Editing Pseudoscience (section)

==Indicators of possible pseudoscience==
{{See also|List of topics characterized as pseudoscience}}
[[File:Rhustox.jpg|thumb|upright|Homeopathic preparation ''Rhus toxicodendron'', derived from [[Toxicodendron radicans|poison ivy]]]]
A topic, practice, or body of knowledge might reasonably be termed pseudoscientific when it is presented as consistent with the norms of scientific research, but it demonstrably fails to meet these norms.<ref name="Cover_Curd_1998">{{citation|veditors=Cover JA, Curd M|year=1998|title=Philosophy of Science: The Central Issues|pages=1–82}}</ref>{{sfnp|Bunge|1983b|p=}}

===Use of vague, exaggerated or untestable claims===
* Assertion of scientific claims that are vague rather than precise, and that lack specific measurements.{{sfnp|Gauch|2003|pp=211 ff|loc=(Probability, "Common Blunders")}}
* Assertion of a claim with little or no explanatory power.<ref name="Popper, Karl 1963"/>
* Failure to make use of [[operational definition]]s (i.e., publicly accessible definitions of the variables, terms, or objects of interest so that persons other than the definer can measure or test them independently){{refn|group=Note|'Most terms in theoretical physics, for example, do enjoy at least some distinct connections with observables, but not of the simple sort that would permit operational ''definitions'' in terms of these observables. [..] If a restriction in favor of operational definitions were to be followed, therefore, most of theoretical ''physics'' would have to be dismissed as meaningless pseudoscience!'<ref name="EUf6R">{{cite book|first=Paul Montgomery|last=Churchland|title=Matter and Consciousness: A Contemporary Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind|year=1999|publisher=MIT Press|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=_7CBvggqOE4C&q=%22operational+definitions.%22+pseudoscience&pg=PA90|page=90|isbn=978-0-262-53074-3|access-date=7 November 2020|archive-date=16 July 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210716200304/https://books.google.com/books?id=_7CBvggqOE4C&q=%22operational+definitions.%22+pseudoscience&pg=PA90|url-status=live}}</ref>}} (See also: [[Reproducibility]]).
* Failure to make reasonable use of the principle of [[Occam's razor|parsimony]], i.e., failing to seek an explanation that requires the fewest possible additional assumptions when multiple viable explanations are possible (''See: [[Occam's razor]]'').{{sfnp|Gauch|2003|pp=269 ff|loc="Parsimony and Efficiency"}}
* Lack of boundary conditions: Most well-supported scientific theories possess well-articulated limitations under which the predicted phenomena do and do not apply.<ref name="Hines1988"/>
* Lack of effective [[Scientific control|controls]] in experimental design, such as the use of [[placebos]] and [[double-blinding]].
* Lack of understanding of basic and established principles of physics and engineering.<ref name="OsPUp">{{cite web|author=Donald E. Simanek|url=http://www.lhup.edu/~dsimanek/pseudo/scipseud.htm|title=What is science? What is pseudoscience?|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090425202814/http://www.lhup.edu/~dsimanek/pseudo/scipseud.htm|archive-date=25 April 2009}}</ref>

===Improper collection of evidence===
* Assertions that do not allow the logical possibility that they can be shown to be false by observation or physical experiment (See also: [[Falsifiability]]).<ref name="Popper"/><ref name="Lakatos_1970">{{cite book|vauthors=Lakatos I|year=1970|chapter=Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes|veditors=Lakatos I, Musgrave A|title=Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge|pages=91–195}}</ref>
* Assertion of claims that a theory predicts something that it has not been shown to predict.{{sfnp|Gauch|2003|pp=178 ff|loc=(Deductive Logic, "Fallacies")}}{{sfnp|Gauch|2003|pp=211 ff|loc=(Probability, "Common Blunders")}} Scientific claims that do not confer any predictive power are considered at best "conjectures", or at worst "pseudoscience" (e.g., ''[[ignoratio elenchi]]'').<ref name="Vtd7w">''Macmillan Encyclopedia of Philosophy'' Vol. 3, "Fallacies" 174 ff, esp. section on "Ignoratio elenchi"</ref>
* Assertion that claims which have not been proven false must therefore be true, and vice versa (''See: [[Argument from ignorance]]'').<ref name="T3iJ6">''Macmillan Encyclopedia of Philosophy'' Vol 3, "Fallacies" 174 ff esp. 177–178</ref>
* Over-reliance on testimonial, [[anecdotal evidence]], or personal experience: This evidence may be useful for the context of discovery (i.e., hypothesis generation), but should not be used in the context of [[Theory of justification|justification]] (e.g., [[statistical hypothesis testing]]).{{sfnp|Bunge|1983a|p=381}}
* Use of [[myth]]s and [[religious text]]s as if they were fact, or basing evidence on readings of such texts.<ref name="coker">{{cite web |author1=Rory Coker |title=Science versus Pseudoscience |url=https://web2.ph.utexas.edu/~coker2/index.files/distinguish.htm |website=web2.ph.utexas.edu |access-date=1 March 2022 |archive-date=1 March 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220301104806/https://web2.ph.utexas.edu/~coker2/index.files/distinguish.htm |url-status=live }}</ref>
* Use of concepts and scenarios from [[science fiction]] as if they were fact. This technique appeals to the familiarity that many people already have with science fiction tropes through the popular media.<ref name="cokerSF">{{cite web |author1=Rory Coker |title=SF in pseudoscience |url=https://web2.ph.utexas.edu/~coker2/index.files/sfandps.shtml |website=web2.ph.utexas.edu |access-date=1 March 2022 |archive-date=27 June 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220627154318/https://web2.ph.utexas.edu/~coker2/index.files/sfandps.shtml |url-status=live }}</ref>
* Presentation of data that seems to support claims while suppressing or refusing to consider data that conflict with those claims.{{sfnp|Thagard|1978|pp=227–228}} This is an example of [[selection bias]] or [[cherry picking]], a distortion of evidence or data that arises from the way that the data are collected. It is sometimes referred to as the selection effect.
* Repeating excessive or untested claims that have been previously published elsewhere, and promoting those claims as if they were facts; an accumulation of such uncritical secondary reports, which do not otherwise contribute their own empirical investigation, is called the [[Woozle effect]].<ref name="Gambrill2012">{{cite book|author=Eileen Gambrill|title=Critical Thinking in Clinical Practice: Improving the Quality of Judgments and Decisions|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=NsuHtwciwQwC&pg=PA109|date=1 May 2012|publisher=John Wiley & Sons|isbn=978-0-470-90438-1|page=109|edition=3rd|access-date=25 October 2015|archive-date=22 December 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191222023232/https://books.google.com/books?id=NsuHtwciwQwC&pg=PA109|url-status=live}}</ref>
* [[Evidence of absence|Reversed burden of proof]]: science places the burden of proof on those making a claim, not on the critic. "Pseudoscientific" arguments may neglect this principle and demand that [[skeptic]]s demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that a claim (e.g., an assertion regarding the efficacy of a novel therapeutic technique) is false. It is essentially impossible to prove a universal negative, so this tactic incorrectly places the burden of proof on the skeptic rather than on the claimant.<ref name="Lilienfeld">Lilienfeld SO (2004). ''Science and Pseudoscience in Clinical Psychology'' Guildford Press {{ISBN|1-59385-070-0}}</ref>
* Appeals to [[holism]] as opposed to [[reductionism]] to dismiss negative findings: proponents of pseudoscientific claims, especially in organic medicine, alternative medicine, naturopathy and mental health, often resort to the "mantra of holism" .{{sfnp|Ruscio|2002}}

===Lack of openness to testing by other experts===
* Evasion of peer review before publicizing results (termed "[[science by press conference]]"):<ref name="Lilienfeld"/><ref name="58lDT">{{cite journal|vauthors=Gitanjali B|title=Peer review – process, perspectives and the path ahead|journal=Journal of Postgraduate Medicine|volume=47|issue=3|pages=210–14|year=2001|pmid=11832629|url=http://www.senseaboutscience.org.uk/PDF/peerReview.pdf|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060623193431/http://www.senseaboutscience.org.uk/PDF/PeerReview.pdf|url-status=dead|archive-date=23 June 2006}}</ref>{{refn|group=Note|For an opposing perspective, e.g. [http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/sts/bmartin/dissent/documents/ss/ss5.html Chapter 5 of Suppression Stories by Brian Martin] (Wollongong: Fund for Intellectual Dissent, 1997), pp. 69–83.}} Some proponents of ideas that contradict accepted scientific theories avoid subjecting their ideas to [[peer review]], sometimes on the grounds that peer review is biased towards established paradigms, and sometimes on the grounds that assertions cannot be evaluated adequately using standard scientific methods. By remaining insulated from the peer review process, these proponents forgo the opportunity of corrective feedback from informed colleagues.{{sfnp|Ruscio|2002}}
* Some agencies, institutions, and publications that fund scientific research require authors to [[Data sharing (Science)|share data]] so others can evaluate a paper independently. Failure to provide adequate information for other researchers to reproduce the claims contributes to a lack of openness.{{sfnp|Gauch|2003|pp=124 ff}}
* Appealing to the need for secrecy or proprietary knowledge when an [[independent review]] of data or methodology is requested.{{sfnp|Gauch|2003|pp=124 ff}}
* Substantive debate on the evidence by knowledgeable proponents of all viewpoints is not encouraged.{{sfnp|Sagan|1994|p=210}}

===Absence of progress===
* Failure to progress towards additional evidence of its claims.<ref name="Lakatos_1970"/>{{refn|name=fredb|group=Note|"We can now propose the following principle of demarcation: A theory or discipline which purports to be scientific is pseudoscientific if and only if: it has been less progressive than alternative theories over a long period of time, and faces many unsolved problems; but the community of practitioners makes little attempt to develop the theory towards solutions of the problems, shows no concern for attempts to evaluate the theory in relation to others, and is selective in considering confirmations and non confirmations."{{sfnp|Thagard|1978|pp=227–228}}}} [[Terence Hines]] has identified astrology as a subject that has changed very little in the past two millennia.{{sfnp|Thagard|1978|pp=223 ff}}<ref name="Hines1988">{{cite book|author-link=Terence Hines |last=Hines|first=Terence|year=1988|title=Pseudoscience and the Paranormal: A Critical Examination of the Evidence |publisher=Prometheus Books|location=Buffalo, NY|isbn=978-0-87975-419-8 |url=https://archive.org/details/pseudosciencepar00hine}}</ref>
* Lack of self-correction: scientific research programmes make mistakes, but they tend to reduce these errors over time.{{sfnp|Ruscio|2002|p=120}} By contrast, ideas may be regarded as pseudoscientific because they have remained unaltered despite contradictory evidence. The work ''Scientists Confront Velikovsky'' (1976) Cornell University, also delves into these features in some detail, as does the work of [[Thomas Kuhn]], e.g., ''The Structure of Scientific Revolutions'' (1962) which also discusses some of the items on the list of characteristics of pseudoscience.
* Statistical significance of supporting experimental results does not improve over time and are usually close to the cutoff for statistical significance. Normally, experimental techniques improve or the experiments are repeated, and this gives ever stronger evidence. If statistical significance does not improve, this typically shows the experiments have just been repeated until a success occurs due to chance variations.

===Personalization of issues===
* Tight social groups and [[authoritarian personality]], [[suppression of dissent]] and [[groupthink]] can enhance the adoption of beliefs that have no rational basis. In attempting to confirm their beliefs, the group tends to identify their critics as enemies.{{sfnp|Devilly|2005}}
* Assertion of a conspiracy on the part of the mainstream scientific community, government, or educational facilities to suppress pseudoscientific information. People who make these accusations often compare themselves to [[Galileo Galilei]] and his persecution by the Roman Catholic Church; this comparison is commonly known as the [[Galileo gambit]].<ref>{{cite web | url=http://www.indiana.edu/~c228/Fallacies.pdf | title=Recognizing Microstructural Fallacies | access-date=24 March 2014 | author=Amsden, Brian | pages=22 | archive-date=12 July 2019 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190712055955/http://www.indiana.edu/~c228/Fallacies.pdf | url-status=dead }}</ref>
* Attacking the motives, character, morality, or competence of critics, rather than their arguments (see ''[[ad hominem]]''){{sfnp|Devilly|2005}}<ref>{{cite web|url=http://philosophy.lander.edu/logic/person.html|title=Ad Hominem and Related Fallacies|website=philosophy.lander.edu|access-date=30 August 2022|archive-date=4 December 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201204164205/http://philosophy.lander.edu/logic/person.html|url-status=live}}</ref>

===Use of misleading language===
* Creating scientific-sounding terms to persuade non-experts to believe statements that may be false or meaningless: for example, a long-standing hoax refers to water by the rarely used formal name "[[Dihydrogen monoxide parody|dihydrogen monoxide]]" and describes it as the main constituent in most [[poison]]ous solutions to show how easily the general public can be misled.
* Using established terms in idiosyncratic ways, thereby demonstrating unfamiliarity with mainstream work in the discipline.