Editing Vote counting (section)

==Manual counting==<!-- This section is linked from [[Ballot]] -->
[[File:Couting ballots, Ouagadougou, 2015.jpg|left|thumb|Counting ballots, Ouagadougou, 2015]]
Manual counting, also known as hand-counting, requires a physical [[ballot]] that represents voter intent. The physical ballots are taken out of ballot boxes and/or envelopes, read and interpreted; then results are tallied.<ref name="pbs">[https://www.pbs.org/newshour/vote2004/primaries/sr_technology_history.html History of Voting Technology] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131101095421/http://www.pbs.org/newshour/vote2004/primaries/sr_technology_history.html |date=2013-11-01 }} from [[Public Broadcasting Service|PBS]]'s [[The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer]]</ref>
Manual counting may be used for [[election audit]]s and [[recount]]s in areas where automated counting systems are used.<ref name="md-pilot"/>

===Manual methods===
One method of manual counting is to sort ballots in piles by candidate, and count the number of ballots in each pile. If there is more than one contest on the same sheet of paper, the sorting and counting are repeated for each contest.<ref name="minn">{{Cite web |url=http://www.sos.state.mn.us/media/2701/post-election-review-guide.pdf |title=2018 Post-Election Review Guide |date=2018-07-19 |website=Minnesota Secretary of State }}</ref> This method has been used in Burkina Faso, Russia, Sweden, United States (Minnesota), and Zimbabwe.<ref name="ace"/>

A variant is to read aloud the choice on each ballot while putting it into its pile, so observers can tally initially, and check by counting the piles. This method has been used in Ghana, Indonesia, and Mozambique.<ref name="ace">{{Cite web |url=http://aceproject.org/main/english/vc/vcy.htm |title=Country Examples Index — |website=ACE-Electoral Knowledge Network |access-date=2020-02-14}}</ref> These first two methods do not preserve the original order of the ballots, which can interfere with matching them to tallies or digital images taken earlier.

Another approach is for one official to read all the votes on a ballot aloud, to one or more other staff, who tally the counts for each candidate. The reader and talliers read and tally all contests, before going on to the next ballot.<ref name="md-pilot">{{Cite web |url=https://www.elections.maryland.gov/press_room/documents/Post%20Election%20Tabulation%20Audit%20Pilot%20Program%20Report.pdf |title=Post-Election Tabulation Audit Pilot Program Report |date=October 2016 |website=Maryland State Board of Elections |access-date=2020-02-14}}</ref> A variant is to project the ballots where multiple people can see them to tally.<ref name="wi-eo"/><ref name="wi-pdf"/>

Another approach is for three or more people to look at and tally ballots independently; if a majority (Arizona<ref name="fifeld">{{Cite news |last=Fifield  |first=Jen and Andrew Oxford |date=2021-04-24 |title=Arizona election audit: Here's what you're seeing on the video feeds as counting continues Saturday |language=en-US |work=Arizona Republic |url=https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/politics/elections/2021/04/24/arizona-senate-election-audit-video-streaming-what-youre-seeing/7367424002/ |access-date=2021-04-29}}</ref>) or all (Germany<ref>https://www.deutschland.de/en/topic/politics/elections-in-germany-checking-and-counting-ballot-papers</ref>) agree on their tallies after a certain number of ballots, that result is accepted; otherwise they re-tally.

A variant of all approaches is to scan all the ballots and release a file of the images, so anyone can count them. Parties and citizens can count these images by hand or by software. The file gives them evidence to resolve discrepancies.<ref name="auditguide">{{Cite web |url=https://www.auditelectionsusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Ballot-Image-Audit-Guide-for-Candidates-and-Campaigns-v1.1-part-1.pdf|title=Ballot Image Audit Guide for Candidates and Campaigns |date=2018-11-26 |website=AuditElectionsUSA.org/download-guide |language=en-US |access-date=2020-02-15}}</ref> 
<ref name="lutz">{{Cite web |url=https://www.copswiki.org/w/pub/Common/OpenBallotInitiative/OpenBallotInitiativeWhitePaper_withsample.pdf |title=The Open Ballot Initiative |last=Lutz |first=Ray |date=2017-01-10 |website=OpenBallotInitiative.org |access-date=2020-02-15}}</ref>
The fact that different parties and citizens count with independent systems protects against errors from bugs and hacks. A [[checksum]] for the file identifies true copies.<ref name="tracht">{{Cite web |url=https://dickatlee.com/issues/elections/evote/pdfs/EAC_Grant_TEVS_Docs_1.pdf |title=The Humboldt County Election Transparency Project and TEVS |last=Trachtenberg |first=Mitch |date=2013-06-29 |access-date=2020-02-15}}</ref>
Election machines which scan ballots typically create such image files automatically,<ref name="map">{{Cite web |url=https://www.auditelectionsusa.org/use-newer-machines-with-numerically-pegged-ballot-imaging-to-help-verify-elections/states-precincts-use-ballot-images-physical-ballots/ |title=States/Counties that Use Ballot Images from Paper Ballots |website=AUDIT USA |language=en-US |access-date=2020-02-15}}</ref>
though those images can be hacked or be subject to bugs if the election machine is hacked or has bugs. Independent scanners can also create image files. [https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Ballot-foia.png Copies of ballots] are known to be available for release in many parts of the United States.<ref name="rcfp1">{{Cite web |title=I. Election Records Archives |url=https://www.rcfp.org/open-government-sections/i-election-records/ |access-date=2021-04-29 |website=The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press |language=en-US}}</ref><ref name="rcfp2">{{Cite web |title=Reporters Committee Election Legal Guide, Updated 2020 |url=https://www.rcfp.org/resources/election-legal-guide/ |access-date=2021-04-29 |website=The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press |language=en-US}}</ref><ref name="nass">{{Cite web |date=2013-02-17 |title=National Association of Secretaries of State Survey |url=http://www.nass.org/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid=95 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130217200102/http://www.nass.org/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid=95 |url-status=dead |archive-date=2013-02-17 |access-date=2021-04-29 }}</ref>
The press obtained copies of many ballots in the [[2000 United States presidential election recount in Florida#Post-election studies|2000 Presidential election in Florida]] to recount after the Supreme Court halted official recounts.<ref name="norc">{{Cite web |url=http://www.norc.uchicago.edu/fl/votomatic.asp |title=NORC Florida Ballots Project |date=2001-12-14 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20011214034837/http://www.norc.uchicago.edu/fl/votomatic.asp |access-date=2020-02-15|archive-date=2001-12-14 }}</ref> Different methods resulted in different winners.

===When manual counts happen===
The tallying may be done at night at the end of the last day of voting, as in Britain,<ref name="britain">{{Cite news |url=http://theconversation.com/explainer-how-britain-counts-its-votes-41265 |title=Explainer: how Britain counts its votes |last=Game |first=Chris |date=May 7, 2015 |work=The Conversation |access-date=August 16, 2019 |language=en}} {{Cite news |url=http://theconversation.com/how-votes-are-counted-on-election-night-78863 |title=How votes are counted on election night |last=Keaveney |first=Paula |date=June 8, 2017 |work=The Conversation |access-date=August 16, 2019 |language=en}}</ref> Canada,<ref name="canada">{{Cite web |url=https://lop.parl.ca/About/Parliament/Education/ourcountryourparliament/html_booklet/elections-e.html |title=Elections, Our Country, Our Parliament |website=lop.parl.ca |access-date=August 16, 2019}}</ref> France,<ref name="france">{{Cite news |url=https://www.vie-publique.fr/decouverte-institutions/citoyen/participation/voter/bureau-vote/qu-est-ce-qu-depouillement.html |title=Qu'est-ce qu'un dépouillement ? - Comment se déroule une journée dans un bureau de vote ? Découverte des institutions - Repères - vie-publique.fr |date=January 14, 2018 |access-date=August 16, 2019 |language=fr}}</ref> Germany,<ref name="ger">{{Cite web |url=https://wahlhelfer.muelheim-ruhr.de/m%C3%BClheim/wahllexikon/stimmenausz%C3%A4hlung/372 |title=Stimmenauszählung |date=2019 |website=Mülheim an der Ruhr  |access-date=August 17, 2019|language=de}}</ref> and Spain,<ref name="esp">{{Cite news |url=https://www.elconfidencial.com/elecciones-generales/2019-04-28/escrutinio-recuento-votos-urnas-papeletas-28a_1950082/ |title=¿Qué es el escrutinio y cómo se cuentan los votos en las elecciones generales 2019? |date=April 28, 2019 |work=El Confidencial |access-date=August 17, 2019 |language=es }} and Section 14 of the law:{{Cite web |url=http://www.juntaelectoralcentral.es/cs/jec/normativa/estatal?idLeyJunta=1&template=Loreg/JEC_Contenido |title=Ley Orgánica 5/1985, de 19 de Junio, del régimen electoral general. SECCIÓN 14.ª ESCRUTINIO EN LAS MESAS ELECTORALES |website=www.juntaelectoralcentral.es |access-date=August 17, 2019}}</ref> or the next day,<ref name="ace"/> or 1–2 weeks later in the US, after [[provisional ballot]]s have been adjudicated.<ref name="bp2018b">"Starting to audit only when all the audit units have already been counted is the most straightforward method." {{Cite web |url=https://electionaudits.org/files/Audit%20Principles%20and%20Best%20Practices%202018.pdf |title=Principles and Best Practices for Post-Election Tabulation Audits |date=2018 |website=ElectionAudits.org |access-date=August 12, 2019}}</ref>

If counting is not done immediately, or if courts accept challenges which can require re-examination of ballots, the ballots need to be [[Physical security|securely stored]], which is problematic.

Australia federal elections count ballots at least twice, at the polling place and, starting Monday night after election day, at counting centres.<ref name="aec-house">{{Cite web |last=Australian Electoral Commission |title=House of Representatives count |url=https://aec.gov.au/Voting/counting/hor.htm |access-date=2022-08-27 |website=Australian Electoral Commission |language=en-AU}}</ref><ref name="aec-sen">{{Cite web |last=Australian Electoral Commission |title=The Senate counting process |url=https://aec.gov.au/Voting/counting/senate.htm |access-date=2022-08-27 |website=Australian Electoral Commission |language=en-AU}}</ref>

===Errors in manual counts===
Hand counting has been found to be slower and more prone to error than other counting methods.<ref>{{Cite AV media |url=https://apnews.com/video/donald-trump-georgia-district-of-columbia-national-cb651acf448449f687e12d25c0239994 |title=Explaining Election Day: How hand counting votes carries risks |language=en |access-date=2024-10-10 |via=apnews.com}}</ref>

Repeated tests have found that the tedious and repetitive nature of hand counting leads to a loss of focus and accuracy over time. A 2023 test in [[Mohave County, Arizona]] used 850 ballots, averaging 36 contests each, that had been machine-counted many times. The hand count used seven experienced poll workers: one reader with two watchers, and two talliers with two watchers.

The results included 46 errors not noticed by the counting team, including:
*Caller called the wrong candidate, and both watchers failed to notice the incorrect call
*Tally markers tried to work out inconsistencies while tallying
*Tally markers marked a vote for an incorrect candidate and the watchers failed to notice the error
*Caller calling too fast resulted in double marking a candidate or missed marking a candidate
*Caller missed calling a vote for a candidate and both watchers failed to notice the omission
*Watchers not watching the process due to boredom or fatigue
*Illegible tally marking caused incorrect tally totaling
*Enunciation of names caused incorrect candidate tally
*Using incorrect precinct tally sheets to tally ballots resulted in incorrect precinct level results.<ref name="mohave" />

Similar tallying errors were reported in Indiana and Texas election hand counts. Errors were 3% to 27% for various candidates in a 2016 Indiana race, because the tally sheet labels misled officials into over-counting groups of five tally marks, and officials sometimes omitted absentee ballots or double-counted ballots.<ref name="indiana">{{Cite news |last=BEILMAN |first=ELIZABETH |url=https://www.newsandtribune.com/news/jeffersonville-city-council-at-large-recount-tally-sheets-show-vote/article_75f432ce-cf7e-11e5-8c1a-5365ef7d3540.html |title=Jeffersonville City Council At-large recount tally sheets show vote differences|work=News and Tribune (Jeffersonville, IN)|access-date=2020-02-14 |language=en}}</ref> 
12 of 13 precincts in the 2024 Republican primary in Gillespie County, TX, were added or written down wrong after a hand count, including two precincts with seven contests wrong and one with six contests wrong.<ref name="vbg">{{Cite news |last=Contreras |first=Natalia |date=2024-03-18 |title=Texas county's GOP officials declared hand count a success, but kept finding errors |url=https://www.votebeat.org/texas/2024/03/18/gillespie-county-texas-republican-primary-hand-count-election-errors-discrepancies/ |access-date=2024-03-21 |work=Votebeat |language=en}}</ref>
While the Texas errors were caught and corrected before results were finalized, the Indiana errors were not.
 
Average errors in hand-counted candidate tallies in New Hampshire towns were 2.5% in 2002, including one town with errors up to 20%. Omitting that town cut the average error to 0.87%. Only the net result for each candidate in each town could be measured, by assuming the careful manual recount was fully accurate. Total error can be higher if there were countervailing errors hidden in the net result, but net error in the overall electorate is what determines winners.<ref name="nh">{{Cite web |url=https://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/handle/1721.1/96548/vtp_wp11.pdf |title=Using Recounts to Measure the Accuracy of Vote Tabulations: Evidence from New Hampshire Elections 1946-2002. |last=Ansolabehere |first=Stephen |author2=Andrew Reeves |date=January 2004 |website=CALTECH/MIT Voting Technology Project |access-date=2020-02-14}}</ref> Connecticut towns in 2007 to 2013 had similar errors up to 2%.<ref name="tigran" />

In candidate tallies for precincts in Wisconsin recounted by hand in 2011 and 2016, the average net discrepancy was 0.28% in 2011 and 0.18% in 2016.<ref name="wi-an">{{Cite journal |last1=Ansolabehere |first1=Stephen |last2=Burden |first2=Barry C. |last3=Mayer |first3=Kenneth R. |last4=Stewart |first4=Charles |date=2018-03-20 |title=Learning from Recounts |journal=Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy |volume=17 |issue=2 |pages=100–116 |doi=10.1089/elj.2017.0440 |issn=1533-1296|doi-access=free }}</ref>

India hand tallies paper records from a 1.5% sample of election machines before releasing results. For each voter, the machine prints the selected candidate on a slip of paper, displays it to the voter, then drops the slip into a box. In the April–May 2019 elections for the lower house of Parliament, the Lok Sabha, the Election Commission hand-tallied the slips of paper from 20,675 voting machines (out of 1,350,000 machines)<ref name="maha" /> and found discrepancies for 8 machines, usually of four votes or less.<ref name="jain" /> Most machines tally over 16 candidates,<ref name="ques">{{Cite news |date=2019-03-09 |title=What are EVMs, VVPAT and how safe they are |language=en |work=Times of India |url=https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/what-are-evms-vvpat-and-how-safe-they-are/articleshow/66969640.cms |access-date=2021-11-08}}</ref> and they did not report how many of these candidate tallies were discrepant. They formed investigation teams to report within ten days, were still investigating in November 2019, with no report as of June 2021.<ref name="jain" /><ref name="nath">{{Cite news |last=Nath |first=Damini |date=2019-07-25 |title=ECI sets up teams to probe VVPAT mismatch in Lok Sabha election |language=en-IN |work=The Hindu |url=https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/ec-sets-up-teams-to-probe-vvpat-mismatch-in-lok-sabha-election/article28713704.ece |access-date=2021-11-08 |issn=0971-751X}}</ref> Hand tallies before and after 2019 had a perfect match with machine counts.<ref name="jain" />

An experiment with multiple types of ballots counted by multiple teams found average errors of 0.5% in candidate tallies when one person, watched by another, read to two people tallying independently. Almost all these errors were overcounts. The same ballots had errors of 2.1% in candidate tallies from sort and stack. These errors were equally divided between undercounts and overcounts of the candidates. Optical scan ballots, which were tallied by both methods, averaged 1.87% errors, equally divided between undercounts and overcounts. Since it was an experiment, the true numbers were known. Participants thought that having the candidate names printed in larger type and bolder than the office and party would make hand tallies faster and more accurate.<ref name="goggin"/>

Intentional errors hand tallying election results are fraud. Close review by observers, if allowed, may detect fraud, and the observers may or may not be believed.<ref name="pickles">{{Cite web |url=https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/securing-the-ballot-review-into-electoral-fraud |title=Securing the ballot: review into electoral fraud |last=Pickles |first=Eric |date=2016-12-27 |website=Cabinet Office, UK |language=en |access-date=2020-02-14}}</ref> 
If only one person sees each ballot and reads off its choice, there is no check on that person's mistakes. In the US only Massachusetts and the District of Columbia give anyone but officials a legal right to see ballot marks during hand counting.<ref name="vvstates"/>
If fraud is detected and proven, penalties may be light or delayed. US prosecution policy since the 1980s has been to let fraudulent winners take office and keep office, usually for years, until convicted,<ref name="doj8">{{Cite web |url=https://www.justice.gov/criminal/file/1029066/download |title=Federal Prosecution of Election Offenses Eighth Edition |date=December 2017 |website=US Department of Justice |access-date=2020-02-14}}</ref>
<ref name="doj-compare">{{Cite web |url=http://site.votewell.net/a/doj-elections.htm |title=Federal Prosecution of Election Offenses |website=votewell.net |access-date=2020-02-14}}</ref>
and to impose sentencing level 8–14,<ref name="level">{{Cite web |url=https://www.ussc.gov/guidelines/2018-guidelines-manual/2018-chapter-2-c |title=2018 Chapter 2 PART C - OFFENSES INVOLVING PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND VIOLATIONS OF FEDERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN LAWS |date=2018-06-27 |website=United States Sentencing Commission |language=en |access-date=2020-02-14}}</ref> which earns less than two years of prison.<ref name="prison">{{Cite web |url=https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/guidelines-manual/2011/manual-pdf/Sentencing_Table.pdf |title=Sentencing Table |date=2011-10-26 |website=US Sentencing Commission |access-date=2020-02-14}}</ref>

In 1934, the United States had been hand-counting ballots for over 150 years, and problems were described in a report by Joseph P. Harris, who 20 years later invented a [[Voting machine#Punched card voting|punched card voting]] machine,<ref name="harber">{{Cite web |date=1983 |editor-last=Harris |editor-first=Joseph P. |editor2-last=Nathan |editor2-first=Harriet |title=Joseph P. Harris: Professor and Practitioner: Government, Election Reform, and the Votomatic |url=https://digicoll.lib.berkeley.edu/record/217520?v=pdf |access-date=2024-07-29 |website=UC Berkeley |publisher=Regional Oral History Office}}</ref>
{{blockquote|"Recounts in Chicago and Philadelphia have indicated such wide variations that apparently the precinct officers did not take the trouble to count the ballots at all... While many election boards pride themselves upon their ability to conduct the count rapidly and accurately, as a general rule the count is conducted poorly and slowly... precinct officers conduct the count with practically no supervision whatever... It is impossible to fix the responsibility for errors or frauds... Not infrequently there is a mixup with the ballots and some uncertainty as to which have been counted and which have not... The central count was used some years ago in San Francisco... experience indicated that there is considerable confusion at the central counting place... and that the results are not more accurate than those obtained from the count by the precinct officer."<ref name="harris">{{Cite web |last=Harris |first=Joseph P. |date=1934 |title=Election Administration in the United States, chapter VI, pages 236-246 |url=https://www.nist.gov/itl/election-administration-united-states-1934-joseph-p-harris-phd |access-date=2024-07-29 |website=NIST, originally published by Brookings |language=en}}</ref>}}

{| class="wikitable sortable" style="font-size: 95%; text-align: center; "
|+ class="nowrap" | Errors in hand-counted tallies for candidates
|-
!Place||Year||Candidate tally errors, as % of votes counted||Reference Standard||Notes
|-
|New Hampshire towns||1946-1962||0.83%||careful hand recount||wtd avg is sum of absolute values of errors, divided by total ballots<ref name="nh"/>
|-
|New Hampshire towns||2002||2.49%||careful hand recount||20% in one town; others average 0.87%<ref name="nh"/>
|-
|Connecticut towns||2007-2013||up to 2%||investigations of differences between hand & machine counts||"routinely show up to 2% error"<ref name="tigran">{{Cite journal |last=Antonyan |first=Tigran |display-authors=etal |date=2013-06-21 |title=Computer Assisted Post Election Audits |url=https://voter.engr.uconn.edu/voter/wp-content/uploads/AS-2013.pdf |journal=State Certification Testing of Voting Systems National Conference |via=University of Connecticut}}</ref>
|-
|Experiment, optical scan style ballots||2011||1.87%||Known values in experiment||As % of all 120 ballots, not candidate's ballots<ref name="goggin"/>
|-
|Experiment, read to talliers||2011||0.48%||Known values in experiment||As % of all 120 ballots, not candidate's ballots<ref name="goggin"/>
|-
|Experiment, sort & stack||2011||2.13%||Known values in experiment||As % of all 120 ballots, not candidate's ballots<ref name="goggin"/>
|-
|Wisconsin precincts||2011||0.28%||careful hand recount||Table 6 "0.59% of the ballots" "out of 3,019" where 3,019 is total number of ballots<ref name="wi-an"/>
|-
|Wisconsin precincts||2016||0.18%||careful hand recount||Table 7a. "0.59% of the ballots" but 0.18% if exclude write-ins<ref name="wi-an"/>
|-
|Indiana, Jeffersonville||2016||3%-27%||Newspaper tally||Over-counted groups of 5 tally marks, and omitted or double-counted groups of ballots<ref name="indiana"/>
|-
|Colorado audits||2018||0.8%||Consensus between election computer & Sec of State staff||Errors by audit boards in determining voter intent on individual ballots. No manual totals done.<ref name="yrs3">{{Cite web |date=2020-04-16 |title=Colorado Risk Limiting Audits: Three Years In |url=https://www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/elections/RLA/files/OverviewThreeYearsIn.pdf |access-date=2021-10-27 |website=Colorado Sec. of State}}</ref>
|-
|Colorado audits||2019||0.2%||Consensus between election computer & Sec of State staff||Errors by audit boards in determining voter intent on individual ballots. No manual totals done.<ref name="yrs3"/>
|-
|India national election audit||2019||8<ref name="jain">{{Cite news |last1=Jain |first1=Bharti|date=2021-06-03 |title=Tallying of VVPAT slips and EVM count in constituencies that went to polls recently throw up 100% match|language=en |work=Times of India |url=https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/tallying-of-vvpat-slips-and-evm-count-in-constituencies-that-went-to-polls-recently-throw-up-100-match/articleshow/83192568.cms |access-date=2021-11-08}}</ref> of 20,625 machines audited<ref name="maha">{{Cite news |last1=Mahapatra |first1=Dhananjay|date=2019-04-09 |title=Supreme Court: Count VVPAT slips of 5 booths in each assembly seat |language=en |work=Times of India |url=https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/count-vvpat-slips-of-5-booths-in-each-assembly-seat-sc/articleshow/68786810.cms |access-date=2021-11-08}}</ref>||Discrepancy between hand tally of [[VVPAT]]s & election computers||They investigated and have not released analysis, so it is not clear how many of these were errors in hand tally.<ref name="jain"/>
|-
|Colorado audits||2020||0.6%||Consensus between election computer & Sec of State staff||Errors by audit boards in determining voter intent on individual ballots. No manual totals done.<ref name="co2020">{{Cite web |date=2020-11-25 |title=2020 General Election Risk-limiting Audit Discrepancy Report |url=https://www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/elections/RLA/2020/general/DiscrepancyReport.pdf |access-date=2021-10-27 |website=Colorado Sec of State}}</ref>
|-
|[[2021 Maricopa County presidential ballot audit|Maricopa County, AZ audit]]||2021||15%||Paper-counting machine||Audit & machine count were contracted by state Senate<ref name=anglen>{{Cite news |last=Anglen |first=Robert |date=2021-10-12 |title=New Arizona audit review shows Cyber Ninjas' ballot count off by 312K |language=en-US |work=Arizona Republic |url=https://roselawgroupreporter.com/2021/10/new-arizona-audit-review-shows-cyber-ninjas-ballot-count-off-by-312k/ |access-date=2022-07-29}} [https://archive.today/20211012210419/https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/politics/elections/2021/10/11/new-arizona-audit-review-shows-cyber-ninjas-ballot-count-off-312-k/6094144001/ Full article]</ref><ref name="scan-az">{{Cite web |date=2021-10-08 |title=Scan of Pullen Pallets Binders 1-45 |url=https://statecraftlaw.app.box.com/v/senateauditpublicreadingroom/file/870446599996 |access-date=2022-07-29 |website=Statecraftlaw}}</ref>
|-
|Mohave County, AZ, experiment||2023||0.15%||Logic & Accuracy Test ballots||46 errors were 0.15% of 30,600 contest totals on 850 test ballots.<ref name="mohave">{{Cite web |date=2023-07-25 |title=Ballot Hand Tally |url=https://resources.mohave.gov/Repository/Calendar/08_01_2023BOSAgenda0fe47379-660b-465f-a8b5-4eb9fc976f30.pdf |access-date=2024-03-02 |website=Mohave County Board of Supervisors}}</ref>
|}
Data in the table are comparable, because average error in candidate tallies as percent of candidate tallies, weighted by number of votes for each candidate (in NH) is mathematically the same as the sum of absolute values of errors in each candidate's tally, as percent of all ballots (in other studies).

===Time needed and cost of manual counts===
[[File:Time for hand counts.png|258px|thumb|Time for hand counts: Minutes per vote counted]]

Cost depends on pay levels and staff time needed, recognizing that staff generally work in teams of two to four (one to read, one to watch, and one or two to record votes). Teams of four, with two to read and two to record are more secure<ref name="goggin"/><ref name="tobi"/> and would increase costs. Three to record might more quickly resolve discrepancies, if 2 of the 3 agree.

Typical times in the table below range from a tenth to a quarter of a minute per vote tallied, so 24-60 ballots per hour per team, if there are 10 votes per ballot.

One experiment with identical ballots of various types and multiple teams found that sorting ballots into stacks took longer and had more errors than two people reading to two talliers.<ref name="goggin"/>

{| class="wikitable sortable" style="font-size: 75%; text-align: center; "
|+ class="nowrap" | Staff Time Needed for Hand Counts
|-
!||Team (Wall Clock) Minutes per Vote Checked|| Team Size ||Staff Minutes per Vote Checked||Number of Contests Checked per Ballot||Full Precincts /Batches, or Random Ballots|| Type of Paper Ballot || Number of Ballots Checked ||Total Staff Time, Minutes||Year||Sources|| Overheads Excluded & Notes
|-
|Searcy Cnty, AR|| || ||8.47||1||Full batches||Sheets||1,700||14,400||2024||<ref name="ar-sbec">{{Cite web |date=2024-08-23 |title=Post-Election Audit Report 2024 General Election [actually preference primary], pages 4,5,24,25 |url=https://static.ark.org/eeuploads/elections/2024_Preferential_Primary_Audit_Report_Final.pdf |access-date=2024-10-05 |website=Arkansas State Board of Election Commissioners}}</ref><ref name="arad">{{Cite web |last=Madison |first=Richard Chris |date=2024-06-27 |title=Re: March 2024 Preferential Primary Audit Process |url=https://arkansasadvocate.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/jpr-6.27.24.pdf |access-date=2024-10-05 |website=Arkansas Advocate}}</ref>||Team size & total errors not given. Hand & machine counts of Early Vote for Wes Bradford matched at 517, but certified results showed 520 and tally sheets showed 518. Two other ballots in a precinct batch were omitted from hand and machine counts. Total of 11 were uncounted.
|-
|Butler Cnty, PA, Butler City||0.02||6||0.09||8||Full batches||Sheets||600||450||2022|| <ref name="ppd">{{Cite news |last=McGoldrick |first=Gillian |date=2022-08-17 |title=Butler County finishes its review of 2020 election, finds no inaccuracies among 1,600 ballot |work=Pittsburgh Post-Dispatch |url=https://www.post-gazette.com/news/politics-local/2022/08/17/butler-county-ballots-review-2020-election-vote-recount-elections-staff-scanners-pennsylvania/stories/202208170125 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220829142351/https://www.post-gazette.com/news/politics-local/2022/08/17/butler-county-ballots-review-2020-election-vote-recount-elections-staff-scanners-pennsylvania/stories/202208170125 |archive-date=2022-08-29  |access-date=2022-09-24}}</ref><ref name="gov">{{Cite news |last=McGoldrick |first=Gillian |date=2022-08-18 |title=Butler County Finishes 2020 Election Review After 170 Hours |language=en |work=Governing |url=https://www.governing.com/now/butler-county-finishes-2020-election-review-after-170-hours |access-date=2022-09-24}}</ref> ||1 reads to 4–7. No report available, so times may be under-reported. Not on graph.
|-
|Butler Cnty, PA, Donegal Twp||0.02||4||0.08||8||Full batches||Sheets||1,061||660||2022|| <ref name="ppd"/><ref name="gov"/>||1 reads to 4–7. No report available, so times may be under-reported. Not on graph.
|-
|Dane County, WI||0.04||5||0.20||1||Full sets of images||Sheets||1000||200||2015||<ref name="wi-eo">{{Cite web |title=FOR ELECTION OFFICIALS |url=https://wisconsinelectionintegrity.org/for-election-officials/ |access-date=2020-06-25 |website=Wisconsin Election Integrity |language=en-US}}</ref><ref name="wi-pdf">{{Cite web |last=McKim |first=Karen |date=January 2016 |title=Using automatically created digital ballot images to verify voting-machine output in Wisconsin |url=https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/wiscgrassrootsnetwork/pages/1500/attachments/original/1452755405/DevelopmentReport-DigitalImageAudits.pdf?1452755405 |access-date=2020-06-25 |website=Wisconsin Election Integrity}}</ref>|| Organizing ballot scans for review, training, legal, supervision 
|-
|Mohave County, AZ, experiment||0.05||7||0.34||36||Full batches||Sheets||850||10,266||2023||<ref>Note this line includes 7-person teams to tally: 1 reader+2 watchers, 2 talliers+2 watchers; plus 3 people to enter write-ins @30 seconds per write-in, 15% write-ins. https://resources.mohave.gov/Repository/Calendar/08_01_2023BOSAgenda0fe47379-660b-465f-a8b5-4eb9fc976f30.pdf p.4 says 46 errors were missed by tally team, and only known because the 850 test ballots had been repeatedly counted in Logic & Accuracy Tests. "Some of the observed errors included:
*Caller called the wrong candidate and both watchers failed to notice the incorrect call;
*Tally markers tried to work out inconsistencies while tallying;
*Tally markers marked a vote for an incorrect candidate and the watchers failed to notice the error;
*Caller calling too fast resulted in double marking a candidate or missed marking a candidate;
*Caller missed calling a vote for a candidate and both watchers failed to notice the omission;
*Watchers not watching the process due to boredom or fatigue;
*Illegible tally marking caused incorrect tally totaling;
*Enunciation of names caused incorrect candidate tally; and
*Using incorrect precinct tally sheets to tally ballots resulted in incorrect precinct level results
</ref>|| {{small|Excludes: detecting & retallying errors missed by team, space rental, paying workers to attend training, entering data on computer for web & SOS, creating blank tally sheets for each precinct. They estimate the following would add 33% to direct tallying cost: supervision, summation, sorting ballots by precinct, guards, transportation, background checks, webcams, recruitment}} 
|-
|Maricopa County, AZ recount||0.08||5||0.42||2||Full batches||Sheets||1||0.83||2021||<ref name="polletta">{{Cite news |last=Polletta  |first=Maria and Piper Hansen |date=2021-04-28 |title=Here's what happened at the Arizona election audit of Maricopa County ballots |language=en-US |work=Arizona Republic |url=https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/politics/arizona/2021/04/28/arizona-election-audit-what-happened-ballot-counting-april-28/4876185001/ |access-date=2021-05-06}}</ref>|| Organizing ballots for review, training, legal, supervision, adding tally sheets 
|-
|New Hampshire||0.09||3||0.27||20||Full batches||Sheets||627||3,360||2007||<ref name="tobi">pp.21-22,44 {{Cite web |last=Tobi |first=Nancy |date=2007-09-06 |title=Hands-on Elections: (Condensed Version) |url=http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/files/Hand_Count_Elections_Steps_only_Sept_6_2007.pdf |access-date=2021-05-20 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080919152131/http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/files/Hand_Count_Elections_Steps_only_Sept_6_2007.pdf |archive-date=2008-09-19 }}</ref><ref name="tobibook">{{Cite book |last=Tobi |first=Nancy |url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/816513645 |title=Hands-on elections : an informational handbook for running real elections, using real paper ballots, counted by real people : lessons from New Hampshire |date=2011 |publisher=Healing Mountain Publications |isbn=978-1-4528-0612-9 |edition=2nd |location=Wilton, N.H. |oclc=816513645}}</ref>|| Add 60% to cover: supervision 43% + training 13% + sums 4% 
|-
|Carlisle, MA||0.11||2||0.22||9||Full batches||Sheets||3,670||7,200||2020|||| 8 teams of 2 plus 4 extra 
|-
|Hancock, MA||0.13||2||0.26||9||Full batches||Sheets||513||1,200||2020|||| Organizing ballots for review, training, legal, supervision, adding tally sheets (10 teams of 2 
|-
|Provincetown, MA||0.14||2||0.28||11||Full batches||Sheets||2,616||7,980||2020|||| 16 teams of 2+2 runners+4 tallies 
|-
|Tolland, CT||||||0.11||7||Full batches||Sheets||3851||2,880||2012||<ref name="tigran"/>||
|-
|Bloomfield, CT||||||0.15||7||Full batches||Sheets||2272||2,400||2012||<ref name="tigran"/>||
|-
|Vernon, CT||||||0.31||6||Full batches||Sheets||2544||4,740||2012||<ref name="tigran"/>||
|-
|Bridgeport, CT||0.40||5||2.01||1||Full batches||Sheets||23860||48,000||2010||<ref name="ctb">{{Cite web|last=Connecticut Citizen Election Audit Coalition|date=2011-01-12 |title=Report and Feedback December 2010 Bridgeport Connecticut Coalition Recount |url=http://www.ctelectionaudit.org/bridgeport-recount-details/ |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120419084153/http://www.ctelectionaudit.org/bridgeport-recount-details/ |archive-date=2012-04-19 }}</ref>|| Includes counting number of voters who checked in at polling places, and comparing those counts to ballot counts. 
|-
|Bibb County, GA||0.18||3||0.54||39||Full batches||Rolls||592||12,480||2006||<ref name="ga">{{Cite web |url=http://sos.georgia.gov/elections/VVPATreport.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20081126235810/http://sos.georgia.gov/elections/VVPATreport.pdf |url-status=dead |archive-date=November 26, 2008 |title=Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail Pilot Project Report. Pages 18-22, 42-63. |last=Georgia Secretary of State |first=Elections Division. (2007-04). " |date=April 1, 2007 |access-date=August 17, 2019}}</ref>||
|-
|Camden County, GA||0.11||3||0.33||34||Full batches||Rolls||470||5,220||2006||<ref name="ga"/>||
|-
|Cobb County, GA||0.20||3||0.60||42||Full batches||Rolls||976||24,480||2006||<ref name="ga"/>||
|-
|San Diego precincts||0.22||3||0.67||19||Full batches||Sheets||2,425||30,573||2016||<ref name="sd-cops">{{Cite web |last=Lutz |first=Ray |date=2019-01-28 |title=White Paper: Election Audit Strategy |url=https://copswiki.org/w/pub/Common/M1879/WhitePaper-Election%20Audits%20Part%202-V0.4.pdf |access-date=2021-04-13 |website=Citizens' Oversight Projects}}</ref>||
|-
|Clark County, NV||||||0.72||21||Full batches||Rolls||1,268||19,200||2004||<ref name="theisen"/>||
|-
|Washington State recount||||||1.49||1||Full batches||Sheets||1,842,136||2,741,460||2004||<ref name="theisen">{{Cite web |url=http://www.votersunite.org/info/CostEstimateforHandCounting.pdf |title=Cost Estimate for Hand Counting 2% of the Precincts in the U.S. |last=Theisen |first=Ellen |date=2004 |website=votersunite.org |access-date=May 4, 2018}}</ref>||
|-
|Orange County, CA||||||1.93||1||Full, mostly||Rolls mostly||467||900||2011||<ref name="ca"/>|| Independent count, done by graduate student on university computer 
|-
|Read to Talliers Experiment Second Contest||0.07||4||0.30||1||Full batches||Sheets||1800||537||2012||<ref name="goggin"/>|| Organizing ballots for review, training, legal, supervision, adding tally sheets 
|-
|Read to Talliers Experiment First Contest||0.12||4||0.48||1||Full batches||Sheets||1800||861||2012||<ref name="goggin"/>|| Organizing ballots for review, training, legal, supervision, adding tally sheets 
|-
|Sort & Stack Experiment Second Contest||0.17||3||0.51||1||Full batches||Sheets||1920||972||2012||<ref name="goggin"/>|| Organizing ballots for review, training, legal, supervision, adding tally sheets 
|-
|Sort & Stack Experiment First Contest||0.24||3||0.71||1||Full batches||Sheets||1920||1,369||2012||<ref name="goggin">{{Cite journal |last=Goggin |first=Stephen N. |display-authors=et al. |date=March 2012 |title=Post-Election Auditing: Effects of Procedure and Ballot Type on Manual Counting Accuracy, Efficiency, and Auditor Satisfaction and Confidence |url=http://www.liebertpub.com/doi/10.1089/elj.2010.0098 |journal=Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy |language=en |volume=11 |issue=1 |pages=36–51 |doi=10.1089/elj.2010.0098 |issn=1533-1296|url-access=subscription }}</ref>|| Organizing ballots for review, training, legal, supervision, adding tally sheets 
|-
|'''COUNTING  BALLOTS IN RANDOM ORDER'''||||||||||||||||||||||
|-
|Carroll County, MD||1.03||2||2.06||3||Random images||Sheets||247||1,526||2016||<ref name="md-audit">{{Cite web |url=https://www.elections.maryland.gov/press_room/documents/Post%20Election%20Tabulation%20Audit%20Pilot%20Program%20Report.pdf |title=Post-Election Tabulation Audit Pilot Program Report |last=Maryland State Board of Elections |date=October 21, 2016 |website=elections.maryland.gov |access-date=June 29, 2019}}</ref>|| Organizing ballot scans for review, training, legal, supervision 
|-
|Montgomery County MD||0.88||2||1.76||3||Random images||Sheets||82||432||2016||<ref name="md-audit"/>|| Organizing ballot scans for review, training, legal, supervision 
|-
|Merced County, CA||||||1.82||2||Random ballots||Sheets||198||720||2011||<ref name="ca"/>|| Independent count, done by graduate student on university computer 
|-
|Humboldt County, CA||||||5.87||3||Random ballots||Sheets||143||2,520||2011||<ref name="ca">{{Cite web |last=Bowen |first=Debra |date=2011-03-01 |title=AB 2023 (Saldaña), Chapter 122, Statutes of 2010 Post-Election Risk-Limiting Audit Pilot Program March 1, 2012, Report to the Legislature |url=https://admin.cdn.sos.ca.gov/reports/2012/post-election-audit-report-20120301.pdf |access-date=2021-05-30 |website=California Secretary of State}} and {{Cite web |title=Post-Election Risk-Limiting Audit Pilot Program 2011-2013, Final Report to the United States Election Assistance Commission |last=California Secretary of State |date=July 30, 2014 |url=https://votingsystems.cdn.sos.ca.gov/oversight/risk-pilot/final-report-073014.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190602155902/https://votingsystems.cdn.sos.ca.gov/oversight/risk-pilot/final-report-073014.pdf |url-status=dead|website=Internet Archive|archive-date=2019-06-02 }} AND {{Cite journal |last=California Secretary of State |date=July 30, 2014 |title=Appendices, Post-Election Risk-Limiting Audit Pilot Program 2011-2013 Final Report to the United States Election Assistance Commission." Pages 81-90  |url=https://votingsystems.cdn.sos.ca.gov/oversight/risk-pilot/appendices-073014.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190602160636/https://votingsystems.cdn.sos.ca.gov/oversight/risk-pilot/appendices-073014.pdf |url-status=dead|journal=Internet Archive|archive-date=2019-06-02 }} AND [https://web.archive.org/web/20190602155902/http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/voting-systems/oversight/post-election-auditing-regulations-and-reports/post-election-risk-limiting-audit-pilot-program/ Overview]. The time estimates of other California counties in the study included time to scan ballots to enable ballot comparison audits, so their costs were not comparable. None of the 11 California counties doing audits chose a close race or needed a 100% hand-count.</ref>|| Independent count, done by graduate student on university computer
|-
|}