Editing Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem (section)

== Related results ==
[[Gibbard's theorem]] deals with processes of collective choice that may not be ordinal, i.e. where a voter's action may not consist in communicating a preference order over the candidates. [[Gibbard's 1978 theorem]] and [[Hylland's theorem]] extend these results to non-deterministic mechanisms, i.e. where the outcome may not only depend on the ballots but may also involve a part of chance.

The [[Duggan–Schwartz theorem]] extend this result in another direction, by dealing with deterministic voting rules that choose multiple winners.<ref>{{cite journal|first1=John|last1=Duggan|last2=Schwartz|first2=Thomas|date=2000|title=Strategic manipulability without resoluteness or shared beliefs: Gibbard-Satterthwaite generalized|doi=10.1007/PL00007177|journal=Social Choice and Welfare|volume=17|issue=1|pages=85–93|issn=0176-1714|jstor=41106341|s2cid=271833}}</ref>