Editing Ethical intuitionism (section)

== Rational intuition versus moral sense ==
Some use the term "ethical intuitionism" in moral philosophy to refer to the general position that we have some non-inferential moral knowledge{{sfn|Sinnott-Armstrong|2006a}}{{sfn|Sinnott-Armstrong|2006|p={{pn|date=March 2024}}}}—that is, basic moral knowledge that is not inferred from or based on any proposition. However, it is important to distinguish between empiricist and rationalist models of this. Some, thus, reserve the term "ethical intuitionism" for the rationalist model and the term "moral sense theory" for the empiricist model.{{sfn|Sinnott-Armstrong|2006|pp=184–186, especially fn. 4}} However, the terminology is not ultimately important, so long as one keeps in mind the relevant differences between these two views.

Generally speaking, rationalist ethical intuitionism models the acquisition of such non-inferential moral knowledge on ''a priori'', non-empirical knowledge, such as knowledge of mathematical truths; whereas moral sense theory models the acquisition of such non-inferential moral knowledge on empirical knowledge, such as knowledge of the colors of objects (see [[moral sense theory]]).

=== Rational intuition ===

The rationalist version of ethical intuitionism models ethical intuitions on ''[[A priori and a posteriori|a priori]]'', non-empirically-based intuitions of truths, such as basic truths of mathematics.{{sfn|Franklin|2021}} Take for example the belief that two minus one is one. This piece of knowledge is often thought to be non-inferential in that it is not grounded in or justified by some other proposition or claim. Rather, one who understands the relevant concepts involved in the proposition that two minus one is one has what one might call an "intuition" of the truth of the proposition. One intuits the truth of the proposition, rather than inferring it. Likewise, the ethical intuitionist claims that basic moral truths—whether they are principles (such as ''don't kill people'') or judgments (such as ''it is wrong to kill people'')—are known without inference, and in particular they are known via one's rational intuition.

Some rationalist ethical intuitionists characterize moral "intuitions" as a species of belief<ref>For example {{harvnb|Audi|2004|pp=33–36}}</ref> that are ''[[self-evidence|self-evident]]'' in that they are justified simply by virtue of one's understanding of the proposition believed. Others characterize "intuitions" as a distinct kind of mental state, in which something ''seems'' to one to be the case (whether one believes it or not) as a result of intellectual reflection. [[Michael Huemer]], for example, defines "intuition" as a sort of seeming:{{sfn|Huemer|2005|p={{pn|date=March 2024}}}}

<blockquote>Reasoning sometimes changes how things seem to us. But there is also a way things seem to us prior to reasoning; otherwise, reasoning could not get started. The way things seem prior to reasoning we may call an 'initial appearance'. An initial, ''intellectual'' appearance is an 'intuition'. That is, an intuition that ''p'' is a state of its seeming to one that ''p'' that is not dependent on inference from other beliefs and that results from thinking about ''p'', as opposed to perceiving, remembering, or introspecting. An ethical intuition is an intuition whose content is an evaluative proposition. (§5.2)</blockquote>

Regardless of one's definition of rational intuition, intuitionists all agree that rational intuitions are not justified by inference from a separate belief.

=== Moral sense ===
{{main|Moral sense theory}}
Another version—what one might call the [[empiricism|empiricist]] version—of ethical intuitionism models non-inferential ethical knowledge on sense perception. This version involves what is often called a "moral sense". According to moral sense theorists, certain moral truths are known via this moral sense simply on the basis of experience, not inference.

One way to understand the moral sense is to draw an analogy between it and other kinds of senses. Beauty, for example, is something we see in some faces, artworks and landscapes. We can also hear it in some pieces of music. We clearly do not need an independent aesthetic sense faculty to perceive beauty in the world. Our ordinary five senses are quite enough to observe it, though merely observing something beautiful is no guarantee that we can observe its beauty. In the same way, a [[color blindness|color-blind]] person is not necessarily able to perceive the green color of grass although he is capable of vision. Suppose we give a name to this ability to appreciate the beauty in things we see: one might call it the ''aesthetic sense''. This aesthetic sense does not come automatically to all people with perfect vision and hearing, so it is fair to describe it as something extra, something not wholly reducible to vision and hearing. As the aesthetic sense informs us about what is beautiful, we can [[analogy|analogically]] understand the ''moral sense'' as informing us of what is good. A modern example of a moral sensation is the impression of wrongness felt when one sees puppies being kicked.