Open main menu
Home
Random
Recent changes
Special pages
Community portal
Preferences
About Wikipedia
Disclaimers
Incubator escapee wiki
Search
User menu
Talk
Dark mode
Contributions
Create account
Log in
Editing
Data remanence
(section)
Warning:
You are not logged in. Your IP address will be publicly visible if you make any edits. If you
log in
or
create an account
, your edits will be attributed to your username, along with other benefits.
Anti-spam check. Do
not
fill this in!
===Encryption=== [[Encryption|Encrypting]] data before it is stored on the media may mitigate concerns about data remanence. If the [[Key (cryptography)|decryption key]] is strong and carefully controlled, it may effectively make any data on the media unrecoverable. Even if the key is stored on the media, it may prove easier or quicker to [[#Overwriting|overwrite]] just the key, versus the entire disk. This process is called [[crypto-shredding]]. Encryption may be done on a [[Filesystem-level encryption|file-by-file]] basis, or on the [[Disk encryption|whole disk]]. [[Cold boot attack]]s are one of the few possible methods for subverting a [[Disk encryption|full-disk encryption]] method, as there is no possibility of storing the plain text key in an unencrypted section of the medium. See the section [[#Complications|Complications: Data in RAM]] for further discussion. Other [[side-channel attack]]s (such as [[keyloggers]], acquisition of a written note containing the decryption key, or [[rubber-hose cryptanalysis]]) may offer a greater chance of success, but do not rely on weaknesses in the cryptographic method employed. As such, their relevance for this article is minor.
Edit summary
(Briefly describe your changes)
By publishing changes, you agree to the
Terms of Use
, and you irrevocably agree to release your contribution under the
CC BY-SA 4.0 License
and the
GFDL
. You agree that a hyperlink or URL is sufficient attribution under the Creative Commons license.
Cancel
Editing help
(opens in new window)