Editing Year and a day rule (section)

==The rule and homicide==
In English [[common law]], it was held that a [[death]] was [[conclusive presumption|conclusively presumed]] not to be [[murder]] (or any other [[homicide]]) if it occurred more than a year and one day since the act (or omission) that was alleged to have been its cause.  The rule also applied to the offence of assisting with a [[suicide]].{{citation needed|date=March 2011}}

Certain problems with this rule arise from the advance of [[medicine]]. [[Life support]] technology can extend the interval between the murderous act and the subsequent death. Application of the year and a day rule prevented murder prosecutions, not because of the merits of the case, but because of the successful intervention of doctors in prolonging life.  Additionally, advances in [[forensic medicine]] may assist the court to determine that an act was a cause of death even though it was carried out fairly far in the past.

=== England and Wales, Northern Ireland ===
The rule was abolished by the [[Law Reform (Year and a Day Rule) Act 1996]]. [[English and Welsh law]] and [[Northern Irish law]] is now substantially revised such that if a specific action can be proved to be the cause of death, it can now potentially constitute murder regardless of the intervening time.  The abolition of the rule does not relieve the [[prosecution]] of its obligation to prove the ''[[mens rea]]'' element; in cases of murder, this is the accused intended to cause either death or serious injury.

The permission of the [[Attorney General for England and Wales]] or [[Attorney General for Northern Ireland]] is required for any prosecution in which it is alleged that the death occurred more than three years after the causative act, or when the offender has previously been convicted of an offence in connection with the death.

===New Zealand===
New Zealand had a year and a day rule until it was abolished unanimously in March 2018.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/politics/102410323/government-scraps-year-and-a-day-rule-from-crimes-act |title=Government scraps 'year and a day' rule from Crimes Act |date=March 19, 2018 |work=[[Stuff.co.nz]] |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190307175227/https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/politics/102410323/government-scraps-year-and-a-day-rule-from-crimes-act |archive-date=March 7, 2019 |url-status=live}}</ref>

===United States===
*In 1891, the rule was upheld at the federal level in ''[[United States v. Ball]]''.<ref name=brady/>
*In 1987, the [[District of Columbia Court of Appeals]], the highest local court in [[Washington, DC]], rejected the year-and-a-day-rule in ''[[United States v. Jackson (1987)|United States v. Jackson]]''.<ref name=brady/><ref>{{cite court|litigants=[[United States v. Jackson (1987)|United States v. Jackson]]|vol=528|reporter=A.2d|opinion=1211|pinpoint=1213|court=D.C. App.|date=1987|quote=We also conclude that abrogation of the common law year and a day rule is overdue and properly accomplished by judicial opinion, and leave it to the legislature to determine if a time limitation on death should exist in the District of Columbia other than the limitations arising from the requirements of due process of law and of proof beyond a reasonable doubt of causation.|url=https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=8055326357893486910|access-date=November 15, 2015,}}</ref>
*In 2001, the [[Supreme Court of the United States]] held that a Tennessee court's retroactive abolition of the rule was constitutional in ''[[Rogers v. Tennessee]],'' since the [[Article One of the United States Constitution#Section 10: Limits on the States|''ex post facto'' clause]] only prohibits an ''ex post facto'' law from being passed, but does not prohibit a judicial organ from revising the [[common law]] in an ''ex post facto'' manner.<ref name=brady/>

The rule's common law status has been successfully used by defendants to overturn convictions as recently as 2003: the [[Supreme Court of Wisconsin]] upheld the year and a day rule in the case before it, but simultaneously abolished the rule for any later cases, noting the modern circumstances of homicide cases, in which there is "the specter of a family's being forced to choose between terminating the use of a life-support system and allowing an accused to escape a murder charge" and the court's finding that it is "unjust to permit an assailant to escape punishment because of a convergence of modern medical advances and an archaic rule from the thirteenth century".<ref>''State v. Picotte'', 2003 Wisc. 42, ¶ 35 (2003).  Summarized in {{cite journal | url =  http://www.wisbar.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Wisconsin_Lawyer&TEMPLATE=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&CONTENTID=44850 | title = Supreme Court Digest: Homicide - Year-and-a-Day Rule Abrogated | journal = Wisconsin Lawyer | volume = 76 | issue = 7 |date=July 2003 | publisher = [[State Bar of Wisconsin]] | location = [[Madison, Wisconsin]] }}</ref>

In [[California]], the "year and a day" rule has been changed to a "three years and a day" rule.<ref name = "HKrept">''Report on the Year and a Day Rule in Homicide'', The Law Reform Commission of Hong Kong, June 1997.</ref>  If a death occurs more than three years and one day after the act alleged to have caused it (and the act was committed on or after 1 January 1997), there is "a [[rebuttable presumption]] that the killing was not criminal", but the prosecution may seek to overcome this presumption.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displaySection.xhtml?sectionNum=194&lawCode=PEN|publisher=[[California Office of Legislative Counsel]]|title=California Penal Code § 194|access-date=22 March 2021|date=1 January 1997}}</ref> However, if the murder is committed by somebody who is serving a term of life imprisonment and is sentenced to state prison the year and a day rule applies instead.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displaySection.xhtml?lawCode=PEN&sectionNum=4500.|title=California Penal Code § 4500|publisher=[[California Office of Legislative Counsel]]|date=1986|access-date=22 March 2021}}</ref>

In 2014, the D.C. rule (as it existed in 1981) was one of the reasons given for why [[John Hinckley, Jr.|John Hinckley]], the attempted [[Assassination attempt of Ronald Reagan|assassin]] of President [[Ronald Reagan]], could not be prosecuted for the murder of [[James S. Brady]]. The [[medical examiner]] listed the [[cause of death]] for Brady as bullets fired 33 years earlier.<ref name=brady>{{cite news |author=Eugene Volokh |author-link=Eugene Volokh |title=Hinckley won't face murder charge in death of James Brady, prosecutors say |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/01/02/hinckley-wont-face-murder-charge-in-death-of-james-brady-prosecutors-say/ |newspaper=[[Washington Post]] |date=January 2, 2015 |access-date=2015-01-03 }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal|url=http://www.newsweek.com/will-john-hinckley-jr-face-murder-charges-delayed-death-james-brady-263716|journal=Newsweek|title=Will John Hinckley Jr. Face Murder Charges for the 'Delayed Death' of James Brady?|last=Wofford|first=Taylor|date=August 9, 2014|access-date=February 28, 2015}}</ref>

=== Hong Kong ===
The rule was abolished in 2000 by section 33C of the Offences against the Person Ordinance (Cap. 212).<ref>{{cite web |title=STATUTE LAW (MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS) ORDINANCE 2000 |url=https://www.elegislation.gov.hk/hk/2000/32!en}}</ref>