Editing Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (section)

===Theodicy and optimism===
{{further|Best of all possible worlds|Philosophical optimism}}

The ''[[Théodicée|Theodicy]]''<ref>Rutherford (1998) is a detailed scholarly study of Leibniz's [[theodicy]].</ref> tries to justify the apparent imperfections of the world by claiming that it is [[Best of all possible worlds|optimal among all possible worlds]]. It must be the best possible and most balanced world, because it was created by an all powerful and all knowing God, who would not choose to create an imperfect world if a better world could be known to him or possible to exist. In effect, apparent flaws that can be identified in this world must exist in every possible world, because otherwise God would have chosen to create the world that excluded those flaws.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Franklin |first1=James |date=2022 |title=The global/local distinction vindicates Leibniz's theodicy |journal=Theology and Science |volume=20 |issue=4 |pages= 445–462|doi=10.1080/14746700.2022.2124481|s2cid=252979403 |doi-access=free |hdl=1959.4/unsworks_80586 |hdl-access=free }}</ref>

Leibniz asserted that the truths of theology (religion) and philosophy cannot contradict each other, since reason and faith are both "gifts of God" so that their conflict would imply God contending against himself. The ''Theodicy'' is Leibniz's attempt to reconcile his personal philosophical system with his interpretation of the tenets of Christianity.<ref>Magill, Frank (ed.). ''Masterpieces of World Philosophy''. New York: Harper Collins (1990).</ref> This project was motivated in part by Leibniz's belief, shared by many philosophers and theologians during the [[Age of Enlightenment|Enlightenment]], in the rational and enlightened nature of the Christian religion. It was also shaped by Leibniz's belief in the perfectibility of human nature (if humanity relied on correct philosophy and religion as a guide), and by his belief that metaphysical necessity must have a rational or logical foundation, even if this metaphysical causality seemed inexplicable in terms of physical necessity (the natural laws identified by science).

In the view of Leibniz, because reason and faith must be entirely reconciled, any tenet of faith which could not be defended by reason must be rejected. Leibniz then approached one of the central criticisms of Christian theism:<ref>Magill, Frank (ed.) (1990)</ref> if God is [[Omnibenevolence|all good]], [[Omniscience|all wise]], and [[Omnipotence|all powerful]], then how did [[Problem of evil|evil come into the world]]? The answer (according to Leibniz) is that, while God is indeed unlimited in wisdom and power, his human creations, as creations, are limited both in their wisdom and in their will (power to act). This predisposes humans to false beliefs, wrong decisions, and ineffective actions in the exercise of their [[free will]]. God does not arbitrarily inflict pain and suffering on humans; rather he permits both ''moral evil'' (sin) and ''physical evil'' (pain and suffering) as the necessary consequences of ''metaphysical evil'' (imperfection), as a means by which humans can identify and correct their erroneous decisions, and as a contrast to true good.<ref>{{Cite book|title=The Golden Book About Leibniz|last=Anderson Csiszar|first=Sean|date=26 July 2015|isbn=978-1515243915|pages=20|publisher=CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform }}</ref>

Further, although human actions flow from prior causes that ultimately arise in God and therefore are known to God as metaphysical certainties, an individual's free will is exercised within natural laws, where choices are merely contingently necessary and to be decided in the event by a "wonderful spontaneity" that provides individuals with an escape from rigorous predestination.