Editing Metaethics (section)

=== Moral universalism ===
[[Moral universalism]] (or universal morality) is the metaethical position that some system of ethics, or a [[universal ethic]], applies universally, that is to all intelligent beings regardless of [[culture]], [[Race (classification of human beings)|race]], [[sex]], [[religion]], [[nationality]], [[sexual orientation|sexuality]], or other distinguishing feature. The source or justification of this system may be thought to be, for instance, [[human nature]], shared vulnerability to suffering, the demands of universal [[reason]], what is common among existing moral codes, or the common mandates of [[religion]] (although it can be argued that the latter is not in fact moral universalism because it may distinguish between Gods and mortals). Moral universalism is the opposing position to various forms of [[moral relativism]].

Universalist theories are generally forms of [[moral realism]], though exceptions exists, such as the subjectivist [[ideal observer theory|ideal observer]] and [[divine command theory|divine command]] theories, and the non-cognitivist [[universal prescriptivism]] of [[R.M. Hare|R. M. Hare]]. Forms of moral universalism include:
* Value monism is the common form of universalism, which holds that all goods are [[Commensurability (ethics)|commensurable]] on a single value scale.
* [[Value pluralism]] contends that there are two or more genuine scales of value, knowable as such, yet incommensurable, so that any prioritization of these values is either non-cognitive or subjective. A value pluralist might, for example, contend that both a life as a nun and a life as a mother realize genuine values (in a universalist sense), yet they are incompatible (nuns may not have children), and there is no purely rational way to measure which is preferable. A notable proponent of this view is [[Isaiah Berlin]].