Editing Chinese unification (section)

=== Stasis ===
Unification proposals were not actively floated in Taiwan and the issue remained moot under President Chen Shui-bian, who refused to accept talks under Beijing's pre-conditions. Under the PRC administration of [[Hu Jintao]], incorporating Taiwan lost emphasis amid the reality that the DPP presidency in Taiwan would be held by pro-independence President Chen until 2008. Instead, the emphasis shifted to meetings with politicians who opposed independence.{{cn|date=April 2024}}

A series of [[2005 Pan–Blue visits to mainland China|high-profile visits in 2005]] to China by the leaders of the three pan-Blue Coalition parties was seen as an implicit recognition of the status quo by the PRC government. Notably, Kuomintang chairman Lien Chan's trip was marked by unedited coverage of his speeches and tours (and some added positive commentary) by government-controlled media and meetings with high level officials including Hu Jintao. Similar treatment (though marked with less historical significance and media attention) was given during subsequent visits by PFP chairman James Soong and New Party chairman Yok Mu-ming. The CCP and the Pan-Blue Coalition parties emphasized their common ground in renewed negotiations under the 1992 consensus, opening the [[Three Links]], and opposing Taiwan's formal independence.{{cn|date=April 2024}}

The PRC passed an Anti-Secession Law shortly before Lien's trip. While the Pan-Green Coalition held mass rallies to protest the codification of using military force to retake Taiwan, the Pan-Blue Coalition was largely silent. The language of the Anti-Secession Law was clearly directed at the independence supporters in Taiwan (termed "'Taiwan independence' secessionist forces" in the law) and designed to be somewhat acceptable to the Pan-Blue Coalition. It did not explicitly declare Taiwan to be part of the People's Republic of China but instead used the term "China" on its own, allowing definitional flexibility. It made repeated emphasis of promoting peaceful national unification but left out the concept of "one country, two systems" and called for negotiations in "steps and phases and with flexible and varied modalities" in recognition of the concept of eventual rather than immediate incorporation of Taiwan.{{cn|date=April 2024}}

Under both President Chen and President Ma Ying-jeou, the main political changes in cross-straits relationship involved closer economic ties and increased business and personal travel. Such initiatives were met by grassroots oppositions such as the [[Sunflower Student Movement]], which successfully scuttled [[Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement]] in 2014. President Ma Ying-Jeou advocated for the revitalization of Chinese culture, as in the re-introduction of [[traditional Chinese characters|traditional Chinese]] in texts to mainland China used in Taiwan and historically in China. It expressed willingness to allow the usage [[simplified Chinese characters|simplified Chinese]] in informal writing.{{cn|date=April 2024}}

Starting in 2017, the [[All-China Federation of Taiwan Compatriots]], a group of Taiwanese residing in the PRC, took on a more prominent role in the CCP's [[United front in Taiwan|united front]] efforts directed at Taiwan.<ref>{{Cite web |date=2017-05-07 |title=Civilian group from mainland China to take more prominent role in cross-strait affairs |url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2093280/civilian-group-mainland-china-take-more-prominent-role |access-date=2023-08-27 |website=[[South China Morning Post]] |language=en |archive-date=15 May 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230515024912/https://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2093280/civilian-group-mainland-china-take-more-prominent-role |url-status=live }}</ref>