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===As a foundation of our conceptual system=== [[Cognitive linguistics|Cognitive linguists]] emphasize that metaphors serve to facilitate the understanding of one conceptual domain—typically an abstraction such as "life", "theories" or "ideas"—through expressions that relate to another, more familiar conceptual domain—typically more concrete, such as "journey", "buildings" or "food".<ref name=lakoffmwlb>{{Cite book | author= Lakoff G. | author2= Johnson M. | orig-year= 1980 | year= 2003 | title= Metaphors We Live By | location= Chicago | publisher= University of Chicago Press | isbn= 978-0-226-46801-3 | url= https://archive.org/details/metaphorsweliveb00lako}}</ref><ref name=kovecses2002>Zoltán Kövecses. (2002) ''Metaphor: a practical introduction''. [[Oxford University Press]] US. {{ISBN|978-0-19-514511-3}}.</ref> For example: one ''devours'' a book of ''raw'' facts, tries to ''digest'' them, ''stews'' over them, lets them ''simmer on the back-burner'', ''regurgitates'' them in discussions, and ''cooks'' up explanations, hoping they do not seem ''half-baked''. {{blockquote|A convenient short-hand way of capturing this view of metaphor is the following: Conceptual Domain (A) is Conceptual Domain (B), which is what is called a ''conceptual metaphor''. A conceptual metaphor consists of two conceptual domains, in which one domain is understood in terms of another. A conceptual domain is any coherent organization of experience. For example, we have coherently organized [[knowledge]] about journeys that we rely on in understanding life.<ref name=kovecses2002/>|sign=|source=}} Lakoff and Johnson greatly contributed to establishing the importance of conceptual metaphor as a framework for thinking in language, leading scholars to investigate the original ways in which writers used novel metaphors and to question the fundamental frameworks of thinking in conceptual metaphors. From a sociological, cultural, or philosophical perspective, one asks to what extent [[ideologies]] maintain and impose conceptual patterns of thought by introducing, supporting, and adapting fundamental patterns of thinking metaphorically.<ref>McKinnon, AM. (2013). [http://aura.abdn.ac.uk/bitstream/2164/3714/1/rational_choice_critique_author_final_version.pdf "Ideology and the Market Metaphor in Rational Choice Theory of Religion: A Rhetorical Critique of 'Religious Economies']". ''Critical Sociology'', vol 39, no. 4, pp. 529-543. {{Webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141112222515/http://aura.abdn.ac.uk/bitstream/2164/3714/1/rational_choice_critique_author_final_version.pdf |date=12 November 2014}}</ref> The question is to what extent the ideology fashion and refashion the idea of the nation as a container with borders, and how enemies and outsiders are represented. {{Citation needed|date=December 2017}} Some cognitive scholars have attempted to take on board the idea that different languages have evolved radically different concepts and conceptual metaphors, while others hold to the [[Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis|Sapir-Whorf hypothesis]]. German [[philologist]] [[Wilhelm von Humboldt]] (1767–1835) contributed significantly to this debate on the relationship between culture, language, and linguistic communities. Humboldt remains, however, relatively unknown in English-speaking nations. [[Andrew Goatly]], in "Washing the Brain", takes on board the dual problem of conceptual metaphor as a framework implicit in the language as a system and the way individuals and ideologies negotiate conceptual metaphors. Neural biological research suggests that some metaphors are innate, as demonstrated by reduced metaphorical understanding in psychopathy.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Meier |first1=Brian P. |display-authors=etal |title=Failing to take the moral high ground: Psychopathy and the vertical representation of morality |journal=Personality and Individual Differences |date=September 2007 |volume=43| issue=4 |pages=757–767 |doi=10.1016/j.paid.2007.02.001 |url=https://www.researchgate.net/publication/222054362 |access-date=1 November 2016}}</ref> James W. Underhill, in ''Creating Worldviews: Ideology, Metaphor & Language'' (Edinburgh UP), considers the way individual speech adopts and reinforces certain metaphoric paradigms. This involves a critique of both communist and fascist discourse. Underhill's studies are situated in Czech and German, which allows him to demonstrate the ways individuals are thinking both within and resisting the modes by which ideologies seek to appropriate key concepts such as "the people", "the state", "history", and "struggle". Though metaphors can be considered to be "in" language, Underhill's chapter on French, English and [[ethnolinguistics]] demonstrates that language or languages cannot be conceived of in anything other than metaphoric terms. Several other philosophers have embraced the view that metaphors may also be described as examples of a linguistic "category mistake" which have the potential of leading unsuspecting users into considerable obfuscation of thought within the realm of epistemology. Included among them is the Australian philosopher [[Colin Murray Turbayne]].<ref>[https://books.google.com/books?id=DsKvAwAAQBAJ&dq=Colin+Murray+Turbayne&pg=PA2451 ''Dictionary of Modern American Philosophers'' Shook, John. 2005 p. 2451 Biography of Colin Murray Turbayne on Google Books]</ref> In his book ''The Myth of Metaphor'', Turbayne argues that the use of metaphor is an essential component within the context of any language system which claims to embody richness and depth of understanding.<ref>Murphy, Jeffrie G. "Berkeley and the Metaphor of Mental Substance". ''[[Ratio (journal)|Ratio]]'' 7 (1965):176.</ref> In addition, he clarifies the limitations associated with a literal interpretation of the mechanistic Cartesian and Newtonian depictions of the universe as little more than a "machine" – a concept which continues to underlie much of the [[scientific materialism]] which prevails in the modern Western world.<ref name=Hesse1966>{{cite journal |last1=Hesse |first1=Mary |title=Review of The Myth of Metaphor |journal=Foundations of Language |date=1966 |volume=2 |issue=3 |pages=282–284 |jstor=25000234 }}</ref> He argues further that the philosophical concept of "substance" or "substratum" has limited meaning at best and that physicalist theories of the universe depend upon mechanistic metaphors which are drawn from deductive logic in the development of their hypotheses.<ref>[https://books.google.com/books?id=DsKvAwAAQBAJ&dq=Colin+Murray+Turbayne&pg=PA2451 ''Dictionary of Modern American Philosophers'' Shook, John. 2005 p. 2451 Biography of Colin Murray Turbayne on Google Books]</ref><ref>[http://www.sas.rochester.edu/phl/about/prize.html The University of Rochester Department of Philosophy- Berkley Essay Prize Competition - History of the Prize Colin Turbayne's ''The Myth of Metaphor'' on rochester.edu]</ref><ref name=Hesse1966/> By interpreting such metaphors literally, Turbayne argues that modern man has unknowingly fallen victim to only one of several metaphorical models of the universe which may be more beneficial in nature.<ref>[http://www.sas.rochester.edu/phl/about/prize.html The University of Rochester Department of Philosophy- Berkley Essay Prize Competition - History of the Prize Colin Turbayne's ''The Myth of Metaphor'' on rochester.edu]</ref><ref name=Hesse1966/><ref>[https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/metaphor/#MetaMakeBeli "Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Metaphor" Stanford University. August 19, 2011 Revised August 12, 2022. "Section 5 Recent Developments - 5.3 Metaphor and Make Believe". ISSN 1095-5054. Colin Turbayne's "The Myth of Metaphor"] See Hills, David, "Metaphor", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2024 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2024/entries/metaphor/>.on plato.stanford.edu</ref> In his book ''In Other Shoes: Music, Metaphor, Empathy, Existence'' [[Kendall Walton]] also places the formulation of metaphors at the center of a "Game of Make Believe," which is regulated by tacit norms and rules. These "principles of generation" serve to determine several aspects of the game which include: what is considered to be fictional or imaginary, as well as the fixed function which is assumed by both objects and people who interact in the game. Walton refers to such generators as "props" which can serve as means to the development of various imaginative ends. In "content oriented" games, users derive value from such props as a result of the intrinsic fictional content which they help to create through their participation in the game. As familiar examples of such content oriented games, Walton points to putting on a play of ''Hamlet'' or "playing cops and robbers". Walton further argues, however, that not all games conform to this characteristic.<ref>[https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-0378.1993.tb00023.x "European Journal of Philosophy - Metaphor and Prop Oriented Make-Believe"] Walton, Kendall L.. Vol. 1 No. 1 April 1993 p. 39-57 {{doi|10.1111/j.1468-0378.1993.tb00023.x}} Metaphor and prop oriented make Believe on Google.com</ref> In the course of creating fictions through the use of metaphor we can also perceive and manipulate props into new improvised representations of something entirely different in a game of "make-believe". Suddenly the properties of the props themselves take on primary importance. In the process the participants in the game may be only partially conscious of the "prop oriented" nature of the game itself.<ref>[https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/metaphor/#MetaMakeBeli "Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Metaphor" Stanford University, August 19, 2011 Revised August 12, 2022 "Section 5. Recent Developments 5.3 Metaphor and Make Believe"] ISSN 1095-5054. Kendall Walton and metaphor - See Hills, David, "Metaphor", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2024 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2024/entries/metaphor/>. on plato.stanford.edu</ref><ref>[https://www.google.com/books/edition/Mind_as_Metaphor/rSG3EAAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1&dq=Kendall+Walton+metaphor&pg=PA15&printsec=frontcover "Mind as Metaphor A Defense of Mental Ficionalism".] Toon, Adam. OPU Oxford 2023 ebook {{ISBN|9780198879671}} "Chapter 1 Making Up Minds 1.3 Mind as Metaphor 1.3.1 Metaphor and Make-believe" p. 15–18 Kendall Walton on Google Books</ref><ref>[https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=ib1oBQAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PP1&dq=In+Other+shoes+music+Metaphor&ots=SVHEa5qGC7&sig=YWUh8-CalzualtHdIpq9nWAACLU#v=onepage&q=In%20Other%20shoes%20music%20Metaphor&f=false "In Other Shoes: Music, Metaphor, Empathy, Existence".] Walton, Kendall L. 2015 Oxford University Press New York pp. 175–195 "Chapter 10 Metaphor and Prop Oriented Make-Believe" {{ISBN|978-0-19-509871-6}} on Google Scholar</ref>
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