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Protectionism
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=== United States === {{Main|Protectionism in the United States|Tariffs in United States history}} [[File:Droits de douane (France, UK, US).png|thumb|Tariff rates (France, UK, and US)]] [[File:Average Tariff Rates in USA (1821-2016).png|thumb|Average tariff rates in US (1821–2016)]] The [[United States]] has employed tariffs throughout much of its history. [[Alexander Hamilton]], the first [[United States Secretary of the Treasury]], supported tariffs at the country's inception in his 1791 [[Report on Manufactures]]. [[Abraham Lincoln]] signed the 1861 [[Morrill Tariff]] to raise revenue during the [[United States Civil War]]. In the early years of [[the Great Depression]], over the objection of many economists, Hoover signed the [[Smoot–Hawley Tariff Act]] into law in June 1930.{{sfn|Whyte 2017|pp=414–415}} According to economic historian [[Douglas Irwin]], a common myth about US trade policy is that low tariffs harmed American manufacturers in the early 19th century and then that high tariffs made the United States into a great industrial power in the late 19th century.<ref name=":5">{{Cite news|url=https://www.economist.com/news/books-and-arts/21731616-douglas-irwin-agrees-trade-policy-important-all-manner-powers-are-wrongly?fsrc=scn/tw/te/bl/ed/ahistorianonthemythsofamericantradescapegoatingtrade|title=A historian on the myths of American trade|newspaper=The Economist|access-date=26 November 2017|language=en}}</ref> A review by ''The Economist'' of Irwin's 2017 book ''Clashing over Commerce: A History of US Trade Policy'' states:<ref name=":5"/> <blockquote>Political dynamics would lead people to see a link between tariffs and the economic cycle that was not there. A boom would generate enough revenue for tariffs to fall, and when the bust came pressure would build to raise them again. By the time that happened, the economy would be recovering, giving the impression that tariff cuts caused the crash and the reverse generated the recovery. 'Mr. Irwin' also attempts to debunk the idea that protectionism made America a great industrial power, a notion believed by some to offer lessons for developing countries today. As its share of global manufacturing powered from 23% in 1870 to 36% in 1913, the admittedly high tariffs of the time came with a cost, estimated at around 0.5% of GDP in the mid-1870s. In some industries, they might have sped up development by a few years. But American growth during its protectionist period was more to do with its abundant resources and openness to people and ideas.</blockquote> According to Irwin, tariffs have served three primary purposes in the United States: "to raise revenue for the government, to restrict imports and protect domestic producers from foreign competition, and to reach reciprocity agreements that reduce trade barriers."<ref name=":02">{{Cite journal|last=Irwin|first=Douglas A.|date=2 August 2020|title=Trade Policy in American Economic History|url=https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev-economics-070119-024409|journal=Annual Review of Economics|language=en|volume=12|issue=1|pages=23–44|doi=10.1146/annurev-economics-070119-024409|s2cid=241740782|issn=1941-1383|url-access=subscription}}</ref> From 1790 to 1860, average tariffs increased from 20 percent to 60 percent before declining again to 20 percent.<ref name=":02" /> From 1861 to 1933, which Irwin characterizes as the "restriction period", the average tariffs increased to 50 percent and remained at that level for several decades. From 1934 onwards, which Irwin characterizes as the "reciprocity period", the average tariff declined substantially until it leveled off at 5 percent.<ref name=":02" /> Historian [[Paul Bairoch]] documented that the United States imposed among the highest rates in the world from around the founding of the country until the World War II period, describing the United States as "the mother country and bastion of modern protectionism" since the end of the 18th century and until the post-World War II period.<ref name="Paradoxes">{{cite book|title=Economics and World History: Myths and Paradoxes|author=Paul Bairoch|publisher=University of Chicago Press|year=1995|url=https://www.scribd.com/document/193124153/Economics-and-World-History-Myths-and-Paradoxes-Paul-Bairoch|pages=31–32|author-link=Paul Bairoch|access-date=16 August 2017|archive-date=12 October 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171012060209/https://www.scribd.com/document/193124153/Economics-and-World-History-Myths-and-Paradoxes-Paul-Bairoch|url-status=dead}}</ref> [[Alexander Hamilton]], the first [[United States Secretary of the Treasury]], was of the view, as articulated most famously in his "[[Report on Manufactures]]", that developing an [[industrialized economy]] was impossible without protectionism because import duties are necessary to shelter domestic "[[Infant industry argument|infant industries]]" until they could achieve [[economies of scale]].<ref>{{cite book|title=Economics and World History: Myths and Paradoxes|author=Paul Bairoch|publisher=University of Chicago Press|year=1995|page=33}}</ref> The industrial takeoff of the United States occurred under protectionist policies 1816–1848 and under moderate protectionism 1846–1861, and continued under strict protectionist policies 1861–1945.<ref>{{cite book|title=Economics and World History: Myths and Paradoxes|author=Paul Bairoch|publisher=University of Chicago Press|year=1995|page=34}}</ref> In the late 19th century, higher tariffs were introduced on the grounds that they were needed to protect American wages and to protect American farmers.<ref>{{cite book|title=Economics and World History: Myths and Paradoxes|author=Paul Bairoch|publisher=University of Chicago Press|year=1995|page=36}}</ref> Between 1824 and the 1940s, the U.S. imposed much higher average tariff rates on manufactured products than did Britain or any other European country, with the exception for a period of time of Spain and Russia.<ref>{{cite book|title=Economics and World History: Myths and Paradoxes|author=Paul Bairoch|publisher=University of Chicago Press|year=1995|pages=34, 40}}</ref> Until World War II, the United States maintained among the highest tariff rates globally.<ref name="MehrotraGuichard2020">{{cite book|author1=Santosh Mehrotra|author2=Sylvie Guichard|title=Planning in the 20th Century and Beyond: India's Planning Commission and the NITI Aayog|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=6xzhDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA285|date=2020|publisher=Cambridge University Press|isbn=978-1-108-49462-5|page=285|quote=Most importantly, the United States was the birthplace of the idea of infant industry protection, and indeed was the most heavily protected economy in the world for about a century, until the Second World War}}</ref> The Bush administration implemented [[2002 United States steel tariff|tariffs on Chinese steel in 2002]]; according to a 2005 review of existing research on the tariff, all studies found that the tariffs caused more harm than gains to the US economy and employment.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Read|first=Robert|date=1 August 2005|title=The Political Economy of Trade Protection: The Determinants and Welfare Impact of the 2002 US Emergency Steel Safeguard Measures|journal=World Economy|language=en|volume=28|issue=8|pages=1119–1137|doi=10.1111/j.1467-9701.2005.00722.x|s2cid=154520390|issn=1467-9701|url=http://www.lancaster.ac.uk/media/lancaster-university/content-assets/documents/lums/economics/working-papers/SteelSafeguard.pdf}}</ref> The Obama administration implemented tariffs on Chinese tires between 2009 and 2012 as an [[Dumping (pricing policy)|anti-dumping measure]]; a 2016 study found that these tariffs had no impact on employment and wages in the US tire industry.<ref>{{Cite journal|date=1 June 2016|title=Did China tire safeguard save U.S. workers?|journal=European Economic Review|language=en|volume=85|pages=22–38|doi=10.1016/j.euroecorev.2015.12.009|issn=0014-2921|last1=Chung|first1=Sunghoon|last2=Lee|first2=Joonhyung|last3=Osang|first3=Thomas|url=https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/59112/2/MPRA_paper_59112.pdf}}</ref> In 2018, EU Trade Commissioner [[Cecilia Malmström]] stated that the US was "playing a dangerous game" in applying tariffs on steel and aluminum imports from most countries and stated that she saw the Trump administration's decision to do so as both "pure protectionist" and "illegal".<ref>{{cite web|url=https://gulfnews.com/opinion/op-eds/why-american-allies-are-angry-1.2231528|title=Why American allies are angry|website=Gulfnews.com|date=4 June 2018 }}</ref> The [[First Trump tariffs|tariffs]] imposed by the [[First presidency of Donald Trump|first Trump administration]] during the [[China–United States trade war]] led to a reduction in the United States trade deficit with China.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5700.html|title=Foreign Trade – U.S. Trade with China|publisher=United States Census Bureau}}</ref> The [[Republican Party (United States)]], a [[conservatism in the United States|fiscally conservative]] political party, has historically often supported protectionism and currently does so.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.marketwatch.com/story/the-republicans-have-a-long-history-of-protectionism-2018-06-14|title=The Republicans have a long history of protectionism|website=MarketWatch|first1=Jeffrey|last1=Frankel|date=June 15, 2018}}</ref>
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