Editing Nonintercourse Act (section)

===Affirmative defenses===
Courts have considered and rejected several [[affirmative defense]]s to Nonintercourse Act suits.<ref>''[[Oneida County v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. State]]'', 470 U.S. 226 (1985) (rejecting the affirmative defenses of statute of limitations, abatement, implicit federal ratification, and nonjusticiability); ''[[Mohegan Indians v. Connecticut#Modern relitigation and settlement|Mohegan Tribe v. Connecticut]]'', 528 F. Supp. 1359 (D. Conn. 1982) (rejecting the affirmative defenses of Tenth and Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity and res judicata); ''[[Schaghticoke Tribe of Indians v. Kent School Corp.]]'', 423 F. Supp. 780 (D. Conn. 1976) (rejecting the affirmative defenses of laches, statute of limitations, marketable title statute, adverse possession, and waiver and estoppel based on post-Act conduct; waiver and estoppel based on pre-Act conduct are valid); ''[[Narragansett land claim#Narragansett I|Narragansett Tribe of Indians v. Southern Rhode Island Land Development Co.]]'', 418 F. Supp. 798 (D.R.I. 1976) (rejecting the affirmative defenses of  nonjusticiability, laches, statute of limitations/adverse possession, estoppel by sale, operation of state law, and public policy); ''[[Narragansett land claim#Narragansett II|Narragansett Tribe of Indians v. Murphy]]'', 426 F. Supp. 132 (D.R.I. 1976) (rejecting the affirmative defense of sovereign immunity).</ref> However, there are two affirmative defenses that have been accepted by some courts: state sovereign immunity and the equitable doctrine of [[laches (equity)|laches]].

====State sovereign immunity====

The structure of the original Constitution and the text of the Eleventh Amendment gives states sovereign immunity from most suits.<ref>See ''Skokomish Indian Tribe v. France'', 269 F.2d 555 (9th Cir. 1959); see also Katharine F. Nelson, Resolving Native American Land Claims and the Eleventh Amendment: Changing the Balance of Power, 39 Vill. L. Rev. 525 (1994).</ref> There are exceptions: when the state consents to suit; when the federal government abrogates sovereign immunity by statute; when the federal government is the plaintiff or plaintiff-intervenor; and the category authorized by ''[[Ex parte Young]]'' (1908). In several cases, Nonintercourse Act plaintiffs have satisfied one of these exceptions.<ref>''Seneca Nation of Indians v. New York'', 26 F. Supp. 2d 555 (W.D.N.Y. 1998), aff'd, 178 F.3d 95 (2nd Cir. 1999) (US as intervenor); ''United States for and on Behalf of Santa Ana Indian Pueblo v. Univ. of N.M.'', 731 F.2d 703 (10th Cir. 1984) (US as plaintiff); ''[[Mohegan Indians v. Connecticut#Modern relitigation and settlement|Mohegan Tribe v. Connecticut]]'', 528 F. Supp. 1359 (D. Conn. 1982) (holding states counter-claim waived sovereign immunity).</ref> However, the Nonintercourse Act itself does not abrogate state sovereign immunity.<ref>''Ysleta Del Sur Pueblo v. Laney'', 199 F.3d 281 (5th Cir. 2000); see also ''[[Seminole Tribe v. Florida]]'', 517 U.S. 44 (1996).</ref> Moreover, the authority is clear that the ''Ex parte Young'' exception does not apply.<ref>''[[Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho]]'', 521 U.S. 261 (1997); ''Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. County of Oneida'', 617 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 2010); ''Western Mohegan Tribe and Nation v. Orange County'', 395 F.3d 18 (2d Cir. 2004); cf. ''Canadian St. Regis Band of Mohawk Indians v. New York'', 146 F. Supp.2d 170 (N.D.N.Y. 2001); ''[[Narragansett land claim#Narragansett II|Narragansett Tribe of Indians v. Murphy]]'', 426 F. Supp. 132 (D.R.I. 1976).</ref> Therefore, plaintiffs must obtain the [[intervention (law)|intervention]] of the federal government or relegate themselves to suing local governments and private land owners.<ref>Lauren E. Rosenblatt, Note, Removing the Eleventh Amendment Barrier: Defending Indian Land Title Against State Encroachment After ''Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe'', 78 Tex. L. Rev. 719 (2000).</ref>

Further, in actions against states, Indians are not entitled to the presumption of 25 U.S.C. § 194, which applies only to "persons".<ref>''Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe'', 442 U.S. 653 (1979).</ref>

====Laches====

Four dissenting justices would have barred the tribes action based on ''[[Laches (equity)|laches]]'' in ''[[Oneida County v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. State]]'' (1985), a question the majority did not reach.<ref name="oneidaII"/> The Second Circuit adopted the view of the dissent in ''[[Cayuga Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Pataki]]'' (2d Cir. 2005), and since then no tribal plaintiff has been able to overcome this affirmative defense in that circuit.<ref>''Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. County of Oneida'', 617 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 2010); ''[[Cayuga Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Pataki]]'', 413 F.3d 266 (2d Cir. 2005); ''Onondaga Nation v. New York'', 2010 WL 3806492 (N.D.N.Y. 2010); ''Shinnecock Indian Nation v. New York'', 2006 WL 3501099 (E.D.N.Y. 2006); see also Kathryn E. Fort, The New Laches: Creating Title where None Existed, 16 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 357 (2009); Patrick W. Wandres, Indian Land Claims, ''Sherrill'' and the Impending Legacy of the Doctrine of Laches, 31 Am. Indian L. Rev. 131 (2006).</ref> ''Cayuga'' erased a damage award of $247.9 million, the largest ever awarded under the Act.