Editing Substance theory (section)

==Ancient Greek philosophy==
===Aristotle<!--'Primary substance', 'Primary substances', 'Secondary substance' and 'Secondary substances' redirect here-->===
{{main|Ousia}}
[[Aristotle]] used the term "substance" ({{langx|el|οὐσία}} ''[[ousia]]'') in a secondary sense for [[genus|genera]] and [[species]] understood as [[hylomorphism|hylomorphic forms]]. Primarily, however, he used it with regard to his [[Categories (Aristotle)|category]] of substance, the specimen ("this person" or "this horse") or [[identity (philosophy)|individual]], ''qua'' individual, who survives [[accident (philosophy)|accidental change]] and in whom the [[essence|essential properties]] inhere that define those [[problem of universals|universals]].{{quote|A substance—that which is called a substance most strictly, primarily, and most of all—is that which is neither said of a subject nor in a subject, e.g. the individual man or the individual horse. The species in which the things primarily called substances are, are called secondary substances, as also are the genera of these species. For example, the individual man belongs in a species, man, and animal is a genus of the species; so these—both man and animal—are called secondary substances.<ref name="Ackrill1988">{{cite book |first=J.L. |last=Ackrill |year=1988 |title=A New Aristotle Reader |publisher=Princeton University Press |isbn=9781400835829 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Cz8-DgxETuAC&pg=PA7 |page=7}}</ref>|Aristotle|''[[Categories (Aristotle)|Categories]]'' 2a13 (trans. [[J. L. Ackrill]])}}

In chapter 6 of book I the ''[[Physics (Aristotle)|Physics]]'' Aristotle argues that any change must be analysed in reference to the property of an invariant subject: as it was before the change and thereafter. Thus, in his hylomorphic account of change, ''matter'' serves as a relative substratum of transformation, i.e., of changing (substantial) form. In the ''Categories'', properties are predicated only of substance, but in chapter 7 of book I of the ''Physics'', Aristotle discusses substances coming to be and passing away in the "unqualified sense" wherein '''primary substances'''<!--boldface per WP:R#PLA--> (πρῶται οὐσίαι; ''Categories'' 2a35) are generated from (or perish into) a material substratum by having gained (or lost) the essential property that formally defines substances of that kind (in the secondary sense). Examples of such a substantial change include not only conception and dying, but also metabolism, e.g., the bread a man eats becomes the man. On the other hand, in [[accident (philosophy)|accidental]] change, because the essential property remains unchanged, by identifying the substance with its formal essence, substance may thereby serve as the relative subject matter or property-bearer of change in a qualified sense (i.e., barring matters of life or death). An example of this sort of accidental change is a change of color or size: a tomato becomes red, or a juvenile horse grows.

Aristotle thinks that in addition to primary substances (which are particulars), there are '''secondary substances'''<!--boldface per WP:R#PLA--> (δεύτεραι οὐσίαι), which are universals (''Categories'' 2a11–a18).<ref>{{Cite book|url=https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/aristotle-categories/|title=Aristotle's Categories|first=Paul|last=Studtmann|editor-first=Edward N.|editor-last=Zalta|date=January 9, 2018|publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University|via=Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy}}</ref>

However, according to [[Aristotelian view of God|Aristotle's theology]], a form of invariant form exists without matter, beyond the [[cosmos]], powerless and oblivious, in the eternal substance of the [[unmoved movers]].

===Pyrrhonism===
Early [[Pyrrhonism]] rejected the idea that substances exist. [[Pyrrho]] put this as:

<blockquote>"Whoever wants to live well ([[eudaimonia]]) must consider these three questions: First, how are ''pragmata'' (ethical matters, affairs, topics) by nature? Secondly, what attitude should we adopt towards them? Thirdly, what will be the outcome for those who have this attitude?" Pyrrho's answer is that "As for ''pragmata'' they are all [[adiaphora]] (undifferentiated by a logical differentia), ''astathmēta'' (unstable, unbalanced, not measurable), and ''anepikrita'' (unjudged, unfixed, undecidable). Therefore, neither our sense-perceptions nor our ''doxai'' (views, theories, beliefs) tell us the truth or lie; so we certainly should not rely on them. Rather, we should be ''adoxastoi'' (without views), ''aklineis'' (uninclined toward this side or that), and ''akradantoi'' (unwavering in our refusal to choose), saying about every single one that it no more is than it is not or it both is and is not or it neither is nor is not.<ref>{{cite book |last=Beckwith |first=Christopher I. |title=Greek Buddha: Pyrrho's Encounter with Early Buddhism in Central Asia |publisher=[[Princeton University Press]] |year=2015 |pages=22–23 |url=http://press.princeton.edu/chapters/s10500.pdf |isbn=9781400866328}}</ref></blockquote>

===Stoicism===
{{See also|Stoic categories}}
The [[Stoicism|Stoics]] rejected the idea that [[incorporeal]] beings inhere in matter, as taught by [[Plato]]. They believed that all being is [[Matter|corporeal]] infused with a creative fire called [[pneuma]]. Thus they developed a scheme of [[Categories (Stoic)|categories]] different from [[Categories (Aristotle)|Aristotle's]] based on the ideas of [[Anaxagoras]] and [[Timaeus (dialogue)|Timaeus]]. The fundamental basis of Stoicism in this context was a universally consistent [[ethical]] and moral [[code]] that should be maintained at all time, the physical belief of beings as matter is an important philosophical [[footnote]], as it marked the start of thinking as beings as inherently linked to [[reality]], instead of to some [[Abstract and concrete|abstract]] heaven.<ref>{{Cite journal|author=LEWIS, ERIC|title=Diogenes Laertius and the Stoic Theory of Mixture |year=1988|journal=Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies|volume=35 |issue=35|pages=84–90|doi=10.1111/j.2041-5370.1988.tb00202.x |jstor=43646211 |doi-access=free}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/1584833|title=Stoic and Aristotelian Notions of Substance in Basil of Caesarea|author=Robertson, David G.|year=1998|journal=Vigiliae Christianae|volume=52|issue=4|pages=393–417|doi=10.2307/1584833|jstor=1584833 |url-access=subscription}}</ref>

===Neoplatonism===
[[Neoplatonists]] argue that beneath the surface phenomena that present themselves to our senses are three higher spiritual principles or [[Hypostasis (philosophy and religion)|hypostases]], each one more sublime than the preceding. For [[Plotinus]], these are the soul or [[anima mundi|world-soul]], being/intellect or divine mind (''[[nous]]''), and "the one".<ref name=Paula>''Neoplatonism (Ancient Philosophies)'' by Pauliina Remes (2008), University of California Press {{ISBN|0520258347}}, pages 48–52.</ref>