'' (1st ed.), Pearson Education, 2012, {{ISBN|0-205-79241-3}}</ref>

According to [[Marvin Harris]]<ref>{{cite book | last=Harris | first=Marvin | author-link=Marvin Harris | year=1967 | title=The Rise of Anthropological Theory: A History of Theories of Culture | publisher=Routledge | isbn=0-7591-0133-7 | url=https://books.google.com/books?id=TlgVAAAAIAAJ}}</ref> and [[Tim Ingold]],<ref name="Ingold, Tim 2006 p. 400">Ingold, Tim (2006) "On the social relations of the hunter-gatherer band," in [[Richard Borshay Lee|Richard B. Lee]] and Richard H. Daly (eds.), ''The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Hunters and Gatherers,'' p. 400. New York: Cambridge University Press. {{ISBN|0-521-60919-4}}</ref> [[Lewis Henry Morgan]]'s accounts of egalitarian hunter-gatherers formed part of Karl Marx' and [[Friedrich Engels]]' inspiration for [[communism]]. Morgan spoke of a situation in which people living in the same community pooled their efforts and shared the rewards of those efforts fairly equally. He called this "communism in living". But when Marx expanded on these ideas, he still emphasized an economically oriented culture, with [[property]] defining the fundamental relationships between people.<ref>Barnard, Alan (2006) "Images of hunters and gatherers in European social thought," in [[Richard Borshay Lee|Richard B. Lee]] and Richard H. Daly (eds.), ''The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Hunters and Gatherers,'' p. 379. New York: Cambridge University Press. {{ISBN|0-521-60919-4}}</ref> Yet, issues of [[ownership]] and property are arguably less emphasized in hunter-gatherer societies.<ref name="Gowdy2006">{{cite encyclopedia | isbn=0-521-60919-4 | title=Hunter-gatherers and the mythology of the market | encyclopedia=The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Hunters and Gatherers | publisher=Cambridge University Press | author=Gowdy, John | editor=Lee, Richard B. and Richard H. Daly | year=2006 | pages=391–393}}</ref> This, combined with the very different social and economic situations of hunter-gatherers may account for many of the difficulties encountered when implementing communism in industrialized states. As Ingold points out: "The notion of communism, removed from the context of domesticity and harnessed to support a project of social engineering for large-scale, industrialized states with populations of millions, eventually came to mean something quite different from what Morgan had intended: namely, a principle of redistribution that would override all ties of a personal or familial nature, and cancel out their effects."<ref name="Ingold, Tim 2006 p. 400"/>

The counter-argument to Marxist's conflict theory is the theory of structural functionalism, argued by [[Kingsley Davis]] and [[Wilbert E. Moore|Wilbert Moore]], which states that social inequality places a vital role in the smooth operation of a society. The [[Davis–Moore hypothesis]] argues that a position does not bring power and prestige because it draws a high income; rather, it draws a high income because it is functionally important and the available personnel is for one reason or another scarce. Most high-income jobs are difficult and require a high level of education to perform, and their compensation is a motivator in society for people to strive to achieve more.<ref>{{Cite journal|title = Some Principles of Stratification|jstor = 2085643|journal = American Sociological Review|date = 1 April 1945|pages = 242–249|volume = 10|issue = 2|doi = 10.2307/2085643|first1 = Kingsley|last1 = Davis|first2 = Wilbert E.|last2 = Moore}}</ref>

====Max Weber====
{{Main|Three-component theory of stratification|Tripartite classification of authority}}
[[Max Weber]] was strongly influenced by Marx's ideas but rejected the possibility of effective communism, arguing that it would require an even greater level of detrimental social control and bureaucratization than capitalist society. Moreover, Weber criticized the [[dialectical]] presumption of a proletariat revolt, maintaining it to be unlikely.<ref>Holborn, M. & Langley, P. (2004) AS & A level Student Handbook, accompanies the Sixth Edition: Haralambos & Holborn, ''Sociology: Themes and perspectives,'' London: Collins Educational</ref> Instead, he develops a [[three-component theory of stratification]] and the concept of [[life chances]]. Weber held there are more class divisions than Marx suggested, taking different concepts from both [[Structural functionalism|functionalist]] and [[Marxist]] theories to create his own system. He emphasizes the difference between class, status, and party, and treats these as separate but related sources of power, each with different effects on [[social action]]. Working half a century later than Marx, Weber claims there to be four main social classes: the [[upper class]], the [[white collar workers]], the [[petite bourgeoisie]], and the manual [[working class]].

Weber derives many of his key concepts on social stratification by examining the social structure of [[Germany]]. He notes that, contrary to Marx's theories, stratification is based on more than simple ownership of [[Capital (economics)|capital]]. Weber examines how many members of the aristocracy lacked economic wealth yet had strong political power. Many wealthy families lacked prestige and power, for example, because they were [[Jewish]].{{Citation needed|date=April 2025}} Weber introduced three independent factors that form his theory of stratification hierarchy, which are; class, status, and power:
* '''Class''': A person's economic position in a society, based on birth and individual achievement.<ref>{{cite book|last=Macionis, Gerber|first=John, Linda|title=Sociology 7th Canadian Ed|year=2010|publisher=Pearson Canada Inc.|location=Toronto, Ontario|page=243}}</ref> Weber differs from Marx in that he does not see this as the supreme factor in stratification. Weber notes how corporate executives control firms they typically do not own; Marx would have placed these people in the [[proletariat]] despite their high incomes by virtue of the fact they sell their labor instead of owning capital.
* '''Status''': A person's prestige, social honor, or popularity in a society. Weber notes that political power is not rooted in capital value solely, but also in one's individual status. Poets or saints, for example, can have extensive influence on society despite few material resources.
* '''Power''': A person's ability to get their way despite the resistance of others, particularly in their ability to engage [[social change]]. For example, individuals in government jobs, such as an employee of the [[Federal Bureau of Investigation]], or a member of the [[United States Congress]], may hold little property or status but still wield considerable [[Power (social and political)|social power]].<ref>
{{cite book
 | last=Stark | first=Rodney
 | year=2007
 | title=Sociology
|edition=10th
 | publisher=Thompson Wadsworth
}}
</ref>

====C. Wright Mills====
{{Main|Elite theory}}

[[C. Wright Mills]], drawing from the theories of [[Vilfredo Pareto]] and [[Gaetano Mosca]], contends that the imbalance of power in society derives from the complete absence of countervailing powers against corporate leaders of the [[power elite]].<ref name="Doob">{{cite book | title=Social Inequality and Social Stratification in US Society | publisher=Pearson Education Inc. | last=Doob | first=Christopher | year=2013 | location=Upper Saddle River, New Jersey | page=38 | isbn=978-0-205-79241-2}}</ref><ref name="Mills1956">{{cite book | title=The Power Elite | url=https://archive.org/details/powerelite000mill | url-access=registration | publisher=Oxford University Press | last=Mills | first=Charles W. | year=1956 | location=London}}</ref> Mills both incorporated and revised [[Marxism|Marxist]] ideas. While he shared [[Karl Marx|Marx's]] recognition of a dominant wealthy and powerful class, Mills believed that the source for that power lay not only in the economic realm but also in the political and military arenas.<ref name="Doob" /> During the 1950s, Mills stated that hardly anyone knew about the power elite's existence, some individuals (including the elite themselves) denied the idea of such a group, and other people vaguely believed that a small formation of a powerful elite existed.<ref name="Doob" /> "Some prominent individuals knew that [[Congress of the United States|Congress]] had permitted a handful of political leaders to make critical decisions about peace and war; and that two [[atomic bomb]]s had been dropped on Japan in the name of the United States, but neither they nor anyone they knew had been consulted."<ref name="Doob" />

Mills explains that the power elite embody a privileged class whose members are able to recognize their high position within society.<ref name="Doob" /> In order to maintain their highly exalted position within society, members of the power elite tend to marry one another, understand and accept one another, and also work together.<ref name="Doob" /><ref name="Mills1956" /><sup>[pp.&nbsp;4–5]</sup> The most crucial aspect of the power elite's existence lays within the core of education.<ref name="Doob" /> "Youthful upper-class members attend prominent preparatory schools, which not only open doors to such elite universities as [[Harvard University|Harvard]], [[Yale University|Yale]], and [[Princeton University|Princeton]] but also to the universities' highly exclusive clubs. These memberships in turn pave the way to the prominent social clubs located in all major cities and serving as sites for important business contacts."<ref name="Doob" /><ref name="Mills1956" /><sup>[pp.&nbsp;63–67]</sup> Examples of elite members who attended prestigious universities and were members of highly exclusive clubs can be seen in [[George W. Bush]] and [[John Kerry]]. Both Bush and Kerry were members of the [[Skull and Bones]] club while attending Yale University.<ref name="Leung">{{cite news|last=Leung|first=Rebecca|title=Skull and Bones|url=https://www.cbsnews.com/news/skull-and-bones/|work=[[Frontline (U.S. TV series)|Frontline]] ([[CBS]]) (accessed 12 March 2012)|access-date=4 December 2012|archive-date=7 October 2012|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121007154453/http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-18560_162-576332.html|url-status=live}}</ref> This club includes members of some of the most powerful men of the twentieth century, all of which are forbidden to tell others about the secrets of their exclusive club. Throughout the years, the Skull and Bones club has included [[Presidents of the United States|presidents]], cabinet officers, Supreme Court justices, spies, captains of industry, and often their sons and daughters join the exclusive club, creating a social and political network like none ever seen before.<ref name="Leung"/>

The upper class individuals who receive elite educations typically have the essential background and contacts to enter into the three branches of the power elite: The political leadership, the military circle, and the corporate elite.<ref name="Doob" />
* '''The Political Leadership:''' Mills held that, prior to the end of [[World War II]], leaders of corporations became more prominent within the political sphere along with a decline in central decision-making among professional politicians.<ref name="Doob" />
* '''The Military Circle:''' During the 1950s–1960s, increasing concerns about [[warfare]] resulted in top military leaders and issues involving defense funding and military personnel training becoming a top priority within the United States. Most of the prominent politicians and corporate leaders have been strong proponents of military spending.
* '''The Corporate Elite:''' Mills explains that during the 1950s, when the military emphasis was recognized, corporate leaders worked with prominent military officers who dominated the development of policies. Corporate leaders and high-ranking military officers were mutually supportive of each other.<ref name="Doob" /><ref name="Mills1956" /><sup>[pp.&nbsp;274–276]</sup>

Mills shows that the power elite has an "inner-core" made up of individuals who are able to move from one position of institutional power to another; for example, a prominent military officer who becomes a political adviser or a powerful politician who becomes a corporate executive.<ref name="Doob" /> "These people have more knowledge and a greater breadth of interests than their colleagues. Prominent bankers and financiers, who Mills considered 'almost professional go-betweens of economic, political, and military affairs,' are also members of the elite's inner core.<ref name="Doob" /><ref name="Mills1956" /><sup>[pp. 288–289]</sup>

===Anthropological theories===
{{Anthropology of kinship}}
{{See also|Hierarchy#Biology}}

Most if not all [[Anthropology|anthropologists]] dispute the "universal" nature of social stratification, holding that it is not the standard among all societies. John Gowdy (2006) writes, "Assumptions about human behaviour that members of market societies believe to be universal, that humans are naturally competitive and acquisitive, and that social stratification is natural, do not apply to many hunter-gatherer peoples.<ref name="Gowdy2006" /> Non-stratified [[egalitarian]] or [[Acephalous Society|acephalous]] ("headless") societies exist which have little or no concept of social hierarchy, political or economic status, class, or even permanent leadership."

===Kinship-orientation===
{{See also|Original affluent society}}

Anthropologists identify egalitarian cultures as "[[kinship]]-oriented", because they appear to value social harmony more than wealth or status. These cultures are contrasted with economically oriented cultures (including [[State (polity)|states]]) in which status and material wealth are prized, and stratification, competition, and conflict are common. Kinship-oriented cultures actively work to prevent social hierarchies from developing because they believe that such stratification could lead to conflict and instability.<ref>{{cite book | title=Gender and Rural Development | publisher=LIT Verlag Münster | author=Deji, Olanike F. | year=2011 | location=London | page=93 | isbn=978-3643901033}}</ref> [[Reciprocal altruism]] is one process by which this is accomplished.

A good example is given by [[Richard Borshay Lee]] in his account of the [[Khoisan]], who practice ''"insulting the meat".'' Whenever a hunter makes a kill, he is ceaselessly teased and ridiculed (in a friendly, joking fashion) to prevent him from becoming too proud or egotistical. The meat itself is then distributed evenly among the entire social group, rather than kept by the hunter. The level of teasing is proportional to the size of the kill. Lee found this out when he purchased an entire cow as a gift for the group he was living with, and was teased for weeks afterward about it (since obtaining that much meat could be interpreted as showing off).<ref>Lee, Richard B. (1976), ''Kalahari Hunter-Gatherers: Studies of the !Kung San and Their Neighbors,'' Richard B. Lee and Irven DeVore, eds. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.{{ISBN?}} {{page?|date=August 2024}}</ref>

Another example is the [[Aboriginal Australians|Australian Aboriginals]] of [[Groote Eylandt]] and [[Bickerton Island]], off the coast of [[Arnhem Land]], who have arranged their entire society—spiritually and economically—around a kind of [[gift economy]] called ''[[Reciprocal altruism|renunciation]].'' According to [[David H. Turner]], in this arrangement, every person is expected to give ''everything'' of any resource they have to any other person who needs or lacks it at the time. This has the benefit of largely eliminating social problems like theft and relative poverty. However, misunderstandings obviously arise when attempting to reconcile Aboriginal ''renunciative economics'' with the competition/scarcity-oriented [[economics]] introduced to Australia by European colonists.<ref>Turner, David H. (1999), ''Genesis Regained: Aboriginal Forms of Renunciation in Judeo-Christian Scriptures and Other Major Traditions,'' pp. 1–9, Peter Lang. {{ISBN?}}</ref>