Editing Philosophical methodology (section)

=== Intuition and thought experiments ===
Methods based on [[intuition]], like [[ethical intuitionism]], use intuitions to evaluate whether a philosophical claim is true or false. In this context, intuitions are seen as a non-inferential [[Sources of knowledge|source of knowledge]]: they consist in the impression of correctness one has when considering a certain claim.<ref name="DalyHandbook"/><ref>{{cite web |title=Intuitionism (ethics) |url=https://www.britannica.com/topic/intuitionism-ethics |website=www.britannica.com |access-date=28 February 2022 |language=en}}</ref> They are intellectual seemings that make it appear to the thinker that the considered [[proposition]] is true or false without the need to consider [[argument]]s for or against the proposition.<ref name="DalyHandbook"/><ref name="StanfordIntuition1">{{cite web |last1=Pust |first1=Joel |title=Intuition: 1. The Nature of Intuitions |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/intuition/#NatuIntu |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=28 February 2022 |date=2019}}</ref> This is sometimes expressed by saying that the proposition in question is ''self-evident''. Examples of such propositions include "torturing a sentient being for fun is wrong" or "it is irrational to believe both something and its opposite".<ref name="StanfordIntuition1"/> But not all defenders of intuitionism restrict intuitions to self-evident propositions. Instead, often weaker non-inferential impressions are also included as intuitions, such as a mother's intuition that her child is innocent of a certain crime.<ref name="StanfordIntuition1"/>

Intuitions can be used in various ways as a philosophical method. On the one hand, philosophers may consult their intuitions in relation to very general principles, which may then be used to deduce further theorems. Another technique, which is often applied in ethics, consists in considering concrete scenarios instead of general principles.<ref name="StanfordIntuition2">{{cite web |last1=Joel |first1=Pust |title=Intuition: 2. The Epistemological Role of Intuitions |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/intuition/#EpisRoleIntu |website=plato.stanford.edu |access-date=28 February 2022}}</ref> This often takes the form of [[thought experiment]]s, in which certain situations are imagined with the goal of determining the possible consequences of the imagined scenario.<ref name="Brown"/><ref name="Goffi">{{cite journal |last1=Goffi |first1=Jean-Yves |last2=Roux |first2=Sophie|author2-link=Sophie Roux |title=On the Very Idea of a Thought Experiment |journal=Thought Experiments in Methodological and Historical Contexts |date=2011 |pages=165–191 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/GOFOTV |publisher=Brill|doi=10.1163/ej.9789004201767.i-233.35 |isbn=9789004201774 |s2cid=260640180 }}</ref> These consequences are assessed using intuition and [[counterfactual thinking]].<ref name="Eder"/><ref name="Ichikawa"/> For this reason, thought experiments are sometimes referred to as [[intuition pump]]s: they activate the intuitions concerning the specific situation, which may then be generalized to arrive at universal principles.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Brendel |first1=Elke |title=Intuition Pumps and the Proper Use of Thought Experiments |journal=Dialectica |date=2004 |volume=58 |issue=1 |pages=89–108 |doi=10.1111/j.1746-8361.2004.tb00293.x |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/BREIPA}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last1=Dennett |first1=Daniel C. |title=Intuition Pumps And Other Tools for Thinking |date=5 May 2014 |publisher=W. W. Norton & Company |isbn=978-0-393-34878-1 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=9SduAwAAQBAJ |language=en |chapter=1. Introduction: what is an intuition pump?}}</ref> In some cases, the imagined scenario is physically possible but it would not be feasible to make an actual experiment due to the costs, negative consequences, or technological limitations.<ref name="DalyHandbook"/> But other thought experiments even work with scenarios that defy what is physically possible.<ref name="Brown"/><ref name="Goffi"/> It is controversial to what extent thought experiments merit to be characterized as ''real'' experiments and whether the insights they provide are reliable.<ref name="DalyHandbook"/>

One problem with intuitions in general and thought experiments in particular consists in assessing their epistemological status, i.e. whether, how much, and in which circumstances they provide [[Justification (epistemology)|justification]] in comparison to other [[sources of knowledge]].<ref name="Sorensen10">{{cite book |last1=Sorensen |first1=Roy A. |title=Thought Experiments |date=1999 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-512913-7 |url=https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/019512913X.001.0001/acprof-9780195129137-chapter-10 |chapter=Are Thought Experiments Experiments?|doi=10.1093/019512913X.001.0001 }}</ref><ref name="Bishop">{{cite journal |last1=Bishop |first1=Michael A. |title=Why Thought Experiments Are Not Arguments |journal=Philosophy of Science |date=1999 |volume=66 |issue=4 |pages=534–541 |doi=10.1086/392753 |s2cid=170519663 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/BISWTE}}</ref><ref name="Norton">{{cite journal |last1=Norton |first1=John D. |title=Are Thought Experiments Just What You Thought? |journal=Canadian Journal of Philosophy |date=1996 |volume=26 |issue=3 |pages=333–366 |doi=10.1080/00455091.1996.10717457 |s2cid=143017404 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/NORATE}}</ref> Some of its defenders claim that intuition is a reliable source of knowledge just like [[perception]], with the difference being that it happens without the [[sensory organs]].<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Reiss |first1=Julian |title=Counterfactuals, Thought Experiments, and Singular Causal Analysis in History |journal=Philosophy of Science |date=1 December 2009 |volume=76 |issue=5 |pages=712–723 |doi=10.1086/605826 |s2cid=43496954 |url=https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/605826?journalCode=phos |issn=0031-8248}}</ref><ref name="Brown">{{cite web |last1=Brown |first1=James Robert |last2=Fehige |first2=Yiftach |title=Thought Experiments |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/thought-experiment/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=29 October 2021 |date=2019}}</ref> Others compare it not to perception but to the cognitive ability to evaluate counterfactual conditionals, which may be understood as the capacity to answer what-if questions.<ref name="DalyHandbook"/><ref name="StanfordIntuition3">{{cite web |last1=Pust |first1=Joel |title=Intuition: 3. Challenges and Defenses |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/intuition/#ChalDefe |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=28 February 2022 |date=2019}}</ref> But the reliability of intuitions has been contested by its opponents. For example, [[wishful thinking]] may be the reason why it intuitively seems to a person that a proposition is true without providing any epistemological support for this proposition.<ref name="DalyHandbook"/><ref name="Paulo">{{cite book |last1=Paulo |first1=Norbert |title=Higher-Order Evidence and Moral Epistemology |date=2020 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-0-429-32532-8 |url=https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9780429325328-3/moral-intuitions-higher-order-evidence-wishful-thinking-norbert-paulo |chapter=Moral Intuitions Between Higher-Order Evidence and Wishful Thinking|pages=54–77 |doi=10.4324/9780429325328-3 |s2cid=214337226 }}</ref> Another objection, often raised in the empirical and naturalist tradition, is that intuitions do not constitute a reliable source of knowledge since the practitioner restricts themselves to an [[Armchair theorizing|inquiry from their armchair]] instead of looking at the world to make empirical observations.<ref name="StanfordIntuition2"/><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Neta |first1=Ram |title=Knowing from the Armchair that Our Intuitions Are Reliable |journal=The Monist |date=2012 |volume=95 |issue=2 |pages=329–351 |doi=10.5840/monist201295218 |url=https://doi.org/10.5840/monist201295218}}</ref>