Editing Xi'an Incident (section)

==Background==
{{further|Chinese Civil War}}

[[File:China before the Xi'an Incident.svg|right|thumb|320px|Map of eastern China in December 1936:
{{legend|#FF4D4D|Held by the CCP}}
{{legend|#7A9FFF|Held by the central Nationalist Government}}
{{legend|#B0C6FF|Semi-autonomous areas aligned with the Nationalist Government}}
{{legend|#B0C660|Held by the Northeastern Army, Northwestern Army, or allies}}
{{legend|#C2986D|Held by the Empire of Japan}}]]

===Gradual changes in policy===
The [[Japanese invasion of Manchuria]] in November 1931 posed a clear threat to both sides of the Chinese Civil War (as well as to the Soviet Union), but it did not lead to an immediate cessation of hostilities.{{sfn|Yang|2020|pp=55-56}} The failure of the [[First United Front]] four years previously had created deep, lasting distrust.{{efn|{{Unbulleted list citebundle|For the attitude of the CCP, see {{harvnb|Sheng|1992|pp=153–155}} and {{harvnb|Yang|2020|p=56}}|For Chiang's attitude, see {{harvnb|Coble|1991|pp=56–57}} and {{harvnb|van de Ven|2003|p=172}}}}}} Chiang Kai-shek articulated his policy as "first internal pacification, then external resistance."{{efn|{{lang-zh|t=先安內，後讓外。|p=Xiān ānnèi, hòu ràngwài.}}}}{{sfn|Coble|1991|pp=56-57}} The CCP called for simultaneously "Resisting Japan and Opposing Chiang".{{sfn|Yang|2020|p=59}}

The first subtle changes in this mutual policy of non-cooperation was initiated by the Communists in Manchuria. There, guerilla groups found it impossible to fight against the Japanese while also fighting the Nationalists.{{sfn|Yang|2020|p=57}} Starting in late 1932 the Comintern authorized the Communist guerillas in Manchuria to cooperate with all anti-Japanese forces.{{sfn|Yang|2020|p=57}}{{sfn|Gao|2018|pp=80,123}} That same year, the USSR restored diplomatic relations with the Nationalist Government.{{sfn|Yang|2020|pp=58-59}} The events in Europe—including [[Hitler's rise to power]]—were a major influence on the move towards a united front. The [[7th World Congress of the Comintern]] encouraged Communist parties everywhere to form a united front with moderate forces to resist the Fascists.{{sfn|Pantsov|2012|p=291}} [[Wang Ming]], head of the CCP delegation, published the "1 August Declaration" in October, which publicly called on all parties in China to form a united front against Japanese Imperialism.{{sfn|Gao|2018|p=124}}{{sfn|Pantsov|2023|p=220}} They proposed creating an anti-Japanese defense government to coordinate resistance.{{sfn|Yang|2020|pp=60-61}} Importantly, though, the offer did not extend to Chiang himself; the CCP's delegation still considered him and his central government the "running dog" of the Japanese.{{sfn|Sheng|1992|p=153}}

The CCP itself (cut off from radio communication with Moscow) learned of the 1 August Declaration in November 1935.{{sfn|Yang|2020|pp=60-61}} Party leaders held a conference at Wayaobu in December to discuss the implications of this new policy. Their [[Wayaobu Manifesto]] marked an important retreat from the hardline positions they had held during the early civil war. It called for "the most broad national united front" to resist Japan, and announced that the CCP would suspend class conflict in the interests of cross-class collaboration.{{sfn|Yang|1990|pp=182-184}} However, it also made clear that they did not want to give up their military strength. As a basis from which to resist the Japanese, the Manifesto called for the Red Army to be expanded to 1 million men and for the Chinese Soviet to dramatically increase its land area.{{sfn|Yang|1990|p=184}}

=== Establishing contact ===
In late 1935 Japan stepped up its expansionist policies in north China, severely worsening relations between Nanjing and Tokyo. Negotiations had reached an apparent impasse by October. China reached out to Nazi Germany for mediation, but afraid of offending Japan, the Germans declined to get involved.{{sfn|Coble|1991|pp=251-252}}{{sfn|So|2002|p=237}} Chiang Kai-shek was concerned that war was imminent, and wanted to secure the material and diplomatic support of the Soviet Union.{{sfn|Yang|2020|p=58}} He also faced growing public pressure to actively resist Japan: on December 9, 1935, for example, [[December 9th Movement|a major student protest]] broke out in Beiping.{{sfn|Coble|1991|pp=76-77}}{{sfn|Garver|1988|p=5}}{{sfn|Ienaga|1978|p=88}}

In January, Chiang Kai-shek sent emissaries to Moscow to negotiate a military mutual assistance treaty.{{sfn|Sheng|1992|pp=153-154}} However, as a precondition for a treaty, Chiang wanted the Soviet Union to order the CCP to submit to the Nationalist Government. The Soviet ambassador told Chiang that while the USSR hoped the CCP would agree to a unified command under the Nationalists, Chiang would have to negotiate directly with the CCP.{{sfn|Yang|2020|p=62}} This upset Chiang, who worried that if the USSR was unwilling to order the CCP to stop, they might be willing to support further revolutionary actions by the CCP if a ceasefire broke down. Progress halted, and after news leaked to the press that Chiang was contemplating a treaty with the USSR, he called off negotiations.{{sfn|Yang|2020|p=63}} These maneuvers left Stalin wary of Chiang's intentions.{{sfn|Sheng|1992|p=154}}

Nevertheless, Chiang still sought contacts with the CCP inside China. [[Soong Ching-ling]] and [[Chen Lifu]] managed to recruit two members of the Communist underground, [[Dong Jianwu]] and {{ill|Zhang Zihua|zh|张子华}}, to cross the front lines and bring the CCP the message that Chiang was interested in ending the civil war. They arrived on February 27.{{sfn|Itoh|2016|pp=124-125}} The CCP Central Committee agreed to begin negotiations, sending five conditions to the Nationalists in March. They sought a ceasefire, a government of national defense (i.e., one which included representatives of the Communists and warlords as well as the Nationalists), a military alliance against Japan (but with continued Red Army independence), the right to move their base of operations to Hebei, and political and economic reforms.{{sfn|van de Ven|2003|pp=181-182}} The Nationalist response proposed a different vision for a united front. They wanted to see the Red Army fully integrated into the [[National Revolutionary Army]] and a Communist base in (poorer and more exposed to Japanese attack) Suiyuan and Chahar rather than Hebei, but did agree to letting CCP leaders participate in the national government. The CCP disliked this proposal, but because their attempt to break into Shanxi was defeated in May, they had to continue to negotiate.{{sfn|van de Ven|2003|p=182}}

=== Formation of a northwestern alliance ===
{{multiple image
 | total_width = 320
 | align = left
 | image1 = Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng.jpg
 | alt1 = Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng in uniform, sitting for a portrait
 | image2 = Yan Xishan8.jpg
 | alt2 = Portrait of Yan Xishan
 | footer = Zhang Xueliang, Yang Hucheng, and Yan Xishan}}

Simultaneous to the negotiations with the Nationalist central government, the Communists also opened direct, clandestine negotiations with Nationalist army leaders. In October 1935 the Communists had arrived in [[northern Shaanxi]] at the end of the [[Long March]]. Their new base area was economically backwards, agriculturally unproductive, and cut off from the outside world.{{sfn|Qian|2024|pp=129-130}} It was bordered to the north by the [[Ordos Desert]], to the east by Shanxi (governed by the warlord [[Yan Xishan]]), and to the south and west by the 130,000-strong [[Northeastern Army]], led by [[Zhang Xueliang]], and the 40,000-strong Northwestern Army, led by [[Yang Hucheng]].{{sfn|Coble|1991|p=342}} Both Yang and Zhang were former warlords who had pledged their armies to the Nationalist Government. Zhang had governed Manchuria before it was overrun by the Japanese, and strongly wished to retake his homeland.{{sfn|Hammond|2023|p=32}} He opposed the concessions that Chiang had made to Japan, and was frustrated by his orders to fight the Communists rather than the Japanese.{{sfn|Coble|1991|pp=224-225}} Yang had likewise become skeptical of Chiang's anti-Japanese commitment after the public demonstrations in December 1935.{{sfn|Itoh|2016|p=108}} Zhang and Yang had been promised an easy victory against the Communists. They were surprised and dismayed when the Red Army defeated them in several major engagements. The Red Army treated their POWs well and gave them a political education, sending them back to spread the word that the Communists wanted to form an anti-Chiang and anti-Japanese alliance.{{sfn|Itoh|2016|pp=106–107}} This effectively destroyed morale in the Nationalist armies, and the soldiers began pressing for a truce with the Communists.{{sfn|Itoh|2016|p=107}} With his officer [[Nan Hanchen]] acting as intermediary, Yang Hucheng was able to conclude a ceasefire quickly.{{sfn|Yang|1990|p=187}} They formalized a non-aggression pact in May 1936.{{sfn|van de Ven|2003|p=179}}

Negotiations with Zhang Xueliang took longer because the CCP had no established contacts in the Northeastern Army. But after Dong Jianwu requested passage to CCP territory on a mission from the central government, Zhang realized that the central government was negotiating with the CCP and was encouraged to do so himself.{{sfn|Itoh|2016|pp=115, 124-125}} A ceasefire was agreed on February 25.{{sfn|Itoh|2016|p=118}} On April 9, Zhang Xueliang met with Zhou Enlai. Zhou, an experienced negotiator, was able to solidify the ceasefire and secure supplies for the Red Army.{{sfn|Yang|1990|p=221}} In this and subsequent meetings, Zhang Xueliang would argue that resisting Japan would only be possible if the CCP gave up its opposition to Chiang. Zhou said that the CCP would discuss the point, but refused to commit to changing the policy.{{sfn|Itoh|2016|pp=119-120,123,127}} As negotiations between Zhang and the CCP continued, the Communists infiltrated the Northeastern Army. They spread communist ideas among the soldiers and recruited officers into secret societies.{{sfn|Yang|1990|pp=221-223}} In June they set up an officer training camp that celebrated the united front.{{sfn|Coble|1991|p=342}} This support from within the army helped them to persuade Zhang to form an alliance. They concluded a formal agreement on September 22.{{sfn|van de Ven|2003|p=179}}

{{Quote box|The [CCP]'s call for suspending the civil war and forming a united anti-Japanese resistance touched not only my heart deeply but also the hearts of most of the men in the Northeastern Army.|source=Zhang Xueliang{{sfn|Itoh|2016|p=115}}|width=25%|align=right| style = padding:8px;}}

Yan Xishan also moved towards a united front with the CCP. Illegally imported Japanese products were undermining the Shanxi economy and the Japanese puppet [[Mengjiang|Mongol Military Government]] was encroaching on Yan's rule over [[Suiyuan]].{{sfn|Gillin|1967|pp=228-230}} Out of fear of the Japanese, Yan accepted Mao's overtures and agreed to a truce in June 1936.{{sfn|Gillin|1967|p=232}} In September, he created the "League for Sacrifice and Salvation" to agitate the Shanxi public against the Japanese. CCP leaders [[Bo Yibo]] and [[Feng Xuefeng]] began working closely with Yan.{{sfn|van de Ven|2003|p=180}}

The members of this northwestern alliance were united by their desire to resist Japan, but they differed over the details of how this could best be accomplished.{{sfn|van de Ven|2003|p=179}} The Communists supported a plan to use Soviet support to take over [[Shaanxi]], [[Gansu]], [[Ningxia]], [[Qinghai]], and [[Xinjiang]] and turn northwest China into a base under Zhang's command to resist Japan and oppose Chiang.{{sfn|Yang|2020|p=64}} Zhang, Yang, and Yan were still committed to convincing Chiang to lead the anti-Japanese resistance.{{sfn|van de Ven|2003|p=179}} As they continued to negotiate, they kept their alliance secret and even staged fake military battles to deceive the Nanjing government.{{sfn|Barnouin|Yu|2006|p=65}}{{sfn|van de Ven|2003|p=179}}

===Renewed negotiations===
{{multiple image
 | align = left
 | total_width = 340
 | image1 = Pan Hannian.jpg
 | caption1 = Pan Hannian
 | alt1 = Pan Hannian in a business suit
 | image2 = Chen Li-fu.jpg
 | alt2 = Colorized photo of Chen Lifu
 | caption2 = Chen Lifu
 | footer = The chief negotiators}}

Over the course of the year, the Soviets had become more convinced that the united front should include Chiang. This created a problem when, in late June, the CCP re-established radio communications with Moscow. They transmitted the Wayaobu Manifesto and informed the Comintern of their alliance with Zhang. They asked for assistance in carrying out their plan to form an anti-Japan, anti-Chiang base.{{sfn|Yang|2020|p=64}} The Comintern responded with a telegram on August 15 admonishing the CCP for continuing to oppose Chiang. The Comintern did approve the other provisions of the Wayaobu Manifesto, agreeing that neither soviet power nor the independence of the Red Army should be sacrificed.{{sfn|Sheng|1992|p=157}} But they absolutely vetoed the CCP's plan to form a base in the northwest, knowing that such a move would scuttle any chance for a united front with the KMT.{{sfn|Yang|2020|p=64}} The CCP accepted the new directive from the Comintern. They adopted the new slogan "compelling Chiang to resist Japan," and [[Pan Hannian]] was sent to Nanjing to begin negotiating a truce with [[Chen Lifu]].{{sfn|Sheng|1992|p=158}}

Chiang continued to try to resolve the civil war militarily. He had always considered negotiations with the CCP to be a last resort, and after bringing the Liangguang Incident to a peaceful conclusion in September, he could bring all his force to bear on wiping out the Communists entirely.{{sfn|Chen|2024|pp=161-162}} He was encouraged by the results of the Ningxia campaign in mid-to-late October. The Second and Fourth Corps of the Red Army marched north to pick up supplies dropped in Mongolia by the Soviet Union, but found themselves trapped on the wrong side of the Yellow River.{{sfn|Yang|2020|p=65}} They were cut to pieces by the [[Hui people|Hui]] cavalry allied with the Nationalists.{{sfn|Watt|2014|pp=111-112}} Chiang began making preparations for a sixth encirclement campaign, and instructed Zhang and Yang to participate.{{sfn|Itoh|2016|pp=129-130}} In early November, Chen Lifu presented Pan Hannian with a set of extremely harsh conditions for a deal.{{efn|The terms called for, among other things, reducing the Red Army to 3,000 men and sending all of its senior officers into exile.{{sfn|Peng|2023|p=476}}{{sfn|Sheng|1992|p=163}}}} Pan balked, calling them "conditions for surrender".{{sfn|Chen|2024|p=161}} In late November, Chiang ordered the Northeastern Army and forces from the central Nationalist Army, [[Hu Zongnan]]'s Right Route Army, to attack towards the Communist capital at [[Zhidan County|Bao'an]]. At the resulting Battle of Shanchengbao, the Northeastern Army withheld most of its forces from the attack. This allowed the Red Army to ambush and nearly wipe out Hu's 78th regiment.{{sfn|Dillon|2020|p=102}}{{sfn|Yang|1990|p=223}} This reversed the diplomatic situation: Chen Lifu moderated his conditions, but the CCP recalled Pan Hannian from Nanjing on December 10.{{sfn|Dillon|2020|pp=101-102}}{{sfn|Peng|2023|pp=476-477}}

The tensions between Zhang and Chiang were reaching a breaking point. During Chiang's birthday celebrations on October 31, Zhang Xueliang attempted to convince Chiang to give up the bandit suppression campaign and focus on Japan instead. Zhang was supported by [[Yan Xishan]] and Feng Yuxiang, but Chiang angrily refused. He gave a speech the following day where he proclaimed that "the Communists are our greatest traitors".{{sfn|Pantsov|2023|p=237}}{{sfn|Itoh|2016|pp=129-130}}{{sfn|Spence|1990|p=384}} When Zhang returned to Xi'an and recounted the incident to Yang Hucheng, the latter suggested the idea of a ''bingjian'' ({{lang-zh|links=no|c=兵谏|p=bīngjiàn|tr=military remonstrance}}). In an episode in ancient Chinese history, a military officer had arrested the Emperor to force him to change a bad policy. The officer had been rewarded for his conduct rather than punished. Zhang, who historian Alexander Pantsov calls a "gallant cavalier", was intrigued by the nobility of the idea.{{sfn|Pantsov|2023|pp=241-242}}{{sfn|Pantsov|2012|p=302}} On November 23, Chiang ordered the arrest of seven leaders of the [[National Salvation Association]]. The move created an outcry across China.{{sfn|Coble|1991|p=339}} Zhang flew to Luoyang on December 3 and tried to convince Chiang to release the seven prisoners and to form a united front with the CCP against Japan, to no avail.{{sfn|Yang|2020|p=66}}{{sfn|Pantsov|2023|p=242}} Chiang declared "You are the only one in the whole country who sees things as you do. I am the revolutionary government; what I do is revolution!"{{sfn|Pantsov|2023|p=242}} When news arrived that day that Japanese marines had landed at [[Qingdao]], Chiang decided to redouble his efforts to defeat the Communists.{{sfn|Pantsov|2023|p=242}}