Editing Problem of evil (section)

==Secular responses==
While the problem of evil is usually considered to be a theistic one, [[Peter Kivy]] says there is a secular problem of evil that exists even if one gives up belief in a deity; that is, the problem of how it is possible to reconcile "the pain and suffering human beings inflict upon one another".<ref name="Peter Kivy">{{cite journal |last1=Kivy |first1=Peter |title=Melville's "Billy" and the Secular Problem of Evil: The Worm in the Bud |journal=The Monist |date=1980 |volume=63 |issue=4 |page=481 |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/27902666 |publisher=Oxford University Press|doi=10.5840/monist198063429 |jstor=27902666 |url-access=subscription }}</ref> Kivy writes that all but the most extreme moral skeptics agree that humans have a duty to not knowingly harm others. This leads to the secular problem of evil when one person injures another through "unmotivated malice" with no apparent rational explanation or justifiable self-interest.<ref name="Peter Kivy"/>{{rp|486, 491}}

There are two main reasons used to explain evil, but according to Kivy, neither are fully satisfactory.<ref name="Peter Kivy"/> The first explanation is [[psychological egoism]] – that everything humans do is from self-interest. Bishop Butler has countered this asserting pluralism: human beings are motivated by self-interest, but they are also motivated by particulars – that is particular objects, goals or desires – that may or may not involve self-interest but are motives in and of themselves and may, occasionally, include genuine benevolence.<ref name="Peter Kivy"/>{{rp|481–482}} For the egoist, "man's inhumanity to man" is "not explainable in rational terms", for if humans can be ruthless for ruthlessness' sake, then egoism is not the only human motive.<ref name="Peter Kivy"/>{{rp|484}} Pluralists do not fare better simply by recognizing three motives: injuring another for one of those motives could be interpreted as rational, but hurting for the sake of hurting, is as irrational to the pluralist as the egoist.<ref name="Peter Kivy"/>{{rp|485}}

[[Amélie Rorty]] offers a few examples of secular responses to the problem of evil:<ref name="Rorty">Rorty, Amélie Oksenberg. ''Introduction. The Many Faces of Evil: Historical Perspectives''. Ed. Amélie Oksenberg Rorty. London: Routledge, 2001. xi–xviii.{{ISBN?}}</ref>

===Evil as necessary===
According to [[Michel de Montaigne]] and [[Voltaire]], while character traits such as wanton cruelty, partiality and egoism are an innate part of the human condition, these vices serve the "common good" of the social process.<ref name="Rorty"/>{{rp|xiii}} For Montaigne, the idea of evil is relative to the limited knowledge of human beings, not to the world itself or to God. He adopts what philosophers [[Graham Oppy]] and [[Nick Trakakis|N. N. Trakakis]] refer to as a "neo-Stoic view of an orderly world" where everything is in its place.<ref name="Oppy and Trakakis">{{cite book |last1=Oppy |first1=Graham |last2=Trakakis |first2=N. N. |title=Early Modern Philosophy of Religion: The History of Western Philosophy of Religion |date=2014 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=9781317546450 |page=69}}</ref>

This secular version of the early coherentist response to the problem of evil, (coherentism asserts that acceptable belief must be part of a coherent system), can be found, according to Rorty, in the writings of [[Bernard Mandeville|Bernard de Mandeville]] and [[Sigmund Freud]]. Mandeville says that when vices like greed and envy are suitably regulated within the social sphere, they are what "spark[s] the energy and productivity that make progressive civilization possible". Rorty asserts that the guiding motto of both religious and secular coherentists is: 'Look for the benefits gained by harm and you will find they outweigh the damage'."<ref name="Rorty"/>{{rp|xv}}

Economic theorist [[Thomas Malthus]] stated in a 1798 essay on the question of population over-crowding, its impact on food availability, and food's impact on population through famine and death, that it was: "Necessity, that imperious, all pervading law of nature, restrains them within the prescribed bounds{{nbsp}}[...] and man cannot by any means of reason escape from it".<ref name="Malthus T.R.">Malthus T.R. 1798. "An essay on the principle of population". Oxford World's Classics reprint.</ref>{{rp|2}} He adds: "Nature will not, indeed cannot be defeated in her purposes."<ref name="Malthus T.R."/>{{rp|412}} According to Malthus, nature and the God of nature, cannot be seen as evil in this natural and necessary process.<ref>Thomas Malthus (1798), [http://www.esp.org/books/malthus/population/malthus.pdf "An essay on the principle of population"], Oxford Classics, p. 123</ref>

===Evil as the absence of good===
{{Main|Absence of good}}
[[Paul Elmer More]] says that, to [[Plato]], evil resulted from the human failure to pay sufficient attention to finding and doing good: evil is an absence of good where good should be. More says Plato directed his entire educational program against the "innate indolence of the will" and the neglect of a search for ethical motives "which are the true springs of our life".<ref name="Paul Elmer More">{{cite book |last1=More |first1=Paul Elmer |title=The Religion of Plato |date=1921 |publisher=Princeton University Press |edition=2, reprint}}</ref>{{rp|256–257}} Plato asserted that it is the innate laziness, ignorance and lack of attention to pursuing good that, in the beginning, leads humans to fall into "the first lie, of the soul" that then often leads to self-indulgence and evil.<ref name="Paul Elmer More"/>{{rp|259}} According to Joseph Kelly,<ref name="Kelly2002p42"/> [[Clement of Alexandria]], a neo-Platonist in the 2nd-century, adopted Plato's view of evil.<ref name="Paul Elmer More"/>{{rp|256; 294; 317}} The fourth-century theologian [[Augustine of Hippo]] also adopted Plato's view. In his ''Enchiridion on Faith, Hope and Love'', Augustine maintained that evil exists as an "absence of the good".<ref name=jeffrey49/>

[[Schopenhauer]] emphasized the existence of evil and its negation of the good. Therefore, according to Mesgari Akbar and Akbari Mohsen, he was a pessimist.<ref name="Akbar and Mohsen">{{cite journal |last1=Akbar |first1=Mesgari Ahmad Ali |last2=Mohsen |first2=Akbari |title=Schopenhauer: Pessimism, and the Positive Nature of Evil |journal=Knowledge (Journal of Human Sciences) |date=2013 |volume=67 |issue=1 |url=https://www.sid.ir/en/Journal/ViewPaper.aspx?ID=408681}}</ref> He defined the "good" as coordination between an individual object and a definite effort of the will, and he defined evil as the absence of such coordination.<ref name="Akbar and Mohsen"/>

Arguably, [[Hannah Arendt]]'s presentation of the [[Eichmann in Jerusalem|Eichmann Trial]] as an exemplar of "the banality of evil"—consisting of a lack of empathic imagination, coupled with thoughtless conformity—is a variation on Augustine's theodicy.

===Deny problem exists===
[[Theophrastus]], the Greek Peripatetic philosopher and author of ''Characters'',<ref name="Sonia Pertsinidis">{{cite book |last1=Pertsinidis |first1=Sonia |title=Theophrastus' Characters: A New Introduction |date=2018 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=9781351997812}}</ref> a work that explores the moral weaknesses and strengths of 30 personality types in the Greece of his day, thought that the nature of 'being' comes from, and consists of, contraries, such as eternal and perishable, order and chaos, good and evil; the role of evil is thereby limited, he said, since it is only a part of the whole which is overall, good.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Theophrastus |editor1-last=van Raalte |editor1-first=M. |title=Theophrastus Metaphysics: With Introduction, Translation and Commentary |date=2018 |publisher=Brill |isbn=9789004329218 |page=31}}</ref>  According to Theophrastus, a world focused on virtue and vice was a naturalistic social world where the overall goodness of the universe as a whole included, of necessity, both good and evil, rendering the problem of evil non-existent.<ref name="Rorty"/>{{rp|xv}}

[[David Hume]] traced what he asserted as the psychological origins of virtue but not the vices. Rorty says: "He dispels the superstitious remnants of a [[Manichean]] battle: the forces of good and evil warring in the will"; concluding instead that human beings project their own subjective disapproval onto events and actions.<ref name="Rorty"/>{{rp|282}}

====Evil as illusory====
A modern version of this view is found in [[Christian Science]] which asserts that evils such as suffering and disease only {{em|appear}} to be real but, in truth, are illusions.<ref name="Millard J. Erickson 2007, page 445-446">Millard J. Erickson, Christian Theology, Second Edition, Baker Academic, 2007, pp. 445–446.</ref> The theologians of Christian Science, states Stephen Gottschalk, posit that the Spirit is of infinite might; mortal human beings fail to grasp this and focus instead on evil and suffering that have no real existence as "a power, person or principle opposed to God".<ref name= Gottschalkp65>{{cite book|first=Stephen |last=Gottschalk |title=Christian Science |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=r-FYQv75w7kC |year=1978|publisher=University of California Press |isbn=978-0-520-03718-2|pages=65–69}}</ref>

The illusion theodicy has been critiqued for denying the reality of crimes, wars, terror, sickness, injury, death, suffering and pain to the victim.<ref name= Gottschalkp65/> Further, adds Millard Erickson, the illusion argument merely shifts the problem to a new problem, as to why God would create this "illusion" of crimes, wars, terror, sickness, injury, death, suffering and pain; and why God does not stop this "illusion".<ref name="Millard J. Erickson 1998 446–47">{{cite book|first=Millard J.|last=Erickson|title=Christian Theology|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=8Z5zBQAAQBAJ |year=1998|publisher=Baker Academic|isbn=978-0-8010-2182-4 |pages=446–447 }}</ref>

===Moral rationalism===
"In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries rationalism about morality was repeatedly used to reject strong divine command theories of ethics".<ref name="J. B. Schneewind">{{cite journal |last1=Schneewind |first1=J. B. |title=Hume and the Religious Significance of Moral Rationalism |journal=Hume Studies |date=2000 |volume=26 |issue=2 |pages=211–223 |doi=10.1353/hms.2000.a385723 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/SCHHAT-11|url-access=subscription }}</ref> Such [[moral rationalism]] asserts that morality is based on reason.<ref name="Shaun Nichols">{{cite journal |last1=Nichols |first1=Shaun |title=How Psychopaths Threaten Moral Rationalism Is it Irrational to Be Amoral? |journal=The Monist |date=2002 |volume=85 |issue=2 |doi=10.5840/monist200285210 |url=https://www.pdcnet.org/monist/content/monist_2002_0085_0002_0285_0303|url-access=subscription }}</ref> Rorty refers to [[Immanuel Kant]] as an example of a "pious rationalist".<ref name="Rorty"/>{{rp|xv}} According to Shaun Nichols, "The Kantian approach to moral philosophy is to try to show that ethics is based on practical reason".<ref name="Shaun Nichols"/> The problem of evil then becomes, "how [it is] possible for a rational being of good will to be immoral".<ref name="Rorty"/>{{rp|xiii}}

Kant wrote an essay on theodicy criticizing it for attempting too much without recognizing the limits of human reason.<ref name=dembski11>[http://www.designinference.com/documents/2003.04.CTNS_theodicy.pdf "Making the Task of Theodicy Impossible?"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120916165136/http://www.designinference.com/documents/2003.04.CTNS_theodicy.pdf |date=16 September 2012 }}, William Dembski (2003), Baylor University, pp. 11, 12</ref> Kant did not think he had exhausted all possible theodicies, but did assert that any successful one must be based on nature rather than philosophy.<ref>See Kant's essay, "Concerning the Possibility of a Theodicy and the Failure of All Previous Philosophical Attempts in the Field" (1791). p. 291. Stephen Palmquist explains why Kant refuses to solve the problem of evil in "Faith in the Face of Evil", Appendix VI of [http://www.hkbu.edu.hk/~ppp/ksp2 Kant's Critical Religion] (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000).</ref> While a successful philosophical theodicy had not been achieved in his time, added Kant, he asserted there was no basis for a successful anti-theodicy either.<ref>[http://www.designinference.com/documents/2003.04.CTNS_theodicy.pdf 'Making the Task of Theodicy Impossible?"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120916165136/http://www.designinference.com/documents/2003.04.CTNS_theodicy.pdf |date=16 September 2012 }}, William Dembski (2003), Baylor University, p. 12</ref>

===Evil God challenge===
One resolution to the problem of evil is that God is not good. The [[evil God challenge]] thought experiment explores whether an evil God is as likely to exist as a good God. [[Dystheism]] is the belief that God is not wholly good. [[Maltheism]] is the belief in an evil god.

[[Peter Forrest (philosopher)|Peter Forrest]] has stated:{{blockquote|text=The anti-God that I take seriously is the malicious omnipotent omniscient being, who, it is said, creates so that creatures will suffer, because of the joy this suffering gives It. This may be contrasted with a different idea of anti-God, that of an evil being that seeks to destroy things of value out of hatred or envy. An omnipotent, omniscient being would not be envious. Moreover, destructive hatred cannot motivate creation. For these two reasons I find that rather implausible. My case holds, however, against that sort of anti-God as well as the malicious one. The variety of anti-Gods alerts us to the problem of positing any character to God, whether benign, indifferent, or malicious. There are many such character traits we could hypothesize. Why not a God who creates as a jest? Or a God who loves drama? Or a God who, adapting Haldane's quip, is fond of beetles? Or, more seriously, a God who just loves creating regardless of the joy or suffering of creatures?<ref>Forrest, P. (2012). Replying to the anti-god challenge: A god without moral character acts well. Religious Studies, 48(1), 35–43.</ref>}}

====Catholic Response====
The [[Catholic Church]] believes good things include power and knowledge, and that only the misuse of power and knowledge is evil. Consequently, the church believes God could not be evil or become evil if he is omnipotent and omniscient, since these qualities spring from omnibenevolence. As the [[Roman Catechism]] puts it:

{{blockquote|For by acknowledging God to be omnipotent, we also of necessity acknowledge Him to be omniscient, and to hold all things in subjection to His supreme authority and dominion. When we do not doubt that He is omnipotent, we must be also convinced of everything else regarding Him, the absence of which would render His omnipotence altogether unintelligible. Besides, nothing tends more to confirm our faith and animate our hope than a deep conviction that all things are possible to God; for whatever may be afterwards proposed as an object of faith, however great, however wonderful, however raised above the natural order, is easily and without hesitation believed, once the mind has grasped the knowledge of the omnipotence of God. Nay more, the greater the truths which the divine oracles announce, the more willingly does the mind deem them worthy of belief. And should we expect any favour from heaven, we are not discouraged by the greatness of the desired benefit, but are cheered and confirmed by frequently considering that there is nothing which an omnipotent God cannot effect.<ref>[https://www.saintsbooks.net/books/The%20Roman%20Catechism.pdf Roman Catechism: Why Omnipotence Alone Is Mentioned In The Creed]</ref>}}

===Disavowal of theodicy===
This position argues from a number of different directions that the theodicy project is objectionable. Toby Betenson writes that the central theme of all anti-theodicies is that: "Theodicies mediate a praxis that sanctions evil".<ref name="Betenson 2016">{{cite journal|last=Betenson|first=Toby|title=Anti-Theodicy|journal=Philosophy Compass| volume=11|issue=1| year=2016|pages=56–65| doi=10.1111/phc3.12289 |publisher=Wylie Online Library|url=https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/phc3.12289|url-access=subscription}}</ref> A theodicy may harmonize God with the existence of evil, but it can be said that it does so at the cost of nullifying morality. Most theodicies assume that whatever evil there is exists for the sake of some greater good. However, if that is so, then it appears humans have no duty to prevent it, for in preventing evil they would also prevent the greater good for which the evil is required. Even worse, it seems that any action can be rationalized, for if one succeeds in performing an evil act, then God has permitted it, and so it must be for the greater good. From this line of thought one may conclude that, as these conclusions violate humanity's basic moral intuitions, no greater good theodicy is true, and God does not exist. Alternatively, one may point out that greater good theodicies lead humanity to see every conceivable state of affairs as compatible with the existence of God, and in that case the notion of God's goodness is rendered meaningless.<ref>Dittman, Volker and Tremblay, François {{cite web|title=The Immorality of Theodicies
|url=http://www.strongatheism.net/library/atheology/immorality_of_theodicies/ |publisher=StrongAtheism.net |year=2004}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |last=Stretton|first=Dean|title=The Moral Argument from Evil|publisher=The Secular Web |year=1999 |url=http://infidels.org/library/modern/dean_stretton/mae.html |access-date=10 April 2014}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|last=Rachels|first=James|title=God and Moral Autonomy |year=1997 |url=http://infidels.org/library/modern/james_rachels/autonomy.html |access-date=10 April 2014}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|last=Bradley|first=Raymond|title=A Moral Argument for Atheism|publisher=The Secular Web |year=1999 |url=http://infidels.org/library/modern/raymond_bradley/moral.html |access-date=10 April 2014}}</ref>

Betenson also says there is a "rich theological tradition of anti-theodicy".<ref name="Betenson 2016"/> For many theists, there is no seamless theodicy that provides all answers, nor do 21st-century theologians think there should be. As Felix Christen, Fellow at Goethe University, Frankfurt, says, "When one considers human lives that have been shattered to the core, and, in the face of these tragedies [ask] the question 'Where is God?'{{nbsp}}[...] we would do well to stand with [poet and Holocaust survivor] [[Nelly Sachs]] as she says, 'We really don't know'."<ref name="Felix Christen">{{cite journal |last1=Felix Christen |first1=Felix Christen |title=Melancholy Hope: Friendship in Paul Celan's Letters |page=6 |citeseerx=10.1.1.546.7054 }}</ref> Contemporary theodiceans, such as [[Alvin Plantinga]], describe having doubts about the enterprise of theodicy "in the sense of providing an explanation of precise reasons why there is evil in the world". Plantinga's ultimate response to the problem of evil is that it is not a problem that can be solved. Christians simply cannot claim to know the answer to the "Why?" of evil. Plantinga stresses that this is why he does not proffer a theodicy but only a defense of the logic of theistic belief.<ref name="Self profile">{{cite book |last1=Plantinga |first1=Alvin |editor1-last=Tomberlin |editor1-first=H. |editor2-last=Tomberlin |editor2-first=James E. |editor3-last=van Inwagen |editor3-first=P. |title=Alvin Plantinga "Self Profile" |year=2012 |publisher=Springer Netherlands |isbn=9789400952232 |pages=33, 38}}</ref>{{rp|33}}

===Atheistic viewpoint===
From an atheistic viewpoint, the problem of evil is solved in accordance with the principle of [[Occam's razor]]: the existence of evil and suffering is reconciled with the assumption that an omnipotent, omnibenevolent, and omniscient God exists by assuming that no God exists.

[[David Hume]]'s formulation of the problem of evil in ''[[Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion]]'' is this:

{{blockquote|[God's] power we allow [is] infinite: Whatever he wills is executed: But neither man nor any other animal are happy: Therefore he does not will their happiness. His wisdom is infinite: He is never mistaken in choosing the means to any end: But the course of nature tends not to human or animal felicity: Therefore it is not established for that purpose. Through the whole compass of human knowledge, there are no inferences more certain and infallible than these. In what respect, then, do his benevolence and mercy resemble the benevolence and mercy of men?<ref>{{cite book |author=Hume, David |title=Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion |publisher=Project Gutenberg |url=https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/4583 |access-date=12 January 2012}}</ref>}}