Editing Tet Offensive (section)

== Background ==

=== South Vietnam political context ===
Leading up to the Tet Offensive were years of marked political instability and a series of coups after the [[1963 South Vietnamese coup]]. In 1966, the leadership in South Vietnam, represented by the Head of State [[Nguyễn Văn Thiệu]] and Prime Minister [[Nguyễn Cao Kỳ]] were persuaded to commit to democratic reforms in an effort to stabilize the political situation at a [[Declaration of Honolulu, 1966|conference in Honolulu]]. Prior to 1967, the South Vietnamese constituent assembly was in the process of drafting a new constitution and eventual elections.<ref>{{Cite web|last=|first=|date=October 5, 2017|title=50th Anniversary 1967 Election|url=https://vietnam.unsw.ADFA.Edu.au/50th-anniversary-south-Vietnams-1967-presidential-election/|access-date=|website=}}</ref> The political situation in South Vietnam, after the [[1967 South Vietnamese presidential election]], looked increasingly stable. Rivalries between South Vietnam's generals were becoming less chaotic, and Thiệu and Kỳ formed a joint ticket for the election. Despite efforts by North Vietnam to disrupt elections, higher than usual turnouts saw a political turning point towards a more democratic structure and ushered in a period of political stability after a series of coups had characterized the preceding years.<ref name=":1"/>

Protests, campaigning and the atmosphere of elections were interpreted by the [[Politburo of the Communist Party of Vietnam]] and [[Lê Duẩn]] as signs that the population would embrace a 'general uprising' against the government of South Vietnam. The Politburo sought to exploit perceived instability and maintain political weakness in South Vietnam.<ref>{{Cite web|date=2018-01-29|title=The Importance of the Vietnam War's Tet Offensive|url=https://warontherocks.com/2018/01/importance-vietnam-wars-tet-offensive/|access-date=2021-01-27|website=War on the Rocks}}</ref>

=== United States war strategy ===
{{details|topic=the U.S. effort prior to 1968|The United States and the Vietnam War #Search and destroy, the strategy of attrition}}
During late 1967, the question whether the U.S. strategy of attrition was working in South Vietnam weighed heavily on the minds of the American public and the administration of President [[Lyndon B. Johnson]]. General [[William Westmoreland|William C. Westmoreland]], the commander of the [[Military Assistance Command, Vietnam]] (MACV), believed that if a "crossover point" could be reached by which the number of communist troops killed or captured during military operations exceeded those recruited or replaced, the Americans would win the war. There was a discrepancy, however, between the [[Order of battle for the Viet Cong|order of battle]] estimates of the MACV and the [[Central Intelligence Agency]] (CIA) concerning the strength of VC guerrilla forces within South Vietnam.<ref name="DouganWeiss" />{{rp|22–23}} In September, members of the MACV intelligence services and the CIA met to prepare a Special National Intelligence Estimate that would be used by the administration to gauge U.S. success in the conflict.

[[File:Gen William C Westmoreland.jpg|thumb|General [[William Westmoreland|William C. Westmoreland]], [[Military Assistance Command, Vietnam|COMUSMACV]]]]

Provided with an enemy intelligence windfall accrued during [[Operation Cedar Falls|Operations Cedar Falls]] and [[Operation Junction City|Junction City]], the CIA members of the group believed that the number of VC guerrillas, irregulars, and cadre within the South could be as high as 430,000. The MACV Combined Intelligence Center, on the other hand, maintained that the number could be no more than 300,000.<ref name="DouganWeiss" />{{rp|22}} Westmoreland was deeply concerned about the possible perceptions of the American public to such an increased estimate since communist troop strength was routinely provided to reporters during press briefings.<ref>Hammond, p. 326.</ref> According to MACV's chief of intelligence, General [[Joseph A. McChristian]], the new figures "would create a political bombshell", since they were positive proof that the North Vietnamese "had the capability and the will to continue a protracted war of attrition".<ref name="DouganWeiss" />{{rp|22}}

In May, MACV attempted to obtain a compromise from the CIA by maintaining that VC militias did not constitute a fighting force but were essentially low-level fifth columnists used for information collection.<ref name="DouganWeiss" />{{rp|23}} With the groups deadlocked, George Carver, CIA Special Assistant for Vietnam Affairs, represented the CIA in the last stage of the negotiations. In September, Carver devised a compromise: The CIA would drop its insistence on including the irregulars in the final tally of forces and add a prose addendum to the estimate that would explain the agency's position.<ref>Hammond, pp. 326, 327.</ref> George Allen, Carver's deputy, laid responsibility for the agency's capitulation at the feet of [[Richard Helms]], the director of the CIA. He believed that "it was a political problem&nbsp;... [Helms] didn't want the agency&nbsp;... contravening the policy interest of the administration."<ref name="DouganWeiss" />{{rp|23}}{{efn|This Order of Battle controversy resurfaced in 1982 when Westmoreland filed a lawsuit against [[CBS News]] after the airing of its program, ''The Uncounted Enemy: A Vietnam Deception'', which aired had on 23 January 1982.}}

During the second half of 1967 the administration had become alarmed by criticism, both inside and outside the government, and by reports of declining public support for its Vietnam policies.<ref>Those in the administration and the military who urged a change in strategy included: Secretary of Defense [[Robert S. McNamara]]; Undersecretary of State [[Nicholas Katzenbach]]; Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs [[William Bundy]]; Ambassador to South Vietnam [[Henry Cabot Lodge]]; General [[Creighton W. Abrams]], deputy commander of MACV; and Lieutenant General [[Frederick C. Weyand]], commander of II Field Force, Vietnam. Lewis Sorley, ''A Better War''. New York: Harvest Books, 1999, p. 6. Throughout the year, the ''Pentagon Papers'' claimed, Johnson had discounted  any "negative analysis" of U.S. strategy by the CIA and the Pentagon offices of International Security Affairs and System Analysis, and had instead "seized upon optimistic reports from General Westmoreland." Neil Sheehan, et al. ''The Pentagon Papers as Reported by the New York Times''. New York: Ballantine, 1971, p. 592.</ref> According to public opinion polls, the percentage of Americans who believed that the U.S. had made a mistake by sending troops to Vietnam had risen from 25 percent in 1965 to 45 percent by December 1967.<ref name="DouganWeiss" />{{rp|68}} This trend was fueled not by a belief that the struggle was not worthwhile, but by mounting casualty figures, rising taxes, and the feeling that there was no end to the war in sight.<ref>Karnow, pp. 545–546.</ref> A poll taken in November indicated that 55 percent wanted a tougher war policy, exemplified by the public belief that "it was an error for us to have gotten involved in Vietnam in the first place. But now that we're there, let's win—or get out."<ref name="Karnow546">Karnow, p. 546.</ref> This prompted the administration to launch a so-called "success offensive", a concerted effort to alter the widespread public perception that the war had reached a stalemate and to convince the American people that the administration's policies were succeeding. Under the leadership of National Security Advisor [[Walt W. Rostow]], the news media then was inundated by a wave of effusive optimism.

Every statistical indicator of progress, from "kill ratios" and "body counts" to village pacification, was fed to the press and to the [[United States Congress|Congress]]. "We are beginning to win this struggle", asserted Vice President [[Hubert H. Humphrey]] on [[NBC]]'s ''[[Today (U.S. TV program)|Today]]'' show in mid-November. "We are on the offensive. The territory is being gained. We are making steady progress."<ref name="DouganWeiss" />{{rp|66}} At the end of November, the campaign reached its climax when Johnson summoned Westmoreland and the new U.S. Ambassador, [[Ellsworth Bunker]], to Washington, D.C., for what was billed as a "high-level policy review". Upon their arrival, the two men bolstered the administration's claims of success. From Saigon, pacification chief [[Robert Komer]] asserted that the [[Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support|CORDS]] pacification program in the countryside was succeeding, and that sixty-eight percent of the South Vietnamese population was under the control of Saigon while only seventeen percent was under the control of the VC.<ref name="Schmitz">Schmitz</ref>{{rp|56}} General [[Bruce Palmer Jr.]], one of Westmoreland's three Field Force commanders, claimed that "the Viet Cong has been defeated" and that "He can't get food and he can't recruit. He has been forced to change his strategy from trying to control the people on the coast to try to survive in the mountains."<ref name="Schmitz" />{{rp|58}}

Westmoreland was even more emphatic in his assertions. At an address at the [[National Press Club (USA)|National Press Club]] on 21 November, he reported that, as of the end of 1967, the communists were "unable to mount a major offensive&nbsp;... I am absolutely certain that whereas in 1965 the enemy was winning, today he is certainly losing...We have reached an important point when the end begins to come into view."<ref name="DouganWeiss" />{{rp|66}} By the end of the year the administration's approval rating had indeed crept up by eight percent, but an early January Gallup poll indicated that forty-seven percent of the American public still disapproved of the President's handling of the war.<ref name="DouganWeiss" />{{rp|69}} The American public, "more confused than convinced, more doubtful than despairing&nbsp;... adopted a 'wait and see' attitude."<ref name="DouganWeiss" />{{rp|67}} During a discussion with an interviewer from ''[[Time (magazine)|Time]]'' magazine, Westmoreland dared the communists to launch an attack: "I hope they try something because we are looking for a fight."<ref name="Karnow514">Karnow, p. 514.</ref>