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Demographic transition
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==Historical studies== [[File:Demographic-Transition-5-countries.png|thumb|upright=2.75|Demographic change in Germany, Sweden, Chile, Mauritius, China from 1820 to 2010.<br />Pink line: crude [[death rate]] (CDR), green line: (crude) [[birth rate]] (CBR), yellow line: population.]] ===Britain=== Between 1750 and 1975 England experienced the transition from high to low levels of both mortality and fertility. A major factor was the sharp decline in the death rate due to infectious diseases,<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Harris|first=Bernard|title=Health by Association|journal=International Journal of Epidemiology|pages=488–490}}</ref> which has fallen from about 11 per 1,000 to less than 1 per 1,000. By contrast, the death rate from other causes was 12 per 1,000 in 1850 and has not declined markedly.{{citation needed|date=July 2021}} Scientific discoveries and medical breakthroughs did not, in general, contribute importantly to the early major decline in infectious disease mortality.{{citation needed|date=July 2021}} ===Ireland=== In the 1980s and early 1990s, the Irish demographic status converged to the European norm. Mortality rose above the European Community average, and in 1991 Irish fertility fell to replacement level. The peculiarities of Ireland's past demography and its recent rapid changes challenge established theory. The recent changes have mirrored inward changes in Irish society, with respect to family planning, women in the work force, the sharply declining power of the Catholic Church, and the emigration factor.<ref>{{Citation | first = DA | last = Coleman | title= The Demographic Transition in Ireland in International Context | journal= Proceedings of the British Academy | year = 1992 | issue = 79 | pages = 53–77}}.</ref> ===France=== France displays real divergences from the standard model of Western demographic evolution. The uniqueness of the French case arises from its specific demographic history, its historic cultural values, and its internal regional dynamics. France's demographic transition was unusual in that the mortality and the natality decreased at the same time, thus there was no demographic boom in the 19th century.<ref>{{cite journal |title=Quand l'Angleterre rattrapait la France|url=https://www.ined.fr/en/publications/population-and-societies/quand-l-angleterre-rattrapait-la-france-en/|journal=Population & Sociétés |date=May 1999 |issue=346 |first1= Jacques |last1=Vallin|first2=Graziella |last2=Caselli |language=fr}}</ref> France's demographic profile is similar to its European neighbors and to developed countries in general, yet it seems to be staving off the population decline of Western countries. With 62.9 million inhabitants in 2006, it was the second most populous country in the European Union, and it displayed a certain demographic dynamism, with a growth rate of 2.4% between 2000 and 2005, above the European average. More than two-thirds of that growth can be ascribed to a natural increase resulting from high fertility and birth rates. In contrast, France is one of the developed nations whose migratory balance is rather weak, which is an original feature at the European level. Several interrelated reasons account for such singularities, in particular the impact of pro-family policies accompanied by greater unmarried households and out-of-wedlock births. These general demographic trends parallel equally important changes in regional demographics. Since 1982, the same significant tendencies have occurred throughout mainland France: demographic stagnation in the least-populated rural regions and industrial regions in the northeast, with strong growth in the southwest and along the Atlantic coast, plus dynamism in metropolitan areas. Shifts in population between regions account for most of the differences in growth. The varying demographic evolution regions can be analyzed though the filter of several parameters, including residential facilities, economic growth, and urban dynamism, which yield several distinct regional profiles. The distribution of the French population therefore seems increasingly defined not only by interregional mobility but also by the residential preferences of individual households. These challenges, linked to configurations of population and the dynamics of distribution, inevitably raise the issue of town and country planning. The most recent census figures show that an outpouring of the urban population means that fewer rural areas are continuing to register a negative migratory flow – two-thirds of rural communities have shown some since 2000. The spatial demographic expansion of large cities amplifies the process of [[Peri-urbanisation|peri-urbanization]] yet is also accompanied by movement of selective residential flow, social selection, and sociospatial segregation based on income.<ref>{{Citation | first1 = Guy | last1 = Baudelle | first2 = David | last2 = Olivier | title= Changement Global, Mondialisation et Modèle De Transition Démographique: réflexion sur une exception française parmi les pays développés | journal= Historiens et Géographes | year = 2006 | volume = 98 | issue = 395 | pages = 177–204 | issn = 0046-757X | language = fr}}</ref> ===Asia=== McNicoll (2006) examines the common features behind the striking changes in health and fertility in East and Southeast Asia in the 1960s–1990s, focusing on seven countries: Taiwan and South Korea ("tiger" economies), Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia ("second wave" countries), and China and Vietnam ("market-Leninist" economies). Demographic change can be seen as a by-product of social and economic development and, in some cases, accompanied by strong government pressure. An effective, often authoritarian, local administrative system can provide a framework for promotion and services in health, education, and family planning. [[Economic liberalization]] increased economic opportunities and risks for individuals, while also increasing the price and often reducing the quality of these services, all affecting demographic trends.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=McNicoll |first=Geoffrey |date=2006 |title=Policy lessons of the East Asian demographic transition |doi=10.31899/pgy2.1041 |doi-access=free }}</ref> ====India==== Goli and Arokiasamy (2013) indicate that India has a sustainable demographic transition beginning in the mid-1960s and a fertility transition beginning in post-1965.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Goli |first1=Srinivas |last2=Arokiasamy |first2=Perianayagam |date=2013-10-18 |editor-last=Schooling |editor-first=C. Mary |title=Demographic Transition in India: An Evolutionary Interpretation of Population and Health Trends Using 'Change-Point Analysis' |journal=PLOS ONE |language=en |volume=8 |issue=10 |pages=e76404 |doi=10.1371/journal.pone.0076404 |issn=1932-6203 |pmc=3799745 |pmid=24204621|bibcode=2013PLoSO...876404G |doi-access=free }}</ref> As of 2013, India is in the later half of the third stage of the demographic transition, with a population of 1.23 billion.<ref>{{cite web|url= https://www.scribd.com/doc/59771739/THE-ARTHEMETICS-OF-INDIAN-POPULATION |title= The arithmetic's of Indian population|access-date=13 September 2013}}</ref> It is nearly 40 years behind in the demographic transition process compared to [[EU countries]], [[Japan]], etc. The present demographic transition stage of India along with its higher population base will yield a rich [[demographic dividend]] in future decades.<ref>{{cite web|url= https://www.scribd.com/doc/58789334/India-vs-USA-vs-China-vs-World|title=India vs China vs USA vs World|access-date=13 September 2013}}</ref> ====Korea==== Cha (2007) analyzes a panel data set to explore how industrial revolution, demographic transition, and human [[capital accumulation]] interacted in Korea from 1916 to 1938. Income growth and public investment in health caused mortality to fall, which suppressed fertility and promoted education. Industrialization, skill premium, and closing gender wage gap further induced parents to opt for child quality. Expanding demand for education was accommodated by an active public school building program. The interwar agricultural depression aggravated traditional income inequality, raising fertility and impeding the spread of mass schooling. Landlordism collapsed in the wake of de-colonization, and the consequent reduction in inequality accelerated human and physical capital accumulation, hence leading to growth in South Korea.<ref>{{Citation | last = Myung | first = Soo Cha | title = Industrial Revolution, Demographic Transition, and Human Capital Accumulation in Korea, 1916–38 | publisher = Naksungdae Institute of Economic Research | type = working Paper | date = July 2007 | url = http://www.naksung.re.kr/papers/wp2007-7.pdf | place = KR}}.</ref> ====China==== China experienced a demographic transition with high death rate and low fertility rate from 1959 to 1961 due to the great famine.<ref name=":3" /> However, as a result of the economic improvement, the birth rate increased and mortality rate declined in China before the early 1970s.<ref name=":4" /> In the 1970s, China's birth rate fell at an unprecedented rate, which had not been experienced by any other population in a comparable time span. The birth rate fell from 6.6 births per women before 1970 to 2.2 births per women in 1980.The rapid fertility decline in China was caused by government policy: in particular the "later, longer, fewer" policy of the early 1970s and in the late 1970s the one-child policy was also enacted which highly influence China demographic transition.<ref>{{cite journal|last1=John|first1=Bongaarts|last2=Susan|first2=Greenhalgh|date=1985|title=An alternative to the One-Child Policy in China|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/1973456|journal=Population and Development Review|volume=11|issue=4|pages=585–617|doi=10.2307/1973456 |jstor=1973456 }}</ref> As the demographic dividend gradually disappeared, the government abandoned the one-child policy in 2011 and fully lifted the two-child policy from 2015.The two-child policy has had some positive effects on the fertility which causes fertility constantly to increase until 2018.However fertility started to decline after 2018 and meanwhile there was no significant change in mortality in recent 30 years. ===Madagascar=== {{Main|Demographics of Madagascar}} Campbell has studied the demography of 19th-century Madagascar in the light of demographic transition theory. Both supporters and critics of the theory hold to an intrinsic opposition between human and "natural" factors, such as climate, famine, and disease, influencing demography. They also suppose a sharp chronological divide between the precolonial and colonial eras, arguing that whereas "natural" demographic influences were of greater importance in the former period, human factors predominated thereafter. Campbell argues that in 19th-century Madagascar the human factor, in the form of the [[Merina Kingdom|Merina state]], was the predominant demographic influence. However, the impact of the state was felt through natural forces, and it varied over time. In the late 18th and early 19th centuries Merina state policies stimulated agricultural production, which helped to create a larger and healthier population and laid the foundation for Merina military and economic expansion within Madagascar. From 1820, the cost of such expansionism led the state to increase its exploitation of forced labor at the expense of agricultural production and thus transformed it into a negative demographic force. Infertility and infant mortality, which were probably more significant influences on overall population levels than the adult mortality rate, increased from 1820 due to disease, malnutrition, and stress, all of which stemmed from state forced labor policies. Available estimates indicate little if any population growth for Madagascar between 1820 and 1895. The demographic "crisis" in Africa, ascribed by critics of the demographic transition theory to the colonial era, stemmed in Madagascar from the policies of the imperial Merina regime, which in this sense formed a link to the French regime of the colonial era. Campbell thus questions the underlying assumptions governing the debate about historical demography in Africa and suggests that the demographic impact of political forces be reevaluated in terms of their changing interaction with "natural" demographic influences.<ref>{{Citation | first1 = Gwyn | last1 = Campbell | title= State and Pre-colonial Demographic History: the Case of Nineteenth-century Madagascar | journal= Journal of African History | year = 1991 | volume = 32 | issue = 3 | pages = 415–45 | issn = 0021-8537 | doi=10.1017/s0021853700031534}}.</ref> === Russia === {{main|Demographics of Russia}} Russia entered stage two of the transition in the 18th century, simultaneously with the rest of Europe, though the effect of transition remained limited to a modest decline in death rates and steady population growth. The population of Russia nearly quadrupled during the 19th century, from 30 million to 133 million, and continued to grow until the First World War and the turmoil that followed.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.tacitus.nu/historical-atlas/population/russia.htm|title=Population of Eastern Europe|website=tacitus.nu|access-date=2015-09-30|archive-date=2018-01-08|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180108232321/http://www.tacitus.nu/historical-atlas/population/russia.htm|url-status=dead}}</ref> Russia then quickly transitioned through stage three. Though fertility rates rebounded initially and almost reached 7 children/woman in the mid-1920s, they were depressed by the 1931–33 famine, crashed due to the Second World War in 1941, and only rebounded to a sustained level of 3 children/woman after the war. By 1970 Russia was firmly in stage four, with crude birth rates and crude death rates on the order of 15/1000 and 9/1000 respectively. Bizarrely, however, the birth rate entered a state of constant flux, repeatedly surpassing the 20/1000 as well as falling below 12/1000. In the 1980s and 1990s, Russia underwent a unique demographic transition; observers call it a "demographic catastrophe": the number of deaths exceeded the number of births, life expectancy fell sharply (especially for males) and the number of suicides increased.<ref>{{Citation | editor-first = George J | editor-last = Demko | others = et al | title = Population under Duress: The Geodemography of Post-Soviet Russia | year = 1999 | url = | publisher = Westview Press |isbn=0813389399 }}{{page needed|date=July 2021}}</ref> From 1992 through 2011, the number of deaths exceeded the number of births; from 2011 onwards, the opposite has been the case. === United States === Greenwood and Seshadri (2002) show that from 1800 to 1940 there was a [[demographic shift]] from a mostly rural US population with high fertility, with an average of seven children born per white woman, to a minority (43%) rural population with low fertility, with an average of two births per white woman. This shift resulted from technological progress. A sixfold increase in real wages made children more expensive in terms of forgone opportunities to work and increases in agricultural productivity reduced rural demand for labor, a substantial portion of which traditionally had been performed by children in farm families.<ref>{{Cite journal|title=The U.S. Demographic Transition|last1=Greenwood |first1=Jeremy |last2=Seshadri |first2=Ananth|date=January 2002|ssrn = 297952}}</ref> A simplification of the DTM theory proposes an initial decline in mortality followed by a later drop in fertility. The changing demographics of the U.S. in the last two centuries did not parallel this model. Beginning around 1800, there was a sharp fertility decline; at this time, an average woman usually produced seven births per lifetime, but by 1900 this number had dropped to nearly four. A mortality decline was not observed in the U.S. until almost 1900—a hundred years after the drop in fertility. However, this late decline occurred from a very low initial level. During the 17th and 18th centuries, crude death rates in much of colonial North America ranged from 15 to 25 deaths per 1000 residents per year<ref>{{cite book|title=A Population History of the United States|author= Herbert S. Klein|page=39}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|title=A Population History of North America|author1= Michael R. Haines |author2=Richard H. Steckel|pages=163–164}}</ref> (levels of up to 40 per 1000 being typical during stages one and two). Life expectancy at birth was on the order of 40 and, in some places, reached 50, and a resident of 18th century Philadelphia who reached age 20 could have expected, on average, additional 40 years of life. This phenomenon is explained by the pattern of colonization of the United States. Sparsely populated interior of the country allowed ample room to accommodate all the "excess" people, counteracting mechanisms (spread of communicable diseases due to overcrowding, low real wages and insufficient calories per capita due to the limited amount of available agricultural land) which led to high mortality in the Old World. With low mortality but stage 1 birth rates, the United States necessarily experienced exponential population growth (from less than 4 million people in 1790, to 23 million in 1850, to 76 million in 1900). The only area where this pattern did not hold was the American South. High prevalence of deadly endemic diseases such as malaria kept mortality as high as 45–50 per 1000 residents per year in 18th century North Carolina. In [[New Orleans]], mortality remained so high (mainly due to [[yellow fever]]) that the city was characterized as the "death capital of the United States" – at the level of 50 per 1000 population or higher – well into the second half of the 19th century.<ref>{{cite journal |first=Michael R. |last=Haines |title=The Urban Mortality Transition in the United States, 1800–1940 |journal=NBER Historical Working Paper No. 134 |date=July 2001 |doi=10.3386/h0134 |doi-access=free }}</ref> Today, the U.S. is recognized as having both low fertility and mortality rates. Specifically, birth rates stand at 14 per 1000 per year and death rates at 8 per 1000 per year.<ref>{{Citation | url = https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/united-states/ | title = World factbook | date = 17 November 2021 | contribution = US | publisher = CIA | place = USA}}.</ref>
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