Editing Status quo bias (section)

==Examples==
Status quo experiments have been conducted over many fields with [[Daniel Kahneman|Kahneman]], [[Richard Thaler|Thaler]], and [[Jack Knetsch|Knetsch]] (1991) creating experiments on the endowment effect, loss aversion and status quo bias.<ref name=Knetsch>{{cite journal | last1 = Kahneman | first1 = D. | last2 = Knetsch | first2 = J. L. | last3 = Thaler | first3 = R. H. | year = 1991 | title = Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias | journal = Journal of Economic Perspectives | volume = 5 | issue = 1| pages = 193–206 | doi=10.1257/jep.5.1.193| doi-access = free }}</ref> 
Experiments have also been conducted on the effect of   status quo bias on contributions to retirement plans<ref>{{cite journal |last1=van Erp |first1=Frank |last2=Vermeer |first2=Niels |last3=van Vuuren |first3=Daniel |title=Non-financial Determinants of Retirement: A Literature Review |journal=De Economist |date=2014-05-17 |volume=162 |issue=2 |pages=167–191 |doi=10.1007/s10645-014-9229-5|s2cid=254467417 }}</ref> and Fevrier & Gay (2004) study on status quo bias in organ donations consent.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Fevrier |first1=Philippe |last2=Bay |first2=Sebastien |title=Informed Consent Versus Presumed Consent: The Role of the Family in Organ Donations |journal=SSRN Electronic Journal |date=March 8, 2004 |doi=10.2139/ssrn.572241 }}</ref> 

'''Questionnaire:''' [[Samuelson]] and [[Zeckhauser]] (1988) demonstrated status quo bias using a questionnaire in which subjects faced a series of decision problems, which were alternately framed to be with and without a pre-existing status quo position. Subjects tended to remain with the status quo when such a position was offered to them.<ref name=Samuelson>{{cite journal | last1 = Samuelson | first1 = W. | last2 = Zeckhauser | first2 = R. | year = 1988 | title = Status quo bias in decision making | journal = Journal of Risk and Uncertainty | volume = 1 | pages = 7–59 | doi=10.1007/bf00055564| citeseerx = 10.1.1.632.3193 | s2cid = 5641133 }}</ref> Results of the experiment further show that status quo bias advantage relatively increases with the number of alternatives given within the choice set.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Kahneman |first1=Daniel |last2=Knetsch |first2=Jack L |last3=Thaler |first3=Richard H |date=1991-02-01 |title=Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias |journal=Journal of Economic Perspectives |language=en |volume=5 |issue=1 |pages=193–206 |doi=10.1257/jep.5.1.193 |issn=0895-3309|doi-access=free }}</ref> Furthermore, a weaker bias resulted from when the individual exhibited a strong discernible preference for a chosen alternative.<ref name="Samuelson" />

'''Hypothetical choice tasks:'''  Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988) gave subjects a hypothetical choice task in the following "neutral" version, in which no status quo was defined: "You are a serious reader of the financial pages but until recently you have had few funds to invest. That is when you inherited a large sum of money from your great-uncle. You are considering different portfolios. Your choices are to invest in: a moderate-risk company, a high-risk company, treasury bills, municipal bonds." Other subjects were presented with the same problem but with one of the options designated as the status quo. In this case, the opening passage continued: "A significant portion of this portfolio is invested in a moderate risk company ... (The tax and broker commission consequences of any changes are insignificant.)" The result was that an alternative became much more popular when it was designated as the status quo.<ref name=Samuelson />

'''Electric power consumers:''' California electric power consumers were asked about their preferences regarding trade-offs between service reliability and rates. The respondents fell into two groups, one with much more reliable service than the other. Each group was asked to state a preference among six combinations of reliability and rates, with one of the combinations designated as the status quo. A strong bias to the status quo was observed. Of those in the high-reliability group, 60.2 percent chose the status quo, whereas a mere 5.7 percent chose the low-reliability option that the other group had been experiencing, despite its lower rates. Similarly, of those in the low reliability group, 58.3 chose their low-reliability status quo, and only 5.8 chose the high-reliability option.<ref name=Consumer>{{cite journal|last=Hartman|first=Raymond S.|author2=Chi-Keung Woo |title=Consumer Rationality and the Status Quo|journal=Quarterly Journal of Economics|year=1991|volume=106|issue=1|pages=141–162|doi=10.2307/2937910|jstor=2937910}}</ref>

'''Automotive insurance consumers:''' The US states of [[New Jersey]] and [[Pennsylvania]] inadvertently ran a real-life experiment providing evidence of status quo bias in the early 1990s. As part of [[tort law]] reform programs, citizens were offered two options for their automotive insurance: an expensive option giving them full right to [[lawsuit|sue]] and a less expensive option with restricted rights to sue. <ref>{{cite journal |last1=Kahneman |first1=Daniel |last2=Knetsch |first2=Jack L. |last3=Thaler |first3=Richard H. |title=Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias |journal=The Journal of Economic Perspectives |date=1991 |volume=5 |issue=1 |pages=193–206 |doi=10.1257/jep.5.1.193 |jstor=1942711 |issn=0895-3309|doi-access=free }}</ref> In New Jersey the cheaper insurance was the default and in Pennsylvania the expensive insurance was the default. Johnson, Hershey, Meszaros and Kunreuther (1993) conducted a questionnaire to test whether consumers will stay with the default option for car insurance. They found that only 20% of New Jersey drivers changed from the default option and got the more expensive option. Also, only 25% of Pennsylvanian drivers changed from the default option and got the cheaper insurance. Therefore, framing and status quo bias can have significant financial consequences.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=JOHNSON |first1=ERIC J. |last2=HERSHEY |first2=JOHN |last3=MESZAROS |first3=JACQUELINE |last4=KUNREUTHER |first4=HOWARD |title=Framing, Probability Distortions, and Insurance Decisions |journal=Journal of Risk and Uncertainty |date=1993 |volume=7 |issue=1 |pages=35–51 |doi=10.1007/BF01065313 |jstor=41760693 |s2cid=154911666 |url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/41760693 |issn=0895-5646|url-access=subscription }}</ref> 

'''General practitioners:''' [[Lieke H. H. M. Boonen|Boonen]], [[Bas Donkers|Donkers]] and [[Frederik T. Schut|Schut]] created two discrete choice experiments for Dutch residents to conclude a consumer’s preference for general practitioners and whether they would leave their current practitioner. The Dutch health care system was chosen as general practitioners play the role of a gatekeeper. The experiment was conducted to investigate the effect of status quo bias on a consumer’s decision to leave their current practitioner, with knowledge of other practitioners and their current relationship with their practitioner determining the role status quo bias plays.<ref name=":5">{{cite journal | last1=Boonen | first1=Lieke H. H. M. | last2=Donkers | first2=Bas | last3=Schut | first3=Frederik T. | title=Channeling Consumers to Preferred Providers and the Impact of Status Quo Bias: Does Type of Provider Matter? | journal=Health Services Research | publisher=Wiley | volume=46 | issue=2 | date=2010-10-28 | issn=0017-9124 | doi=10.1111/j.1475-6773.2010.01196.x | pages=510–530 | pmid=21029092 | pmc=3064917 }}</ref>  

Through the questionnaire it was shown that respondents were aware of the lack of added benefit aligned with their current general practitioner and were aware of the quality differences between potential practitioners. 35% of respondents were willing to a pay a copayment to stay with their current general practitioner, while only 30% were willing to switch to another practitioner in exchange for a financial gain. These consumers were willing to pay a considerable amount to continue going to their current practitioner up to €17.32.  For general practitioners the value assigned by the consumer to staying with their current one exceeded the total value assigned to all other attributes tested such as discounts or a certificate of quality.<ref name=":5" />

Within the discrete choice experiment the respondents were offered a choice between their current practitioner and a hypothetical provider with identical attributes. The respondents were 40% more likely to choose their current practitioner than if both options were hypothetical providers, which would result in the probability being 50% percent for both. It was found that status quo bias had a massive impact on which general practitioner the respondents would choose. Despite consumers being offered positive financial incentives, qualitative incentives or the addition of negative financial incentives respondents were still extremely hesitant to switch from their current practitioner. The impact of status quo bias was determined as making attempts to channel consumers away from the general practitioner they are currently seeing a daunting task.<ref name=":5" />