Editing X Article (section)

==Background==
[[File:Stalin speech Feb 09 1946.jpg|thumb|Kennan's long telegram began as an analysis of [[Joseph Stalin]]'s speech at the [[Bolshoi Theatre]] on February 9, 1946 (''pictured'').]]

[[Joseph Stalin]], [[General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union|General Secretary]] and de facto leader of the [[Soviet Union]], spoke at the [[Bolshoi Theatre]] on February 9, 1946, the night before the symbolic [[1946 Soviet Union legislative election|1946 Supreme Soviet election]]. The speech did not discuss foreign policy, but instead made pledges to expand industry. He justified the expansion by pointing to [[Marxism–Leninism|Marxist–Leninist]] theory, warning that capitalism possessed a predisposition towards conflict.{{sfn|Gaddis|2011|p=216}}

Stalin's speech provoked fear in the American press and public,{{sfn|Gaddis|2011|pp=226–227}} with ''[[Time (magazine)|Time]]'' magazine calling it "the most warlike pronouncement uttered by any top-rank statesman since [[Victory over Japan Day|V-J Day]]."{{sfn|Gaddis|2011|p=227}} [[George F. Kennan]], then working for the US [[State Department]] as ''[[chargé d'affaires]]'' in Moscow,{{sfn|Gaddis|1997|p=193}} found the speech routine and reflective of previous statements from Stalin.{{sfn|Gaddis|2011|p=216}} With this in mind, he issued only a quick summary of the speech for the State Department.{{sfn|Gaddis|2011|p=216}} Despite the familiar statements from Stalin, the context in which they were made – including the Soviet Union's recent rejection of [[Bretton Woods system|Bretton Woods]] and evidence of [[Atomic spies|atomic espionage]] in the United States and Canada – alarmed officials in Washington.{{sfn|Gaddis|2011|pp=216–217}} In a 1982 interview, former diplomat [[Elbridge Durbrow]] expressed that Stalin's speech had in effect said, "to hell with the rest of the world."{{sfn|Gaddis|2011|pp=217, 718n43}} US President [[Harry S. Truman|Harry Truman]] was confused by the Soviet's policies, at times appearing belligerent and at others exercising self-restraint.{{sfn|Leffler|2007|p=55}} Leaders were increasingly coming to the conclusion that the existing ''quid pro quo'' strategy was ineffective against the Soviets, but had no replacement strategy.{{sfn|Gaddis|2005a|p=21}}

Durbrow and another diplomat, [[H. Freeman Matthews]] – both readers of Kennan's earlier telegrams – were confused by Kennan's relative silence about the speech. On 13 February, Matthews drafted a message, signed by [[United States Secretary of State|Secretary of State]] [[James F. Byrnes]], asking for an analysis. The message described the press and public's reaction having been, "to a degree not hitherto felt",{{sfn|Gaddis|2011|p=217}} and expressed: "We should welcome receiving from you an interpretive analysis of what we may expect in the way of future implementation of these announced policies."{{sfn|Gaddis|2011|p=217}} [[W. Averell Harriman]], having recently returned from his [[List of ambassadors of the United States to Russia|ambassadorship to the Soviet Union]], spoke to Kennan and encouraged him to write a thorough analysis.{{sfn|Gaddis|2011|p=217}}{{refn|group=note|name=speech}}