Editing Special operations (section)

== History ==
===Australia===
In [[World War II]], following advice from the British, Australia began raising special forces.<ref>Horner 1989, p. 21.</ref> The first units to be formed were [[Australian commandos|independent companies]], which began training at [[Wilson's Promontory]] in Victoria in early 1941 under the tutelage of British instructors. With an establishment of 17 officers and 256 men, the independent companies were trained as "stay behind" forces, a role that they were later employed in against the Japanese in the [[South West Pacific Area]] during 1942–43, most notably fighting a guerrilla campaign in [[Battle of Timor|Timor]], as well as actions in [[New Guinea campaign|New Guinea]].<ref>Horner 1989, pp. 22–6.</ref> In all, a total of eight independent companies were raised before they were reorganized in mid-1943 into [[commando]] squadrons and placed under the command of the divisional cavalry regiments that were re-designated as cavalry commando regiments. As a part of this structure, a total of 11 commando squadrons were raised.

They continued to act independently and were often assigned at the brigade level during the later stages of the war, taking part in the fighting in New Guinea, [[Bougainville campaign|Bougainville]] and [[Borneo Campaign (1945)|Borneo]], where they were employed largely in long-range reconnaissance and flank protection roles.<ref>Horner 1989, p. 26.</ref> In addition to these units, the Australians also raised the [[Z Special Unit]] and [[M Special Unit]]. M Special Unit was largely employed in an intelligence-gathering role, while Z Special Force undertook direct action missions. One of its most notable actions came as part of [[Operation Jaywick]], in which several Japanese ships were sunk in [[Singapore]] Harbour in 1943. A second raid on Singapore in 1944, known as [[Operation Rimau]], was unsuccessful.<ref>Horner 1989, pp. 26–7.</ref>

===Japan===
The [[Imperial Japanese Army]] first deployed army paratroops in combat during the [[Battle of Palembang]], on [[Sumatra]] in the [[Netherlands East Indies]], on 14 February 1942. The 425 men of the 1st Parachute Raiding Regiment seized [[Palembang]] airfield, while the paratroopers of the 2nd Parachute Raiding Regiment seized the town and its important oil refinery. Paratroops were subsequently deployed in the [[Burma campaign]].{{Citation needed|date=September 2022}}

However, as with similar airborne units created by the [[Allies of World War II|Allies]] and other [[Axis powers]], the Japanese paratroops suffered from a disproportionately high casualty rate, and the loss of men who required such extensive and expensive training limited their operations to only the most critical ones. Two regiments of ''Teishin Shudan'' were formed into the 1st Raiding Group, commanded by Major General [[Rikichi Tsukada]] under the control of the [[Southern Expeditionary Army Group]], during the [[Philippines campaign (1944–45)|Philippines campaign]]. Although structured as a division, its capabilities were much lower, as its six [[regiment]]s had manpower equivalent to a standard infantry [[battalion]], and it lacked any form of [[artillery]], and had to rely on other units for logistical support. Its men were no longer parachute-trained, but relied on aircraft for transport.{{Citation needed|date=September 2022}}

Some 750 men from the [[2nd Raiding Brigade]], of this group were assigned to attack American air bases on [[Luzon]] and [[Leyte]] on the night of 6 December 1944. They were flown in [[Mitsubishi Ki-57|Ki-57 transports]], but most of the aircraft were shot down. Some 300 [[commando]]s managed to land in the [[Burauen]] area on Leyte. The force destroyed some planes and inflicted casualties before they were destroyed.{{Citation needed|date=September 2022}}

===Poland===
On 20 September 1940 the Polish government in exile in London formed a special military unit in Britain with the soldiers called [[Cichociemni]] (silent and unseen) paratroopers to be deployed into Poland to help the resistance.<ref>{{cite web | url=https://polishhistory.pl/cichociemni-the-silent-unseen-elite-soldiers-of-the-polish-army-during-the-second-world-war/ | title=Cichociemni – the Silent Unseen. Elite soldiers of the Polish army during the Second World War | date=15 February 2022 | access-date=22 March 2023 | archive-date=30 December 2022 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221230165846/https://polishhistory.pl/cichociemni-the-silent-unseen-elite-soldiers-of-the-polish-army-during-the-second-world-war/ | url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="Grom">{{cite web | url=https://sofrep.com/specialoperations/everything-you-need-to-know-about-the-polish-special-unit-grom/ | title=Everything you need to know about the Polish Special Unit GROM | access-date=2022-08-14 | archive-date=2022-08-12 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220812005306/https://sofrep.com/specialoperations/everything-you-need-to-know-about-the-polish-special-unit-grom/ | url-status=live }}</ref> The Cichociemni were trained similar to the early British Special Forces with each soldier receiving specialization training for their specific task of deployment to Poland through a paradrop as a special operation to sustain a Polish state through training the members of the [[Polish resistance movement in World War II|resistance]] in fighting the German occupants.<ref name="Grom" /> This included [[Operation Tempest]] and uprisings in [[Operation Ostra Brama|Wilno]], [[Lwów Uprising|Lwów]] and 91 operators taking part in the [[Warsaw Uprising]].<ref>{{cite web | url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jun/10/honouring-poland-silent-unseen-fighters-resistance-nazi-british | title=Silent, unseen but not forgotten: Poland's resistance fighters honoured | website=[[TheGuardian.com]] | date=10 June 2016 | access-date=22 March 2023 | archive-date=13 February 2023 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230213082644/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jun/10/honouring-poland-silent-unseen-fighters-resistance-nazi-british | url-status=live }}</ref>

Previous to the formation of the [[GROM]] unit Polish special operations [[Operation Simoom|rescued six CIA, DIA and NSA officers]] from Iraq on 25 October 1990.<ref>{{cite web |title=How Poland Rescued CIA Spies From Iraq in 1990 |url=https://sofrep.com/news/how-poland-rescued-cia-spies-from-iraq-in-1990/ |website=SOFREP |access-date=15 August 2022 |language=en |date=15 September 2014 |archive-date=14 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220814203350/https://sofrep.com/news/how-poland-rescued-cia-spies-from-iraq-in-1990/ |url-status=live }}</ref>

===United States===
[[File:Colonel Benjamin Church.jpg|thumb|200px|[[Benjamin Church (ranger)|Colonel Benjamin Church]] (1639–1718) from the [[Plymouth Colony]], father of American Ranging and Rangers]]

Between the 17th and 18th centuries, there were wars between American colonists and Native American tribes. The United States established specialized [[United States Army Rangers|Rangers]]. Learning frontier skills from friendly Native Americans the Rangers helped carry out offensive strikes "frontier combat" against hostile Natives. Thus Ranger companies were formed to provide reconnaissance, intelligence, light infantry, and scouting. [[Benjamin Church (ranger)|Colonel Benjamin Church]] (c. 1639–1718) was the captain of the first Ranger force in America (1676). Several Ranger companies were established in the American colonies, including [[Knowlton's Rangers]], an elite corps of Rangers who supplied reconnaissance and espionage for [[George Washington]]'s Continental Army. [[Rogers' Rangers]] on Roger's Island, in modern-day Fort Edward, New York, is regarded as the "spiritual home" of the [[United States Special Operations Forces]], specifically the United States Army Rangers. These early American light infantry battalions were trained under [[Robert Rogers' 28 "Rules of Ranging"]], which is considered the first known manual of modern [[asymmetric warfare]] tactics used in modern special operations. <ref name="Grenier2005">{{Cite book |last=Grenier |first=John |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=JGCin1JJp8cC |title=The First Way of War: American War Making on the Frontier, 1607–1814 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |year=2005 |isbn=978-1-139-44470-5 |pages=35}}</ref> 

[[75th Ranger Regiment|Army Rangers]] were essential to several [[World War II]] campaigns such as [[Operation Torch|North Africa campaign "Operation Torch"]], [[Tunisian campaign]], [[Allied invasion of Sicily|Sicily campaign "Operation Husky"]], and [[Normandy landings]] during D-day, Ranger companies landed at [[Pointe du Hoc]].

[[File:Marine-raiders.jpg|thumb|Marine Raiders gathered in front of a Japanese dugout on [[Bougainville Island|Bougainville]].]]

In WWII, more elite units were needed to carry out special operations, raids, and reconnaissance, especially behind enemy lines. [[President Franklin D. Roosevelt]] established the [[Marine Raiders]] in February 1942 after Admiral Chester Nimitz requested commando units to raid Japanese-held islands. Major General Thomas Holcomb, the Marine Commandant, chose the name "Raiders" and created two battalions. Other specialized units such as [[Seabee#Naval Combat Demolition Units|Naval Combat Demolition Units]] and [[Underwater Demolition Team|Underwater Demolition Teams (UDTs)]], the predecessors of the Navy's current [[United States Navy SEALs|SEALs]], were formed in   1943.

Many more US special operation units had developed after and had fought in every major 20th-century  conflict. In the 21st century, 2003–2012 saw U.S. national security strategy rely on special operations to an unprecedented degree. Identifying, hunting, and killing terrorists became a central task in the [[Global War on Terrorism]] (GWOT). Linda Robinson, Adjunct Senior Fellow for U.S. National Security and Foreign Policy at the [[Council on Foreign Relations]], argued that the organizational structure became flatter and cooperation with the intelligence community was stronger, allowing special operations to move at the "speed of war".<ref name="Robinson SPECOPS">{{cite journal|last=Robinson|first=Linda|title=The Future of Special Operations: Beyond Kill and Capture|journal=Foreign Affairs|date=November–December 2012|volume=91|issue=6|pages=110–122}}</ref> Special operations appropriations are costly: Its budget went from $2.3 billion in 2001 to $10.5 billion in 2012.<ref name="Robinson SPECOPS" /> Some experts argued the investment was worthwhile, pointing to [[Killing of Osama bin Laden|the raid]] in May 2011 that killed [[Osama bin Laden]] in [[Abbottabad]], Pakistan. 

That raid was organized and overseen by Admiral [[William H. McRaven]], who was both a student and practitioner of special operations, having published a thesis on them in the 1990s.  McRaven's theory of special operations was that they had the potential to achieve significant operational, political, or strategic effects.  This potential required such units to be organized and commanded by special operations professionals rather than being subsumed into larger military units or operations, and required that "relative superiority" be gained during the special operation in question via characteristics such as simplicity, security, rehearsals, surprise, speed, and clearly but narrowly defined purpose.<ref>{{cite journal|last=Wirtz|first=James J.|title=The Abbottabad raid and the theory of special operations|url=https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01402390.2021.1933953|journal=Journal of Strategic Studies|date=2021|volume=45|issue=6–7|pages=972–992|doi=10.1080/01402390.2021.1933953|s2cid=236352806|access-date=2021-10-16|archive-date=2021-10-16|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211016151337/https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01402390.2021.1933953|url-status=live|url-access=subscription}}</ref>

Others claimed that special operations' emphasis precipitated a misconception that it was a substitute for prolonged conflict. "Raids and drone strikes are rarely decisive tactics and often incur significant political and diplomatic costs for the United States. Although raids and drone strikes are necessary to disrupt dire and imminent threats... special operations leaders readily admit that they should not be the central pillar of U.S. military strategy."<ref name="Robinson SPECOPS" /> Instead, special operations advocates stated that grand strategy should include their "indirect approach", suggesting that "the ability to operate with a small footprint and low-visibility, invest time and resources to foster interagency and foreign partnerships, develop deep cultural expertise, and rapidly adapt emerging technologies" was vital for maintaining deterrence and countering aggression.<ref>{{cite journal|last=Bilms|first=Kevin|title=Past as Prelude? Envisioning the Future of Special Operations|url=https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2021/11/12/past-as-prelude-envisioning-the-future-of-special-operations|journal=The Strategy Bridge|date=2021|pages=1|access-date=2022-02-10|archive-date=2022-02-10|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220210152826/https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2021/11/12/past-as-prelude-envisioning-the-future-of-special-operations|url-status=live}}</ref> "Special operations forces forge relationships that can last for decades with a diverse collection of groups: training, advising, and operating alongside other countries' militaries, police forces, tribes, militias or other information groups."<ref name="Robinson SPECOPS" />