Editing Arnold Potts (section)

====Blamey confronts Potts====
On 9 October the 21st Brigade regained their start point at Koitaki. Before the last troops had even made it in from the jungle, Allen asked for a parade. He passed on a personal message from Curtin to the brigade, for "saving Port Moresby and thus Australia".<ref name=Brune249>Brune (2003), p. 249</ref> On 22 October Blamey visited Koitaki at short notice. He requested a private audience with Potts, and Brigade HQ was vacated. Potts' Staff Captain Ken Murdoch was deeply involved in paperwork and somehow remained to witness the "private" conversation. According to Murdoch, Potts, fresh from Allen's glowing endorsement, began by extolling the virtues of his men, and expressed satisfaction with the boost to home front morale they had been able to provide.<ref name=Brune249/>

Blamey cut him short. He relieved Potts of his command, citing Potts' failure to hold back the Japanese, despite commanding "superior forces". Further, Potts had failed to re-take Kokoda despite explicit orders to do so. Blamey explained that Prime Minister John Curtin had told him to say that failures like Kokoda campaign would not be tolerated. Murdoch reports Blamey saying "the men had shown that something was lacking" and that their leaders were to blame. Potts furiously rejected any blame being attached to his battalion commanders. Blamey was not interested in debating the finer points, nor in allowing Potts to remain in contact with those same battalion commanders. He was to leave the brigade immediately and fly to [[Darwin, Northern Territory|Darwin]]—a personal address to the brigade would not be possible, nor could he meet and brief his replacement.<ref name=Brune250>Brune (2003), pp. 250–251</ref> Murdoch says that the news spread rapidly, and as Staff Captain he was inundated with resignation papers from officers wishing to show solidarity with Potts. Potts instructed Murdoch to reject all resignations.<ref name=Brune252>Brune (2003), p. 252</ref>

Rowell was replaced by Lieutenant General [[Edmund Herring]], a man close to Blamey. Now Herring chose Brigadier [[Ivan Dougherty]] to replace Potts. During his recent period of command in the Northern Territory, Herring had relieved both his brigadiers, replacing them with younger and better educated officers, one of whom was Dougherty, an officer in whom he had great confidence.<ref>Sayers (1980), p. 201</ref> Herring believed that his decision to replace Potts with Dougherty, who would command the 21st Brigade for the rest of the war, was the right one. Years later he told official historian Dudley McCarthy that: "We knew the terrain was most difficult and the Japs very good jungle fighters ...  we had a war to win and it was our job to call in the best man we could. It would have been wrong for us to allow ourselves to be influenced by Potts' feelings."<ref>Sayers (1980), p. 223</ref>

Potts' removal could charitably be attributed to Blamey's inadequate understanding of the circumstances Potts had dealt with on the Kokoda Trail. He may have genuinely believed that another commander in the same circumstances would have pushed back the Japanese and re-taken Kokoda. This is the tack taken by Dudley McCarthy in the official war history; "Blamey and Herring, who did not at that time understand so well the circumstances in which Potts found himself and the way he had acquitted himself, genuinely misjudged him".<ref>McCarthy (1959), p. 247</ref> Other historians feel that Potts was a scapegoat, removed by Blamey to avoid a showdown with MacArthur. MacArthur maintained in a letter to the [[Chief of Staff of the United States Army]], General [[George Marshall]], on 6 September that "the Australians have proven themselves unable to match the enemy in jungle fighting. Aggressive leadership is lacking".<ref>McCarthy (1959), p. 225</ref> Peter Brune alleges that Blamey's removal of Potts was simple self-preservation. "It is staggering to contemplate that an Australian brigade commander could be thrust into a campaign with such a damning inadequacy of military intelligence, support and equipment and yet fight a near flawless fighting withdrawal where the military and political stakes were so terribly important and that could then be relieved from his command as a reward."<ref name=Brune252-253>Brune (2003), pp. 252–253</ref> General [[Robert Eichelberger]] wrote to Herring in 1959, after McCarthy's history appeared:{{blockquote|It is a funny thing about historians. If a general relieves a subordinate at any time he is immediately attacked. Whereas in our football game, if you have a better player for a particular play, you always play him, and everyone expects you to do this. I have little doubt that the same is true of your ball game. War historians never seem to give generals the credit for having thought that X might be better than Y for the next phase of operations.<ref>Letter, Eichelberger to Herring, 27 November 1959. Herring Papers, [[State Library of Victoria]], MS11355 Box 37</ref>}}