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Electronic voting
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==== Sybil attacks ==== {{Main|Sybil attack}} One of the biggest weaknesses of online voting is the difficulty of dealing with fake identities, especially when voting is implemented using software without the cooperation of some kind of government agency.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Nebulas |date=2018-09-21 |title=Liberal Radicalism: Can Quadratic Voting Be the Perfect Voting System? |url=https://medium.com/nebulasio/liberal-radicalism-can-quadratic-voting-be-the-perfect-voting-system-e958408567b2 |access-date=2020-11-03 |website=Medium |language=en}}</ref> These attacks use sybils—fake or duplicate identities—to influence community decisions. Since a single vote has the potential to tilt a group decision, prevention of sybil attacks is an important priority in ensuring the security of voting.<ref>{{Cite book |last1=Shahaf |first1=Gal |title=Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence |last2=Shapiro |first2=Ehud |last3=Talmon |first3=Nimrod |date=August 2019 |publisher=International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization |isbn=978-0-9992411-4-1 |location=California |pages=572–579 |chapter=Sybil-Resilient Reality-Aware Social Choice |doi=10.24963/ijcai.2019/81 |doi-access=free}}</ref> Sybil attacks are a common issue with implementations on open, peer-to-peer networks, as the system must have a way to prevent fake identities to prevent gaming of the vote.<ref name="Lalley2017-1">{{Cite SSRN |title=Quadratic Voting: How Mechanism Design Can Radicalize Democracy |last1=Lalley |first1=Steven |last2=Weyl |first2=E. Glen |date=24 December 2017 |language=en |ssrn=2003531}}</ref> Some future possible avenues of inquiries include to investigate more intersectional [[proof of personhood]] systems that aren't directly blockchain-based.<ref name=":6">{{cite arXiv |eprint=2008.05300 |class=cs.CR |first1=Divya |last1=Siddarth |first2=Sergey |last2=Ivliev |title=Who Watches the Watchmen? A Review of Subjective Approaches for Sybil-resistance in Proof of Personhood Protocols |date=2020-10-13 |last3=Siri |first3=Santiago |last4=Berman |first4=Paula}}</ref> For example, extending the [[web of trust]] by having a protocol that verifies proof of identities using social interactions would allow a community of users to assign corresponding levels of trusts to different candidates in relation with others. However, this would require a fully decentralized system.<ref name=":6" /> This web-of-trust protocol could even expand to allowing candidates to provide proof of personhood by physical attendance, which could lead to trusted clusters that grow into communities.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Howitt |first=Aleeza |date=2019-03-05 |title=Proposal for a Decentralized Unique Identity Seeding Protocol |url=https://ubiresearch.org/proposal-for-a-decentralized-unique-identity-seeding-protocol |access-date=2020-11-10 |website=UBI Research |language=en-US}}</ref>
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