Editing Southall rail crash (section)

==Accident==
The collision occurred as the 10:32 [[First Great Western|Great Western Trains]] (GWT) [[InterCity 125]] HST returned from [[Swansea railway station|Swansea]] toward [[Paddington railway station|London Paddington]]. The train was formed of [[British Rail Class 43 (HST)|Class 43 power car]] 43173, eight [[British Rail Mark 3|Mark 3 carriages]], and power car 43163. The driver at the time of the collision, Larry Harrison, boarded the train at Cardiff.<ref name=inquiry/> 

Earlier that day, the HST's previous driver, James Tunnock, had found a fault with the Automatic Warning System (AWS) that prevented the brakes from releasing. In response, he isolated (disabled) the AWS at 06:00 but did not report the failure to the signaller and to Railtrack as was required to enable extra signalling precautions. A fault with the AWS in the London-end power car had also been reported on the previous day, but testing at the [[Old Oak Common TMD|Old Oak Common]] maintenance depot overnight failed to reveal any fault, and the train was passed for service.<ref name=inquiry/>{{rp|Paragraph 6.26}}

As the HST approached Southall East Junction, the driver failed to heed two warning signals (a double yellow followed by a single yellow) without slowing the train down, and only reacted by applying the [[Emergency brake (train)|emergency brake]] when the [[Signal passed at danger|red]] danger signal came into view.<ref name=Rail>{{cite magazine |title= Seven die as HST ploughs into stone empties |magazine=[[Rail Magazine]] |issue=315 |date=8 October 1997| pages=6-11}}</ref> As the tracks on the Up Main Line straightened ahead of the HST, the driver saw the [[Hanson plc|Hanson]]-operated [[British Rail Class 59|Class 59 locomotive]] 59101 ''Village of Whatley'' a mile in the distance, moving "at a funny angle," and realised that it was crossing his path. The freight train, which was formed of 20 empty bogie hopper wagons, was coming from London on the Down Relief line toward the north side, and had been signalled to cross the main lines at Southall East Junction on its way into Southall Yard on the south side. The driver of the freight train, Alan Bricker, observed the approaching HST and expected it to stop, but was alarmed by its speed and apparent brake application. He tried to accelerate his train out of its path of the HST, but to no avail.<ref name=inquiry/> A collision was now inevitable. The HST was travelling at {{convert|125|mph|abbr=on}} when the driver saw the danger signal, so even though he applied the emergency brake, the collision occurred at more than {{convert|80|mph|abbr=on}}.<ref name=inquiry/><ref name=Rail/>

The later accident inquiry report found that:
#At 13:20, the front power car of the HST collided with a 22-tonne (22-ton) hopper car.
#Two seconds later, coach H collided with a hopper. The HST power car severed the brake pipes of the freight train, causing the stranded rear hopper wagons to stop immediately. A coupling from one of the hoppers was then severed by the derailed and damaged front power car as it passed by, causing debris to land on the track.
#Four seconds into the accident, with the HST still travelling at {{convert|60|mph|abbr=on}}, coach H collided with the severed coupling from the freight train, and began to topple away from the freight train onto its left side. It slid on its side for a further four seconds. Two people died in this carriage, falling from the destroyed coach windows and then crushed under the sliding coach H.
#Eight seconds into the accident, with both the forward HST power car and coach H clear forward of the scene, coach G—the second coach in the HST formation—hit the now stationary rear of the freight train. The freight wagons were driven back and jackknifed.
#Both coach G and the struck hopper wagon lifted into the air. The hopper wagon was restrained in its movement, and collided and jammed up against the nearby [[overhead line]] stanchions. The front of coach G was flattened as it slid under the hopper.
#Ten seconds into the accident, the rear of the HST, led by coach F, collided with the now stationary coach G. The energy release of the still moving rear of the HST bent the structure of coach G into a distinct half-curve at its midpoint. Five people died in coach G, which was almost completely destroyed.
#The rear of the HST, led by coach F, collided with the stationary rear of the freight train. Coach F was left derailed.

Seven passengers died; six at the scene and one in hospital.<ref name='inquiry'/>

The HST driver said he was aware of the isolated AWS but admitted to a lack of focus, referring to putting items in his bag before the incident twice in his tape-recorded conversation with signallers at the nearest trackside telephone:

{{quote| "I'm okay, yeah, I was just putting me stuff away in the bag the A, the A, the, the AWS has been isolated because some, some brake problem, I believe, so, I had no AWS so, I put me stuff away in the bag and the next thing I knew, I was coming up against red, up, such coming through, through...Through Southall, yeah"... ..."I was just putting me stuff away in the bag, like I would normally do, you see. (signaller: Right.) And all of a sudden I was whizzing through [[Hayes, Hillingdon|Hayes]] with a red at [[Southall railway station|Southall]] (signaller: Right.) I see the slow train crossing over then"<ref name='inquiry'/>{{rp|Annex 08}}}}

If the AWS or the ATP equipment on the HST had been working, the chance of the accident occurring would have been highly unlikely. Functioning AWS would have given the HST driver an audible warning that he was running towards a signal at danger and needed to start braking.<ref name=inquiry/> Failure to press the AWS cancelling button to acknowledge the warning would have caused the emergency brake to apply. The train was also fitted with fully operational [[Automatic Train Protection]] (ATP) equipment, both at trackside and in the London-end power car, but it was not switched on because neither drivers Harrison nor Tunnock were then qualified to drive with ATP. From 1996, {{cvt|125|mph}} high speed trains were driven by one driver only, following the removal of a requirement for a second driver.<ref name=inquiry/>