Editing Unit 101 (section)

==Background==
Following the [[1948 Arab–Israeli War]], Israel was faced with cross-border raids and infiltrations by Arab militants and non-militants respectively. Many of these were small scale infiltrations that consisted of unarmed Palestinian refugees attempting to rejoin their families and of smugglers bringing in contraband for Israeli markets.<ref name="UNS/636">'No one would deny that the Israel authorities would be justified, and are justified, in using strong measures to check (infiltration), in so far as damage to property or loss of life results. But not everyone who crosses the armistice demarcation line does so with criminal intent. Acts of violence are indeed committed, but as the volume of illegal crossings of the demarcation line is so considerable, if one is to judge from the available statistics, it seems probable that ''many crossings are carried out by persons—sometimes, I understand, even by children—with no criminal object in view''. 'England's ambassador to the UN [http://domino.un.org//UNISPAL.NSF//9a798adbf322aff38525617b006d88d7/eef5490a45758c7c05256727006e0e6c!OpenDocument S/635/Rev.1] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090504233428/http://domino.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/9a798adbf322aff38525617b006d88d7/eef5490a45758c7c05256727006e0e6c!OpenDocument |date=2009-05-04 }} 9 November 1953</ref> These were later followed with attacks launched by [[Palestinian Fedayeen|refugees]] often motivated by economic reasons, but they were quickly adopted by the military of the neighboring Arab states, who organized them into semi-formal brigades which mounted larger scale operations from 1954 onwards.<ref name=Almog>{{cite book|title=Britain, Israel, and the United States, 1955–1958: Beyond Suez|author=Orna Almog|year=2003|page=20|publisher=[[Routledge]]|isbn=0-7146-5246-6}}</ref> According to Israel, about 9,000 attacks were launched from 1949 to 1956,<ref>{{cite book|title=Big Lies: Demolishing The Myths of the Propaganda War Against Israel|url=https://archive.org/details/bigliesdemolishi00meil|url-access=limited|author=David Meir-Levi|year=2005|page=[https://archive.org/details/bigliesdemolishi00meil/page/n19 36]|publisher=[[David Horowitz Freedom Center|Center for the Study of Popular Culture]]|isbn=1-886442-46-0}}</ref> resulting in hundreds of Israeli civilian casualties.<ref>[http://www.jafi.org.il/education/100/concepts/d3.html The Arab Israeli Conflict 1949–1956] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20061001230819/http://www.jafi.org.il/education/100/concepts/d3.html |date=2006-10-01 }}</ref><ref>[[Howard Sachar]], ''History of Israel'', p. 450. cited at {{cite web|publisher=[[Jewish Agency for Israel]] |title=Fedayeen Raids 1951–1956 |url=http://www.jafi.org.il/education/100/maps/fed.html |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090623224146/http://www.jafi.org.il/education/100/maps/fed.html |archive-date=June 23, 2009 }}</ref><ref>[http://www.adl.org/ISRAEL/Record/sinai.asp The 1956 Sinai Campaign] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071016201124/http://www.adl.org/ISRAEL/Record/sinai.asp |date=2007-10-16 }}</ref>

At the same time the IDF was ill-prepared to respond to these raids. The [[Palmach]], its three best combat units of the 1948 war, had been disbanded at Ben-Gurion's instruction.<ref name="Palmach">{{cite web|url=http://www.palmach.org.il/show_item.asp?itemId=8525&levelId=42858&itemType=0|title=Dismantling of the Palmach|access-date=2009-10-15}}</ref> Many experienced officers had left the army after the war, and Israeli society had undergone a difficult period of [[Austerity in Israel|impoverishment]]. As a result, the IDF did not have any units capable of effective reprisal, and did not perform well in offensive operations.<ref name=Morris>{{cite book|title=Israel's Border Wars, 1949–1956: Arab Infiltration, Israeli Retaliation, and the Countdown to the Suez War|author=Benny Morris|year=1993|page=251|publisher=[[Oxford University Press]]|isbn=0-19-829262-7}}</ref>

{{Quote|text=The Palestinians must learn that they will pay a high price for Israeli lives.|sign=A conversation between [[David Ben-Gurion]] and [[Ariel Sharon]].<ref name="Specwar" />}}

As a response to this problem the IDF formed Unit 30 in 1951—a secret unit that belonged to the [[Southern Command (Israel)|IDF Southern Command]].<ref name="Unit 101 (history) - Specwar.info ">{{cite web|url=http://en.specwar.info/special_forces/Unit_101/history.php|title=Unit 101 (history) |publisher=Specwar.info |access-date=2009-09-06}}</ref> Their purpose was to execute [[reprisal operations|retribution missions]] while operating in compact and well-trained teams. Unfortunately for the IDF the officers lacked the required training and executed their duties poorly, leading to the unit's disbandment in 1952.<ref name="Unit 101 (history) - Specwar.info "/>

One of Sharon's final operations before leaving the army in 1952 was the semi-successful [[Operation Bin Nun Alef]] into [[Jordan]].<ref>{{citation|author-link=Ariel Sharon|last=Sharon|first=Ariel|title=Warrior. An Autobiography|year=2001|publisher=[[Simon & Schuster]]|publication-date=2001|page=[https://archive.org/details/warriorautobiogr00shar_0/page/57 57]|isbn=978-0-7432-2566-3|url-access=registration|url=https://archive.org/details/warriorautobiogr00shar_0/page/57}}</ref> During the operation he suffered serious injuries, after which Sharon had recommended to the General Staff that an elite force, trained in [[commando]] tactics, be set up for [[reprisal operations]].<ref name="953 Retribution Acts">{{cite web|url=http://www.ariel-sharon-life-story.com/03-Ariel-Sharon-Biography-1953-Retribution-Acts-Peulot-Tagmul.shtml|title=Ariel Sharon&nbsp;– Biography: 1953 Retribution Acts (Pe'ulot Tagmul)|access-date=2009-10-15|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090927144747/http://www.ariel-sharon-life-story.com/03-Ariel-Sharon-Biography-1953-Retribution-Acts-Peulot-Tagmul.shtml|archive-date=2009-09-27}}</ref> After a series of unsuccessful retribution infiltrations by existing IDF units, Ben Gurion pressed [[Chief of Staff]] [[Mordechai Maklef]] to establish such a special forces unit in the summer of 1953.<ref name="Mordechai Maklef">{{cite web|url=http://dover.idf.il/IDF/English/about/History/50s/1952/1002.htm|title=Mordechai Maklef- Chief of Staff|publisher=Israel Defense Forces|access-date=2009-10-15|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141026101052/http://dover.idf.il/IDF/English/about/History/50s/1952/1002.htm|archive-date=2014-10-26}}</ref> This was Israel's first, and reservist Ariel Sharon was recalled to duty.

Sharon was given the rank of Major and chosen to command the company-sized unit, with [[Shlomo Baum]] as deputy in command. The unit was to consist of 50 men, most of them former [[Paratroopers Brigade|Tzanhanim]] and Unit 30 personnel.<ref name="Unit 101 (history) - Specwar.info "/> They were armed with non-standard weapons and tasked with carrying out special reprisals across the state's borders—mainly establishing small unit maneuvers, activation and insertion tactics that are utilized even today.{{sfn|Morris|1993|pages=251–253}}<ref name="Unit 101 (history) - Specwar.info "/>

The new unit began a hard process of day and night training.<ref name="The roots of Ariel Sharon's legacy">{{cite web|url=http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/print/2006/779/re91.htm|title=The roots of Ariel Sharon's legacy|date=26 January 2006|work=al-Ahram|access-date=2009-09-04|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090807144422/http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/print/2006/779/re91.htm|archive-date=7 August 2009}}</ref> Some of their exercises frequently took them across the border, as enemy engagement was seen as the best preparation. The recruits went on forced marches and undertook weapons and sabotage training at their base camp at [[Sataf]], a depopulated Arab village just west of [[Jerusalem]].<ref name="The roots of Ariel Sharon's legacy" />

'''In addition to the unit's tactical variation, they were also unique in two ways''':<ref name="Specwar" />
* They were first IDF Special Forces unit formed from scratch, rather than modify a previously existing infantry oriented unit—such as with the [[Golani Brigade]] Special Reconnaissance Platoon.
* No other unit ever before received its orders directly from the [[General Staff (Israel)|IDF General Staff]]—the IDF High Command MATKAL, rather than from a lower sub-command.

Originally T'zanhanim ({{langx|he|הצנחנים}}, ''Paratroopers'') company's officers were the biggest opposition against the creation of Unit 101.<ref name="Israeli Special Forces History" /> The reason for this was simply that they didn't want another competitor for retaliation missions. Before the formation of Unit 101 only they undertook these missions.<ref name="Israeli Special Forces History" /><ref name="Unit 101 (history) - Specwar.info "/> One of the unit's tactical commanders was [[Meir Har-Zion]], who was later awarded the rank of an officer solely for his conduct in battle. The tactics of Unit 101 was politically very effective and soon the fighters simply could not keep up with the attrition.<ref name="Specwar" />

This meant that the attacks on Israel decreased and the political objective of Unit 101 was accomplished. The creation of Unit 101 was a major landmark in the Israeli Special Forces history. Beside the [[Sayeret Matkal]], they are considered to be the unit with the most influence on the Israeli infantry oriented units including both special and conventional units.<ref name="Israeli Special Forces History" />