Editing Broken windows theory (section)

===New York City===
{{See also|Crime in New York City}}
[[File:Seen bode ny.jpg|thumb|292x292px|Graffiti in the [[New York City Subway]] system in the early 1980s]]
In 1985, the [[New York City Transit Authority]] hired [[George L. Kelling]], the author of ''Broken Windows'', as a consultant.<ref name=FaganDavies2000>{{Cite journal |url=https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj/vol28/iss2/2/ |title=Street Stops and Broken Windows: Terry, Race, and Disorder in New York City |journal=Fordham Urban Law Journal |volume=28 |issue=2 |pages=457 |date=2000 |last1=Fagan |first1=Jeffrey |last2=Davies |first2=Garth |ssrn=257813 |access-date=2020-02-19 |archive-date=2019-10-22 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191022224950/https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj/vol28/iss2/2/ |url-status=live }}</ref> Kelling was later hired as a consultant to the [[Boston Police Department|Boston]] and the [[Los Angeles Police Department|Los Angeles]] police departments.

One of Kelling's adherents, [[David L. Gunn]], implemented policies and procedures based on the Broken Windows Theory, during his tenure as President of the New York City Transit Authority. One of his major efforts was to lead a campaign from 1984 to 1990 to rid [[graffiti]] from New York's subway system.

In 1990, [[William J. Bratton]] became head of the [[New York City Transit Police]]. Bratton was influenced by Kelling, describing him as his "intellectual mentor". In his role, he implemented a tougher stance on [[fare evasion]], faster [[arrest|arrestee processing]] methods, and [[background check]]s on all those arrested.

After being elected [[Mayor of New York City]] in 1993, as a [[Republican Party (United States)|Republican]], [[Rudy Giuliani]] hired Bratton as his [[police commissioner]] to implement similar policies and practices throughout the city. Giuliani heavily subscribed to Kelling and Wilson's theories. Such policies emphasized addressing crimes that negatively affect [[quality of life]]. In particular, Bratton directed the police to more strictly enforce laws against subway fare evasion, [[public drinking]], [[public urination]], and graffiti. Bratton also revived the [[New York City Cabaret Law]], a previously dormant Prohibition era ban on dancing in unlicensed establishments. Throughout the late 1990s, NYPD shut down many of the city's acclaimed night spots for illegal dancing.
[[File:NYPD Piaggio Beverly lineup.jpg|thumb|[[New York City Police Department]] officers {{Circa|2005}}]]
According to a 2001 study of crime trends in New York City by Kelling and William Sousa, rates of both petty and serious crime fell significantly after the aforementioned policies were implemented. Furthermore, crime continued to decline for the following ten years. Such declines suggested that policies based on the Broken Windows Theory were [[effective]].<ref>{{Cite journal |jstor=10.1086/425594 |title=Carrots, Sticks, and Broken Windows |journal=The Journal of Law and Economics |volume=48 |issue=1 |pages=235–266 |year=2005 |last1=Corman |first1=Hope |last2=Mocan |first2=Naci |s2cid=30448467 |citeseerx=10.1.1.486.9721 |doi=10.1086/425594}}</ref> Later, in 2016, Brian Jordan Jefferson used the precedent of Kelling and Sousa's study to conduct fieldwork in the 70th precinct of New York City, which it was corroborated that crime mitigation in the area were concerning "quality of life" issues, which included noise complaints and loitering.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Jefferson |first=Brian Jordan |date=16 October 2016 |title=Broken Windows Policing and Constructions of Space and Crime: Flatbush, Brooklyn |url=https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/anti.12240 |journal=Antipode |language=en |volume=48 |issue=5 |pages=1270–1291 |doi=10.1111/anti.12240 |bibcode=2016Antip..48.1270J |issn=0066-4812|url-access=subscription }}</ref> The falling crime rates throughout New York City had built a mutual relationship between residents and law enforcement in vigilance of disorderly conduct.{{citation needed|date=December 2023}}

However, other studies do not find a [[cause and effect]] relationship between the adoption of such policies and decreases in crime.<ref name="pbs-frontline"/><ref name=HarcourtLudwig2006/> The decrease may have been part of a broader trend across the United States. The rates of most crimes, including all categories of violent crime, made consecutive declines from their peak in 1990, under Giuliani's predecessor, [[David Dinkins]]. Other cities also experienced less crime, even though they had different police policies. Other factors, such as the 39% drop in New York City's [[unemployment rate]] between 1992 and 1999,<ref name="businessinsider"/> could also explain the decrease reported by Kelling and Sousa.<ref name="businessinsider">{{Citation |title=Criticism for Giuliani's broken windows theory |date=Aug 2013 |url=http://www.businessinsider.com/criticism-for-giulianis-broken-windows-theory-2013-8 |newspaper=Business insider |access-date=2013-11-24 |archive-date=2021-04-23 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210423010610/http://www.businessinsider.com/criticism-for-giulianis-broken-windows-theory-2013-8 |url-status=live }}.</ref>

A 2017 study found that when the New York Police Department (NYPD) stopped aggressively enforcing minor legal statutes in late 2014 and early 2015 that civilian complaints of three major crimes (burglary, felony assault, and grand larceny) decreased (slightly with large error bars) during and shortly after sharp reductions in [[proactive policing]]. There was no statistically significant effect on other major crimes such as murder, rape, robbery, or grand theft auto. These results are touted as challenging prevailing scholarship as well as conventional wisdom on authority and legal compliance by implying that aggressively enforcing minor legal statutes incites more severe criminal acts.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Sullivan |first1=Christopher M. |last2=O'Keeffe |first2=Zachary P. |s2cid=19223955 |date=2017-09-25 |title=Evidence that curtailing proactive policing can reduce major crime |journal=Nature Human Behaviour |language=En |doi=10.1038/s41562-017-0211-5 |pmid=31024103 |issn=2397-3374 |volume=1 |issue=10 |pages=730–737}}</ref>