Editing Union security agreement (section)

==Rationale==
The [[free-rider problem]] is often cited as the rationale for union security agreements. A classic study of the free rider problem is presented in [[Mancur Olson]]'s 1965 work, ''[[The Logic of Collective Action]].''<ref>Olson, Mancur. ''The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups.'' 18th rev. ed. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971. {{ISBN|0-674-53751-3}}</ref> In labor relations, the free rider problem exists because the costs of organizing a union and negotiating a contract with the employer can be very high, and because employers will find it too cumbersome to adopt multiple wage and benefit scales, some or all non-union members may find that the contract benefits them as well.<ref name="Cites">Towers, Brian. ''The Representation Gap: Change and Reform in the British and American Workplace.'' Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1997. {{ISBN|0-19-829319-4}}; Holley, William H.; Jennings, Kenneth M.; and Wolters, Roger S. ''The Labor Relations Process.'' 9th ed. Florence, Ky.: Cengage Learning, 2008. {{ISBN|0-324-42144-3}}; Beatty, David M. ''Putting the Charter to Work: Designing a Constitutional Labour Code.'' Toronto: McGill-Queen's Press - MQUP, 1987. {{ISBN|0-7735-0601-2}}; Bar-Niv, Zvi H. ''International Labour Law Reports, Volume 8.'' Leiden, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1990. {{ISBN|0-7923-0429-2}}</ref>

Thus, the incentive is for some individual workers to "ride for free" by not paying the costs, which can lead to the collapse of the union and no collective bargaining agreement.<ref name="Cites" /> If the union collapses, each worker may be worse off than if the union had negotiated the agreement.<ref name="Cites" /> Union security agreements are one way of ensuring that all (or nearly all) workers pay their fair share of the costs of collective bargaining (e.g., join the union and pay dues).<ref name="Cites" /><ref>Not all scholars agree that a free rider problem exists in labor relations. See: Baird, Charles W. ''Opportunity or Privilege: Labor Legislation in America.'' New York: Transaction Publishers, 1984. {{ISBN|0-912051-02-7}}</ref>

One solution is for the state to provide rights (such as the right to administer welfare or pension funds, or to participate in a [[works council]]) or benefits (such as [[Unemployment benefits|unemployment insurance]]) only to unions or their members.<ref name="Rothstein">Rothstein, Bo. "Labour-Market Institutions and Working-Class Strength." In ''Power Resources Theory and the Welfare State: A Critical Approach: Essays Collected in Honour of Walter Korpi.'' Julia Sila O'Connor and Gregg Matthew Olsen, eds. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998. {{ISBN|0-8020-7171-6}}</ref><ref name="Daubler">Daubler, Wolfgang. "The Individual and the Collective: No Problem for German Labor Law?" ''Comparative Labor Law and Policy Journal.'' 10:505 (Summer 1989).</ref> Another solution is for unions to engage in members-only collective bargaining, which restricts the benefits of the contract to union members.<ref>[[Charles Morris (legal educator)|Morris, Charles]]. ''[[The Blue Eagle At Work|The Blue Eagle At Work: Reclaiming Democratic Rights In The American Workplace]].'' Ithaca, N.Y.: ILR Press, 2004. {{ISBN|0-8014-4317-2}}.</ref><ref name="Ulman">Ulman, Lloyd; Eichengreen, Barry J.; and Dickens, William T. ''Labor and an Integrated Europe.'' Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1993. {{ISBN|0-8157-8681-6}}</ref>