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==Origins and organisation== [[File:Deutsches Reichsgesetzblatt 44T1 053 0253.jpg|thumb|Publication of the decree on the formation of the ''Volkssturm'', 20 October 1944, first page]] [[File:Deutsches Reichsgesetzblatt 44T1 053 0254.jpg|thumb|second page]] [[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 146-1979-107-10, Angetretene Volkssturmmänner.jpg|right|thumb|An SS Propaganda Company photograph of ''Volkssturm'', 21 October 1944; only the men on the far left and far right end of the line appear to be uniformed members, with the far right being an ''[[Ordnungspolizei]]'' officer.]] [[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 183-H29033, Ratibor, Volkssturmmänner mit Panzerfäusten.jpg|thumb| This photo depicts the disparity in age between the members, on the left a man of 50 or more with a boy of about 15 or 16.]] The ''Volkssturm'' drew inspiration from the [[Kingdom of Prussia|Prussia]]n ''[[Landsturm]]'' of 1813–1815, that fought in the liberation wars against [[Napoleon]], mainly as guerrilla forces.{{sfn|Herzstein|1986|p=246}} Plans to form a ''Landsturm'' national militia in eastern Germany as a last resort to boost fighting strength were first proposed in 1944 by General [[Heinz Guderian]], chief of the [[German General Staff]].{{sfn|Guderian|2001|p=362}} The army did not have enough men to resist the Soviet onslaught. So, additional categories of men were called into service, including those in non-essential jobs, those previously deemed unfit, over-age, or under-age, and those recovering from wounds.{{sfn|Moorhouse|2012|p=351}} The ''Volkssturm'' had existed, on paper, since around 1925, but it was only after Hitler ordered [[Martin Bormann]] to recruit six million men for this militia that the group became a physical reality. While the regime formally established the ''Volkssturm'' on 25 September, it was not announced to the public until 16 October 1944.{{sfn|Burleigh|2000|p=786}} The official launch date was two days later, 18 October 1944 and was chosen by [[Heinrich Himmler]] to evoke parallels with the popular uprising which, according to popular legend, ended French rule over Germany and culminated in the [[Battle of Leipzig]] on the same date in 1813.{{sfn|Evans|2010|p=675}} Despite the appeal for this last-ditch effort, the intended strength of "six million" members was never attained.{{sfn|Read|2005|p=855}} Joseph Goebbels and other propagandists depicted the ''Volkssturm'' as an outburst of enthusiasm and the will to resist.{{sfn|Herzstein|1986|pp=251–252}} Historian [[Daniel Blatman]] writes that the ''Volkssturm'' was portrayed as the "incarnation" of the greater ''Volksgemeinschaft'', whereby "all differences in social status, origin, or age vanish and unite all people on the basis of race. It was the service framework for members of the local community, who had been raised together and lived side by side, and now bore arms together in order to defend the community."{{sfn|Blatman|2011|pp=222–223}} The militia was meant to embody Nazi racial community ideals, uniting men across classes for National Socialist ends.{{sfn|Yelton|2002|p=35}} However, many Germans greeted the ''Volkssturm'' with resignation or resentment.{{sfn|Yelton|2002|pp=4–5}} Few were enthusiastic, and many feared its members would be treated as an illegal guerrilla force with the consequences that represented.{{sfn|Yelton|2002|pp=5–6}} To this end, there was a widespread justifiable concern among Germans that the Allies—especially the Soviets—would treat ''Volkssturm'' fighters as illegal combatants, leading to the summary execution of participating members.{{sfn|Yelton|2002|pp=91–93}} Correspondingly, Germany sought legal assurance from the Allies that ''Volkssturm'' members would be treated as lawful combatants. Britain and the U.S. granted recognition contingent on compliance with Hague rules.{{sfn|Yelton|2002|pp=91–93}}{{efn|The use of armbands, paybooks, and the Nazi attempt to equip the ''Volkssturm'' with uniforms reflected their efforts to meet the mandates outlined by the Hague Convention.{{sfn|Yelton|2002|pp=93–94}} }} In some regards, the ''Volkssturm'' was the culmination of Goebbels' "total war" speech of February 1943 and its formation was "given a big build-up" in the November 1944 newsreel episode of ''[[Die Deutsche Wochenschau]]''.{{sfn|Welch|2002|p=120}} Consistent messages of final victory from various Nazi media outlets accompanying the ''Volkssturm's'' creation provided a psychological rallying point for the civilian population.{{sfn|Kallis|2005|pp=181, 192}} While it had some marginal effect on morale, it was undermined by the recruits' visible lack of uniforms and weaponry.{{sfn|Herzstein|1986|p=248}} Nazi themes of death, transcendence, and commemoration were given full play to encourage the fight.{{sfn|Herzstein|1986|p=252}} Many German civilians realised that this was a desperate attempt to turn the course of the war. Sardonic old men would remark, "We old monkeys are the ''Führer''{{'}}s newest weapon" (in German this rhymes: ''"Wir alten Affen sind des Führers neue Waffen"''). A popular joke about the ''Volkssturm'' went "Why is the ''Volkssturm'' Germany's most precious resource? Because its members have silver in their hair, gold in their mouths, and lead in their bones."{{sfn|Fritz|2004|p=36}} Whether it was indicative of desperation or not (as the sardonic German jokes suggest), the creation of the ''Volkssturm'' was part of a Nazi strategy—characterized in modern terminology as “defense-in-depth”—to fortify all German towns into defensive nodes, so as to forestall and delay the Allied entry into the greater Reich.{{sfn|Yelton|2002|pp=34–35}} For these militia units to be effective, they needed not only strength in numbers, but also [[fanaticism]].{{sfn|Benz|2007|p=254}} During the early stages of ''Volkssturm'' planning, it became apparent that units lacking morale would lack combat effectiveness. To generate fanaticism, ''Volkssturm'' units were placed under the direct command of local Nazi Party officials, the ''[[Gauleiter]]'' and ''[[Kreisleiter]]''.{{sfn|Blatman|2011|p=222}} Mass rallies, oath ceremonies, and group singing were designed to instill communal fanaticism.{{sfn|Yelton|2002|p=30}} The new ''Volkssturm'' was also to become a nationwide organisation, with Heinrich Himmler as [[Replacement Army]] commander, responsible for armaments and training. Though nominally under party control, ''Volkssturm'' units were placed under ''[[German Army (1935–1945)|Heer]]'' command when engaged in action. At the Reich level, the SS and the [[Nazi Party Chancellery|Party Chancellery]] agreed to share responsibility between them. Himmler retained responsibility for military equipment and training while Bormann, head of the Party Chancellery, was charged with oversight of administration and political indoctrination.{{sfn|Orlow|1973|p=474}}{{sfn|Zentner|Bedürftig|1991|p=1004}} Aware that a "people's army" would not be able to withstand the onslaught of the modern army wielded by the Allies, Hitler issued the following order towards the end of 1944: <blockquote> Experience in the East has shown that ''Volkssturm'', emergency and reserve units have little fighting value when left to themselves, and can be quickly destroyed. The fighting value of these units, which are for the most part strong in numbers, but weak in the armaments required for modern battle, is immeasurably higher when they go into action with troops of the regular army in the field. I, therefore, order: where ''Volkssturm'', emergency, and reserve units are available, together with regular units, in any battle sector, mixed battle-groups (brigades) will be formed under unified command, so as to give the ''Volkssturm'', emergency, and reserve units stiffening and support.{{sfn|Trevor-Roper|1964|p=204}}</blockquote> With the Nazi Party in charge of organising the ''Volkssturm'', each ''Gauleiter'', or Nazi Party District Leader, was charged with the leadership, enrollment, and organisation of the ''Volkssturm'' in their district. The largest ''Volkssturm'' unit seems to have corresponded to the next smaller territorial subdivision of the Nazi Party organisation—the ''Kreis''. The basic unit was a [[battalion]] of 642 men. Units were mostly composed of members of the [[Hitler Youth]], invalids, the elderly, or men who had previously been considered unfit for military service.{{sfn|Zentner|Bedürftig|1991|pp=1004–1005}} On 12 February 1945, the Nazis conscripted German women and girls into the auxiliaries of the ''Volkssturm''.{{sfn|Hildebrand|1984|p=82}} Correspondingly, girls as young as 14 years were trained in the use of small arms, [[panzerfaust|''Panzerfausts'']], [[MG 42|machine guns]], and hand grenades from December 1944 through May 1945.{{sfn|Kater|2004|p=238}} Municipal organisation: * A ''Bataillon <!--German-->'' (battalion) in every ''[[Districts of Germany|Kreis]]'' (there were 920 ''Kreise'' in Greater Germany) * A ''Kompanie'' ([[Company (military unit)|company]]) in every ''Ortsgruppe'' (the "local chapter" of the Nazi Party). * A ''Zug'' ([[platoon]]) in every ''Zelle'' (literally a "cell" of Party members) * A ''Gruppe'' ([[squad]]) in every ''Block'' (city block) Each ''Gauleiter'' and ''Kreisleiter'' had a ''Volkssturm'' Chief of Staff. From the militia's inception until the spring of 1945, Himmler and Bormann engaged in a power-struggle over the jurisdictional control over the ''Volkssturm'' regarding security and police powers in Germany and the occupied territories; a contest which Himmler and the SS more or less won on one level (police and security), but lost to Bormann on another (mobilising reserve forces).{{sfn|Yelton|2003|pp=167–177}} These disputes over jurisdiction only served to hinder centralized coordination of the ''Volkssturm'', reducing its effectiveness in turn.{{sfn|Yelton|2002|pp=37–38}} Historian David Yelton described the situation as two ranking officers at the helm of a sinking ship fighting over command.{{sfn|Yelton|2003|p=176}} [[Benito Mussolini]] suggested, through his son [[Vittorio Mussolini|Vittorio]], then general secretary of the [[Republican Fascist Party]]'s German branch, that 30,000 Italians should be added to the ''Volkssturm'' in the defence of Germany. However, no evidence exists that this offer was implemented.{{sfn|Goeschel|2018|p=287}} Meanwhile, there were cases when criminals and foreigners were inducted into the ''Volkssturm'' if the authorities determined them to be ideologically acceptable.{{sfn|Yelton|2002|pp=75–76}}
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