Editing Existence (section)

=== Second-order theories ===
Second-order theories understand existence as a second-order property rather than a first-order property. They are often seen as the orthodox position in ontology.<ref>{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Casati|Fujikawa|loc=Lead Section, §1. Existence as a Second-Order Property and Its Relation to Quantification}} |2={{harvnb|Blackburn|2008|loc=[https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803095804522 Existence]}} }}</ref> For instance, the [[Empire State Building]] is an individual object and "being {{convert|443.2|meters|abbr=out|spell=us}} tall" is a first-order property of it. "Being instantiated" is a property of "being 443.2 meters tall" and therefore a second-order property. According to second-order theories, to talk about existence is to talk about which properties have instances.<ref name="auto">{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Blackburn|2008|loc=[https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803095804522 Existence]}} |2={{harvnb|Casati|Fujikawa|loc=§1. Existence as a Second-Order Property and Its Relation to Quantification}} }}</ref> For example, this view says that the sentence "God exists" means "Godhood is instantiated" rather than "God has the property of existing".<ref name="auto4"/>

A key reason against characterizing existence as a property of individuals is that existence differs from regular properties. Regular properties, such as ''being a building'' and ''being 443.2 meters tall'', express what an object is like but do not directly describe whether or not that building exists.<ref>{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Casati|Fujikawa|loc=§1. Existence as a Second-Order Property and Its Relation to Quantification}} |2={{harvnb|Lowe|2005|loc=[https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/acref/9780199264797.001.0001/acref-9780199264797-e-828 Existence]}} }}</ref> According to this view, existence is more fundamental than regular properties because an object cannot have any properties if it does not exist.<ref>{{harvnb|Nelson|2022|loc=§ 1. Frege and Russell: Existence Is Not a Property of Individuals}}</ref>

According to second-order theorists, [[Quantifier (logic)|quantifiers]] rather than [[Predication (philosophy)|predicates]] express existence.<ref>{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Casati|Fujikawa|loc=Lead Section, §1. Existence as a Second-Order Property and Its Relation to Quantification}} |2={{harvnb|Mackie|1998|loc=§2 The Quantifier Account of Existence}} |3={{harvnb|Blackburn|2008|loc=[https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803095804522 Existence]}} |4={{harvnb|Lowe|2005|loc=[https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/acref/9780199264797.001.0001/acref-9780199264797-e-828 Existence]}} }}</ref> Predicates are expressions that apply to and classify objects, usually by attributing features to them, such as "is a butterfly" and "is happy".<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Portner|2006|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=E85VAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA141 141–143]}} | {{harvnb|Ellis|2014|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=DmLfBQAAQBAJ&pg=PT39 39–40]}} }}</ref> Quantifiers are terms that talk about the quantity of objects that have certain properties. [[Existential quantifier]]s express that there is at least one object, like the expressions "some" and "there exists", as in "some cows eat grass" and "there exists an even prime number".<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Magnus|2005|pp=52–53}} | {{harvnb|Uzquiano|2022|loc=Lead Section}} }}</ref> In this regard, existence is closely related to counting because to assert that something exists is to assert that the corresponding concept has one or more instances.<ref name="auto"/>

Second-order views imply a sentence like "[[egg-laying mammals]] exist" is misleading because the word "exist" is used as a predicate in them. These views say the true logical form is better expressed in reformulations like "there exist entities that are egg-laying mammals". This way, "existence" has the role of a quantifier and "egg-laying mammals" is the predicate. Quantifier constructions can also be used to express negative existential statements; for instance, the sentence "talking tigers do not exist" can be expressed as "it is not the case that there exist talking tigers".<ref>{{harvnb|Mackie|1998|loc=§2 The Quantifier Account of Existence}}</ref>

[[File:Russell1907-2.jpg|thumb|alt=Photo of Bertrand Russell|upright=0.8|[[Bertrand Russell]] proposed his [[theory of descriptions]] to dissolve paradoxes surrounding negative existential statements.]]

Many ontologists accept that second-order theories provide a correct analysis of many types of existential sentences. It is, however, controversial whether it is correct for all cases.<ref>{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Mackie|1998|loc=§2 The Quantifier Account of Existence}} |2={{harvnb|Blackburn|2008|loc=[https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803095804522 Existence]}} }}</ref> Some problems relate to assumptions associated with everyday language about sentences like "[[Ronald McDonald]] does not exist". This type of statement is called ''negative singular existential'' and the expression ''Ronald McDonald'' is a [[singular term]] that seems to refer to an individual. It is not clear how the expression can refer to an individual if, as the sentence asserts, this individual does not exist. According to a solution philosopher [[Bertrand Russell]] (1872–1970) proposed, singular terms do not refer to individuals but are [[Theory of descriptions|descriptions of individuals]]. This theory states negative singular existentials deny an object matching the descriptions exists without referring to a nonexistent individual. Following this approach, the sentence "Ronald McDonald does not exist" expresses the idea: "it is not the case there is a unique happy hamburger clown".<ref>{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Nelson|2022|loc=§ 1. Frege and Russell: Existence Is Not a Property of Individuals}} |2={{harvnb|Mackie|1998|loc=§2 The Quantifier Account of Existence}} |3={{harvnb|Nelson|2022|loc=§ 1. Frege and Russell: Existence Is Not a Property of Individuals}} }}</ref>