Editing Intentionality (section)

===Mental states without intentionality <!--'Anti-intentionalism (philosophy of mind)' redirects here-->===
Critics of intentionalism, so-called <!--boldface per WP:R#PLA-->'''anti-intentionalists''',<ref name="Jacob">{{cite encyclopedia |last1=Jacob |first1=Pierre |title=Intentionality |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/intentionality/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |date=2019}}</ref> have proposed various apparent counterexamples to intentionalism: states that are considered mental but lack intentionality.

Some anti-intentionalist theories, such as that of [[Ned Block]], are based on the argument that phenomenal conscious experience or [[qualia]] is also a vital component of consciousness, and that it is not intentional. (The latter claim is itself disputed by [[Michael Tye (philosopher)|Michael Tye]].)<ref>{{cite journal |author=Michael Tye |year=1995 |title=A Representational Theory of Pains and their Phenomenal Character |journal=Philosophical Perspectives |volume=9 |quote=[T]he phenomenal character of my pain intuitively is something that is given to me via introspection of what I experience in having the pain. But what I experience is what my experience represents. So, phenomenal character is representational. |pages=223–39 |url=http://philpapers.org/rec/TYEART |access-date=21 December 2012 |doi=10.2307/2214219 |jstor=2214219 |archive-date=21 April 2014 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140421064754/http://philpapers.org/rec/TYEART |url-status=live |url-access=subscription }}</ref>

Another form of anti-intentionalism [[John Searle#Intentionality and the background|associated with John Searle]] regards phenomenality itself, not intentionality, as the "mark of the mental" and thereby sidelines intentionality, since such anti-intentionalists "might accept the thesis that intentionality coincides with the mental, but they hold the view that intentionality derives from consciousness".<ref name="Jacob"/>

A further form argues that some unusual states of consciousness are non-intentional, although an individual might live a lifetime without experiencing them. [[Robert K.C. Forman]] argues that some of the unusual states of consciousness typical of [[mystical experience]] are ''pure consciousness events'' in which awareness exists, but has no object, is not awareness "of" anything.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Forman |first1=Robert Kc |title=The Problem of Pure Consciousness: Mysticism and Philosophy |publisher=Oxford University Press |page=8 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/FORIMC-2 |chapter=Introduction: Mysticism, Constructivism, and Forgetting |year=1990 |access-date=2020-11-10 |archive-date=2020-11-10 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201110170156/https://philpapers.org/rec/FORIMC-2 |url-status=live }}</ref>