Editing Cosmological argument (section)

===Leibnizian cosmological argument===

In 1714, German philosopher [[Gottfried Leibniz]] presented a variation of the cosmological argument based upon the [[principle of sufficient reason]]. He writes: "There can be found no fact that is true or existent, or any true proposition, without there being a sufficient reason for its being so and not otherwise, although we cannot know these reasons in most cases." Stating his argument succinctly:<ref>{{cite book |last1=Rescher |first1=Nicholas |year=1991 |title=The Monadology: An Edition for Students|publisher=University of Pittsburgh Press}}</ref>

:"Why is there something rather than nothing? The sufficient reason ... is found in a substance which ... is a necessary being bearing the reason for its existence within itself."

[[Alexander Pruss]] formulates the argument as follows:<ref>{{cite book |last1=Pruss|first1=Alexander R. |author-link=Alexander Pruss |editor1-last=Craig |editor1-first=William Lane |editor2-last=Moreland |editor2-first=J. P. |editor2-link=J. P. Moreland |title=The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology |publisher=Wiley-Blackwell |date=May 18, 2009 |pages=25–26 |chapter=The Leibnizian Cosmological Argument|isbn=978-1405176576}}</ref>

# Every contingent fact has an explanation.
# There is a contingent fact that includes all other contingent facts.
# Therefore, there is an explanation of this fact.
# This explanation must involve a necessary being.
# This necessary being is God.

Premise 1 expresses the [[principle of sufficient reason]]. In premise 2, Leibniz proposes the existence of a [[logical conjunction]] of all contingent facts, referred to in later literature as the ''Big Conjunctive Contingent Fact'' (BCCF), representing the sum total of contingent reality.<ref>{{cite journal|last1=Oppy |first1=Graham |title=On 'a new cosmological argument'|journal=Religious Studies|year=2000 |pages=345–353 |volume=36 |issue=3|doi=10.1017/S0034412500005308 |url=https://philarchive.org/rec/OPPOAN }}</ref> Premise 3 applies the principle of sufficient reason to the BCCF, given that it too, as a contingency, has a sufficient explanation. It follows, in statement 4, that the explanation of the BCCF must be necessary, not contingent, given that the BCCF incorporates all contingent facts. Statement 5 proposes that the necessary being explaining the totality of contingent facts is God.

Philosophers Joshua Rasmussen and T. Ryan Byerly have argued in defence of the inference from statement 4 to statement 5.<ref>{{cite journal|title=From a necessary being to God |last1=Rasmussen |first1=Joshua |journal=International Journal for Philosophy of Religion |volume=66 |issue=1 |pages=1–13 |year=2009|doi=10.1007/s11153-008-9191-8 }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal|title=From a necessary being to a perfect being |last1=Byerly |first1=Ryan T |journal=Analysis |volume=79 |issue=1 |pages=10–17 |year=2019|doi=10.1093/analys/any009 }}</ref>