Editing Experience (section)

=== Episodic memory and imagination ===
The experience of [[episodic memory]] consists in a form of reliving a past event one experienced before.<ref name="Perrin"/><ref name="Gardiner">{{cite journal |last1=Gardiner |first1=J. M. |title=Episodic memory and autonoetic consciousness: a first-person approach |journal=Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological Sciences |date=29 September 2001 |volume=356 |issue=1413 |pages=1351–1361 |doi=10.1098/rstb.2001.0955 |pmid=11571027 |pmc=1088519 |issn=0962-8436}}</ref><ref name="Michaelian3">{{cite web |last1=Michaelian |first1=Kourken |last2=Sutton |first2=John |title=Memory: 3. Episodicity |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/memory/#Epis |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=2 October 2021 |date=2017}}</ref> This is different from [[semantic memory]], in which one has access to the knowledge of various facts concerning the event in question without any experiential component associated with this knowledge.<ref name="Michaelian3"/> In episodic memory, on the other hand, the past event is consciously re-experienced.<ref name="Perrin">{{cite journal |last1=Perrin |first1=Denis |last2=Michaelian |first2=Kourken |last3=Sant’Anna |first3=André |title=The Phenomenology of Remembering Is an Epistemic Feeling |journal=Frontiers in Psychology |date=2020 |volume=11 |pages=1531 |doi=10.3389/fpsyg.2020.01531 |pmid=32719642 |pmc=7350950 |issn=1664-1078|doi-access=free }}</ref><ref name="Gardiner"/> In this sense, it is a form of mental time travel that is not present in non-episodic memory.<ref name="Michaelian3"/><ref>{{cite web |last1=Tulving |first1=Endel |title=Learning and Memory: Episodic Memory |url=https://www.encyclopedia.com/psychology/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/episodic-memory}}</ref> But this re-experiencing is not an exact copy of the original experience since the experienced event is presented as something in the past seen from one's current perspective, which is associated with some kind of feeling of pastness or familiarity not present in the original experience.<ref name="Perrin"/><ref name="Michaelian3"/> In this context, it is often held that episodic memory provides two types of information: first-order information about the past event and second-order information about the role of this event in the subject's current memory.<ref name="Michaelian3"/> Episodic memory is different from merely imagining the experience of a past event. An important aspect of this difference is that it is part of the nature of episodic memory to try to represent how the original experience was, even if it sometimes fails to do so. Other suggested differences include the degree of vividness and the causal connection between the original experience and the episodic memory.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Michaelian |first1=Kourken |last2=Sutton |first2=John |title=Memory: 4. Mnemicity |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/memory/#Mnem |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=2 October 2021 |date=2017}}</ref>

[[Imagination|Imaginative]] experience involves a special form of representation in which objects are presented without aiming to show how things actually are.<ref name="Liao">{{cite web |last1=Liao |first1=Shen-yi |last2=Gendler |first2=Tamar |title=Imagination |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/imagination/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=3 October 2021 |date=2020}}</ref> Like memory and unlike perception, the associated mental images are normally not caused by the stimulation of sensory organs.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Russell |first1=Bertrand |title=Sensation and Imagination |journal=The Monist |date=1915 |volume=25 |issue=1 |pages=28–44 |doi=10.5840/monist191525136 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/RUSSAI|url-access=subscription }}</ref><ref name="Manser">{{cite web |last1=Manser |first1=A. R. |title=Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Imagination |url=https://www.encyclopedia.com/medicine/psychology/psychology-and-psychiatry/imagination |access-date=3 October 2021}}</ref> It is often held that both imagination and memory depend on previous perceptual acquaintance with the experienced contents.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Neville |first1=Robert Cummings |title=Encyclopedia of Science and Religion: Imagination |url=https://www.encyclopedia.com/medicine/psychology/psychology-and-psychiatry/imagination |access-date=3 October 2021}}</ref> But unlike memory, more freedom is involved in most forms of imagination since the subject can freely vary, change and recombine various of the experienced contents while memory aims to preserve their original order.<ref name="Manser"/> Different theorists focus on different elements when trying to conceptualize the nature of imagination. The  impoverishment view holds that imagination is distinguished from perception and memory by being less vivid and clear. The will-dependence view, on the other hand, centers on the power of the will to actively shape the contents of imagination whereas the nonexistence view focuses on the impression of unreality or distance from reality belonging to imaginative experience.<ref name="Kind">{{cite journal |last1=Kind |first1=Amy |title=Imaginative Experience |journal=Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Consciousness |date=2020 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/KINIE |publisher=Oxford University Press}}</ref> Despite its freedom and its lack of relation to actuality, imaginative experience can serve certain epistemological functions by representing what is possible or conceivable.<ref name="Liao"/> This is the case, for example, when imaginatively speculating about an event that has happened or might happen.<ref name="Kind"/> Imagination can happen in various different forms. One difference concerns whether the imagined scenario is deliberately controlled or arises spontaneously by itself. Another concerns whether the subject imagines itself as experiencing the imagined event from the inside, as being one of the protagonists within this event, or from the outside.<ref name="Liao"/> Different imaginative experiences tend to have different degrees to which the imagined scenario is just a reconstruction of something experienced previously or a creative rearrangement.<ref name="Liao"/> Accounts of imaginative experience usually focus on the visual domain, but there are also other, less prominent forms, like auditory imagination or olfactory imagination.<ref name="Kind"/>