Editing Great Leap Forward (section)

===Industrialization===
[[File:Carriages on the mine field.jpg|thumb|A minecart leading to the steel base, October 1957]]

Mao saw grain and steel production as the key pillars of economic development. He forecast that within 15 years of the start of the Great Leap, China's industrial output would surpass that of the UK. In the August 1958 Politburo meetings, it was decided that steel production would be set to double within the year, most of the increase coming through backyard steel furnaces.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Chan |first=Alfred L. |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=9pPxwn6EvR4C&pg=PA69 |title=Mao's Crusade: Politics and Policy Implementation in China's Great Leap Forward |publisher=Oxford University Press |year=2001 |isbn=978-0-19-155401-8 |pages=71–74 |access-date=15 November 2015}}</ref> Major investments in larger state enterprises were made: 1,587, 1,361 and 1,815 medium and large-scale state projects were started in 1958, 1959 and 1960 respectively, more in each year than in the first Five Year Plan.{{sfnp|Lardy|1987|p=367}}

Millions of Chinese became state workers as a consequence of this industrial investment: in 1958, 21 million were added to non-agricultural state payrolls, and total state employment reached a peak of 50.44 million in 1960, more than doubling the 1957 level; the urban population swelled by 31.24 million people.{{sfnp|Lardy|1987|p=368}} These new workers placed major stress on China's food-rationing system, which led to increased and unsustainable demands on rural food production.{{sfnp|Lardy|1987|p=368}} Those between the ages of sixteen and thirty were considered ideal candidates for the militia.{{citation needed|date=April 2024}} Peasants were working long hours, all year round, even contributed their own cooking utensils to be melted as a source of production.{{sfnp|Lieberthal|2003|p={{page needed|date=June 2024}}}}

The consequences of the Great Leap Forward were devastating, leading to one of the most severe famines in human history.{{sfnp|Ashton|Hill |Piazza|Zeitz|1984}} The policies that diverted labor from agriculture to industrial projects, such as backyard steel furnaces, resulted in a catastrophic drop in agricultural output; consequently, food shortages became widespread. According to demographic studies, the famine caused an estimated 15 to 45 million deaths, with rural areas being the hardest hit.{{sfnp|Ashton|Hill|Piazza|Zeitz|1984}} Ashton et al. (1984) highlight: "During the period 1958-62, about 30 million premature deaths occurred in China: deaths that occurred earlier than they would have on the basis of mortality trends for more normal years."{{sfnp|Ashton |Hill|Piazza|Zeitz|1984}}

During this rapid expansion, coordination suffered and material shortages were frequent, resulting in "a huge rise in the wage bill, largely for construction workers, but no corresponding increase in manufactured goods".{{sfnp|Lardy|1987|p=387}} Facing a massive deficit, the government cut industrial investment from {{CNY|38.9&nbsp;billion}} to {{CNY|7.1&nbsp;billion}} from 1960 to 1962 (an 82% decrease; the 1957 level was {{CNY|14.4&nbsp;billion}}).{{sfnp|Lardy|1987|p=387}} Partly due to misreporting, or corruption at every level of the government where they would over-report harvest and steel production, by the time people realized, it was too late to correct statistics without angering Mao.{{sfnp|Lieberthal|2003|p={{page needed|date=June 2024}}}}