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Neutral monism
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== Variants == {{Expand section|date=August 2020}} === Radical empiricism === {{Wikisource|Does 'Consciousness' Exist?}} This form of neutral monism was formulated by [[William James]]. It was done mostly in response to his colleagues dismissal of its rank "among first principles". Consciousness, in William James perspective, is the epistemic foundation upon which all other knowledge rests; if an ontology is incompatible with its existence, then it is the ontology that must be dismissed, not consciousness. William James considered "the perceived and the perceiver" to simply be two sides of the same coin.<ref name=":2" /> === Russellian monism === {{Wikisource|Mysticism and Logic and Other Essays/Chapter 08|The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics}} {{Wikisource|The Analysis of Mind}} <!-- [[Russellian monism]] and [[Russellian monist]] redirect to here. -->Russellian monism most famously differs from other views of neutral monism in its proposed solution to the combination problem. Russell proposes the existence of "paraphenomenal" properties, that may give rise to consciousness when organised in a certain way.<ref name=":2" /> === Platonism === {{Main|Platonism}} Not all Platonic theories are neutral monist, but some neutral monist theories are Platonic. Platonic versions of neutral monism have become more prevalent in recent decades.<ref name=":2" /> According to these views, the 'neutral' substance that reality are Platonic forms, or something similar. Though these views vary in the details, they usually take a form similar to more common forms of radical Platonism such as the [[Mathematical universe hypothesis|Mathematical Universe Hypothesis]] (the view that reality is fundamentally made up of mathematics, which is neither physical nor mental). That said, these theories often suffer from the [[Hard problem of consciousness|same problems as physicalist theories of mind]], since the existence of Platonic forms, mathematical objects, and the like, are not on their own sufficient to explain the emergence of conscious experience. Some may also find Platonism appealing thanks to its parsimony: logical truths may necessarily exist, and the mental and physical are mere consequences of this necessary existence. These theories also have the advantage of having coherently defined the neutral variable, thus having overcome what's long been a major challenge for neutral monism.<ref name=":2" />
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