Editing Neurotechnology (section)

=== Identity ===
Identity in this context refers to [[Personal identity#Continuity of consciousness|personal continuity]], described as [[Bodily integrity|bodily]] and mental integrity and their persistence over time. In other words, it is the individual's [[Narrative identity|self-narrative]] and concept of self.

While disruption of identity is not a common goal for neurotechnologies, some techniques can create unwanted shifts that range in severity. For instance, deep brain stimulation is commonly used as treatment for [[Parkinson's disease]] but can have side effects that touch on the concept of identity, such as loss of voice modulation, increased impulsivity or feelings of self-estrangement.<ref name=":12" /><ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Pham U, Solbakk AK, Skogseid IM, Toft M, Pripp AH, Konglund AE, Andersson S, Haraldsen IR, Aarsland D, Dietrichs E, Malt UF | display-authors = 6 | title = Personality changes after deep brain stimulation in Parkinson's disease | journal = Parkinson's Disease | volume = 2015 | pages = 490507 | date = 2015-01-29 | pmid = 25705545 | pmc = 4325225 | doi = 10.1155/2015/490507 | doi-access = free }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Pugh J, Maslen H, Savulescu J | title = Deep Brain Stimulation, Authenticity and Value | journal = Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics | volume = 26 | issue = 4 | pages = 640–657 | date = October 2017 | pmid = 28937346 | pmc = 5658726 | doi = 10.1017/S0963180117000147 }}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal| vauthors = Gilbert F, Goddard E, Viaña JN, Carter A, Horne M |date=2017-04-03|title=I Miss Being Me: Phenomenological Effects of Deep Brain Stimulation |journal=AJOB Neuroscience|volume=8|issue=2|pages=96–109|doi=10.1080/21507740.2017.1320319|s2cid=55652038|issn=2150-7740|doi-access=free}}</ref> In the case of neural prostheses and brain-computer interfaces, the shift may take the form of an extension of one's sense of self, potentially incorporating the device as an integral part of oneself or expanding the range of sensory and cognitive channels available to the user beyond the traditional [[sense]]s.<ref name=":12" /><ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Hildt E | title = Multi-Person Brain-To-Brain Interfaces: Ethical Issues | journal = Frontiers in Neuroscience | volume = 13 | pages = 1177 | date = 5 Nov 2019 | pmid = 31827418 | pmc = 6849447 | doi = 10.3389/fnins.2019.01177 | doi-access = free }}</ref>

Part of the difficulty in determining which changes constitute a threat to identity is rooted in its dynamic nature: since one's personality and concept of self is expected to change with time as a result of emotional development and lived experience, it is not easy to identify clear criteria and draw a line between acceptable shifts and problematic changes.<ref name=":12" /><ref name=":2">{{cite journal | vauthors = Baylis F | title = "I Am Who I Am": On the Perceived Threats to Personal Identity from Deep Brain Stimulation | journal = Neuroethics | volume = 6 | issue = 3 | pages = 513–526 | date = 2013-12-01 | pmid = 24273621 | pmc = 3825414 | doi = 10.1007/s12152-011-9137-1  }}</ref> This becomes even harder when dealing with neurotechnologies aimed at influencing psychological processes—such as those designed to recude the symptoms of depression or post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) by modulating emotional states or saliency of memories to ease a patient's pain.<ref name=":5">{{cite journal | vauthors = Steinert S, Friedrich O | title = Wired Emotions: Ethical Issues of Affective Brain-Computer Interfaces | journal = Science and Engineering Ethics | volume = 26 | issue = 1 | pages = 351–367 | date = February 2020 | pmid = 30868377 | pmc = 6978299 | doi = 10.1007/s11948-019-00087-2  }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Bassil KC, Rutten BP, Horstkötter D | title = Biomarkers for PTSD Susceptibility and Resilience, Ethical Issues | journal = AJOB Neuroscience | volume = 10 | issue = 3 | pages = 122–124 | date = 2019-07-03 | pmid = 31361197 | doi = 10.1080/21507740.2019.1632964 | s2cid = 198982833  | url = https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/en/publications/789df5c5-dfda-44be-b7cb-12fb371e4742 }}</ref> Even helping a patient remember, which would seemingly help preserve identity, can be a delicate question: "Forgetting is also important to how a person navigates the world, since it allows the opportunity for both losing track of embarrassing or difficult memories, and focusing on future-oriented activity. Efforts to enhance identity through memory preservation thus run the risk of inadvertently damaging a valuable, if less consciously-driven cognitive process."<ref name=":12" />