Editing Hard problem of consciousness (section)

==== "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?" ====
{{Main|What Is It Like to Be a Bat?}}
The philosopher Thomas Nagel posited in his 1974 paper "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?" that experiences are essentially subjective (accessible only to the individual undergoing them—i.e., felt only by the one feeling them), while physical states are essentially objective (accessible to multiple individuals). So he argued we have no idea what it could mean to claim that an essentially subjective state just ''is'' an essentially non-subjective state (i.e., that a felt state is nothing but a functional state). In other words, we have no idea of what reductivism amounts to.<ref name="Bat"/> He believes "every subjective phenomenon is essentially connected with a single point of view, and it seems inevitable that an objective, physical theory will abandon that point of view."<ref name="Bat">{{cite journal|last=Nagel|first=Thomas|author-link=Thomas Nagel|date=October 1974|title=What is it like to be a bat?|journal=[[The Philosophical Review]]|volume=83|issue=4|pages=435–450|doi=10.2307/2183914|jstor=2183914|s2cid=49125889}}</ref>