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Strategic voting
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== Common types of strategic voting == {{More citations needed section|date=April 2024}} Some types of strategic voting described in the literature are: ; {{visible anchor|Compromising}}, includes [[Favorite betrayal criterion|''favorite betrayal'']].<ref name="Armytage-SVN">{{cite journal | last=Green-Armytage | first=James | title=Strategic voting and nomination | journal=Social Choice and Welfare | volume=42 | issue=1 | date=2014 | issn=0176-1714 | doi=10.1007/s00355-013-0725-3 | pages=111β138| url=https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/32200/1/MPRA_paper_32200.pdf }}</ref>{{rp|117}} {{See also|Lesser-evil voting}} : A voter ranks or rates a candidate they dislike β a "lesser evil" β higher in the hope of getting them elected, thus preventing an even worse candidate from being elected. : This type of strategic voting includes the [[First-past-the-post election system|first-past-the-post]] strategy of voting for the [[Lesser of two evils principle#In modern elections|lesser of two evils]], as well as the more general [[Favorite betrayal criterion|''favorite betrayal'']] strategy. A sufficiently strong compromising incentive, possibly strengthened by a [[strategic nomination|strategic exit]] incentive,<ref name="Armytage-SVN" />{{rp|118}} can lead to or reinforce two-party rule as voters will abandon minor-party candidates to support stronger major-party candidates. This effect is called [[Duverger's law]].<ref name=":12">{{Cite book |last=VoliΔ |first=Ismar |url=http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/jj.7492228 |title=Making Democracy Count |year=2024 |publisher=Princeton University Press |isbn=978-0-691-24882-0 |chapter=2: Duverger's law |doi=10.2307/jj.7492228}}</ref> : While methods that pass the [[sincere favorite criterion]] never incentivize a voter to rank or rate a lesser evil above one's favorite, they may still incentivize voters to rank or rate the lesser evil ''higher''. For instance, in [[approval voting]], a voter may have an incentive to strategically approve a lesser evil that they dislike. Although not considered favorite betrayal, this is also a type of compromise strategy. : ''Most affects:'' [[Instant-runoff voting|instant-runoff]] (RCV), [[two-round system]], and (especially strong for) [[Plurality voting|plurality]].<ref name="Hodge Klima 2018 p. 922">{{cite book |last1=Hodge |first1=J.K. |title=The Mathematics of Voting and Elections: A Hands-On Approach |last2=Klima |first2=R.E. |publisher=American Mathematical Society |year=2018 |isbn=978-1-4704-4287-3 |series=Mathematical World |chapter=6}}</ref> : ''Also affected:'' [[Borda count|Borda]], [[Score voting|Score]], [[approval voting]].<ref name="Armytage-SVN" />{{rp|at=prop. 4, note}} : ''Immune:'' [[Coombs' method]],<ref name="Armytage-SVN"/>{{rp|at=prop. 4, note}} [[Anti-plurality voting|antiplurality]]. ; {{visible anchor|Burial|Burying}} : A voter ranks or rates a candidate lower in the hope of defeating them. For example, a voter may insincerely rank or rate a perceived strong candidate last in order to help their preferred candidate win.<ref name="Armytage-SVN" /> : Game theory arguments suggest that if burial incentive is sufficiently severe, a method may induce a race to the bottom. Each voter follows a strategy that, in isolation, helps their candidate win, but the result is that a candidate that nobody likes gets elected instead.<ref name="Monroe">{{Cite conference |last=Monroe |first=Burt |date=September 2001 |title=Raising Turkeys: An Extension and Devastating Application of Myerson-Weber Voting Equilibrium |url=https://www.accuratedemocracy.com/archive/condorcet/Monroe/004004MonroeBurt.pdf |conference=American Political Science Association}}</ref> : ''Most affects:'' [[Borda count|Borda]], [[Anti-plurality voting|antiplurality]], [[approval voting]], and [[Score voting|Score]].<ref name="Armytage-SVN" /> : ''Also affected:'' Most [[Condorcet method]]s, with the exception of IRV-Condorcet hybrids.<ref name="Monroe" /><ref name="Armytage-Hare">{{cite journal | last=Green-Armytage | first=James | title=Four Condorcet-Hare hybrid methods for single-winner elections. | journal=Voting Matters | volume=29 | issue=1 | date=2011 | url=http://www.mcdougall.org.uk/voting-matters/ISSUE29/I29P1.pdf}}</ref><ref name="h794">{{cite journal | last=Green-Armytage | first=James | title=A Dodgson-Hare synthesis | journal=Constitutional Political Economy | volume=34 | issue=3 | date=2023 | issn=1043-4062 | doi=10.1007/s10602-023-09392-2 | pages=458β470}}</ref> : ''Immune:'' [[Instant-runoff voting]] and [[plurality voting]]. ; {{visible anchor|Turkey-raising|Pushover|Raiding|Pied-piper}} (sometimes called ''pushover'' or ''pied-piper.'' Includes ''[[Party raiding|raiding]]''.) : A voter gives a high rank to a weak (i.e. ''pushover'') candidate, but not with the intent of getting them elected. Instead, the voter intends for the weak candidate to eliminate a strong alternative, who would otherwise keep the voter's preferred candidate from winning.<ref>{{cite web |author=Matthew S. Cook |date=March 2011 |title=Voting with Bidirectional Elimination |url=http://economics.stanford.edu/files/Matthew%20Cook%20Honors%20Thesis.pdf |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111120014436/http://economics.stanford.edu/files/Matthew%20Cook%20Honors%20Thesis.pdf |archive-date=20 November 2011 |access-date=21 April 2012 |publisher=Voting with Bidirectional Elimination}}</ref> [[Party Raiding|Party raiding]] is a well-known example of such a strategy.<ref name="alvar99b2">{{cite web |author=R. Michael Alvarez |author2=Jonathan Nagler |date=1999 |title=Analysis of Crossover and Strategic Voting |url=http://polmeth.wustl.edu/media/Paper/alvar99b.pdf |url-status=dead |archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20100625234325/http://polmeth.wustl.edu/media/Paper/alvar99b.pdf |archivedate=25 June 2010 |accessdate=21 April 2014 |publisher=Society for Political Methodology (American Political Science Association; Washington University in St. Louis)}}</ref><ref>Negrin, Matt. "[https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/OTUS/democrats-decide-winner-michigan/story?id=15809682 Could Democrats Decide the Winner in Michigan?]" ''ABC News,'' 28 Feb. 2012. Retrieved 9 Dec. 2017.</ref> : ''Most affects:'' Multi-round rules like [[Instant-runoff voting|instant-runoff]], [[Two-round system|two-round]], and [[Partisan primary|primary elections]]. : ''Immune:'' [[Plurality voting|Plurality]] and all commonly-used [[rated voting]] systems, including [[score voting]] and [[approval voting]]. ; {{visible anchor|Compression|Bullet voting|Truncation|Exaggeration}} (sometimes called ''leveling''. Includes ''[[bullet voting]]'' and ''truncation.'') : Compression is a strategy where a voter refuses to disclose which of two candidates they honestly prefer (i.e. both candidates are given the same rating or ranking). Compression is unique in that it does not involve a rank reversal: in compression, a voter who prefers A to B doesn't claim to prefer B to A, only that they're indifferent between them. : Like ''compromising'' and ''burial'', the strategy involves [[Exaggeration|exaggerating]] differences between candidates: ranking or rating lesser evils equal to one's favorite is similar to compromising, and ranking or rating okay candidates equal to one's most loathed candidate is similar to burial. The latter is also called ''truncation''. : Compression has the advantage of making it less likely for a disliked candidate to win, but the disadvantage that it reduces the chances of the best candidate winning. : ''Most affects'': [[Rated voting]].<ref name="Nagel">{{Cite journal |last=Nagel |first=Jack H. |date=February 2007 |title=The Burr Dilemma in Approval Voting |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1111/j.1468-2508.2007.00493.x |journal=[[The Journal of Politics]] |volume=69 |issue=1 |pages=43β58 |doi=10.1111/j.1468-2508.2007.00493.x |jstor=10.1111/j.1468-2508.2007.00493.x |quote=Therefore, strategic approval voting consists primarily of truncation and expansion of the approved list...}}</ref> : ''Immune:'' [[Random ballot]] and methods that require strict rankings.
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